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ABSTRACT 
One of the impacts of globalization on the nation states across the globe is 
how the system reduces governmental intervention and weakens 
governmental control over many activities within a state’s territory. From the 
governance perspective, states regulate and administer affairs within their 
territories in accordance with their constitutional mandates of satisfying 
fundamental objectives of their needs; the extent to which states can satisfy 
those needs is critically dependent on their ability to pursue public interest 
oriented policies for meeting the basic needs and for further development of 
its citizens i.e. for the public good. However, as the tasks of states entail 
regulation and administration for public purpose, it carries the risk of 
infringement of private interest or unfair treatment against private entities 
operating within the state. The complex nature of the investor - state 
relationship, therefore, provides a lush ground for tension and conflict 
between public and private interests. Private interests in this context, are the 
state’s commitments to the foreign investors covered by investment treaty 
jurisprudence, while public interests are the domestic needs regarding public 
good also linked to compliance with other non-investment albeit international 
obligations.  
 
Under various domestic legal orders and some international law regimes, 
there is a well-developed principle of legitimate expectations which allows 
courts and domestic tribunals to filter, both, the legitimacy of individual’s 
expectations and public interest dimension of governmental activities. In 
investment treaty arbitration, however, this tool or mechanism is lacking. The 
practice of the investment treaty (ad hoc) tribunals reveals the worrying 
degree of inconsistency and lack of coherence in the analysis of formulation 
and application of the principle of legitimate expectations. The principle as 
applied by investment treaty tribunals can be understood as “reliance by 
foreign investor” caused by “a state through its representation, conduct, or 
established legal framework”, pursuant to which the foreign investor suffers 
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damage or loss emanating from the state’s regulatory or administrative 
measure. While Claimants in investment treaty arbitration are increasingly 
relying on the principle to frame their claims, its contours remain unsettled. In 
addition to the varying degrees of ambiguity in the formulation of the 
principle, the reach of its application raises the tension of overlap with a 
public interest dimension of the state’s regulatory and administrative 
functions, particularly in the areas of human rights, public health, 
environment, and necessity measures or public choice.  
 
This thesis uses the doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’ as an analytical 
framework for a comparative approach methodology. The doctrine of margin 
of appreciation as a public law tool could serve as a lens through which 
investment treaty tribunals could both formulate and apply the principle of 
legitimate expectations without obscuring the regulatory and administrative 
functions of states.  
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Chapter I: Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The 
Quest for Balancing 
 
 
 
1.0  Background 
The impact of globalisation on states and the emergence of international law 
rules have diluted the concept of state sovereignty from absolute control by 
states over activities within their territory to an international scrutiny through 
the instrumentality of international regulations.1 This impact reduces 
governmental intervention and weakens governmental control over activities 
within territories of states.2 One of the factors responsible for this changing 
nature in domestic administration is the expansion of economic activities 
from purely domestic boundaries regulated by domestic laws to transnational 
coverage. From the governance perspective, states regulate and administer 
affairs within their territories in accordance with their constitutional 
mandates of satisfying fundamental objectives of their needs; the extent to 
which states can satisfy those needs depends largely on their ability to pursue 
                                                 
1 Jack Goldsmith, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law’ (1999) 
52 Stanford Law Review 959 For a contrary view see:; Duncan Hollis, ‘Private Actors in 
Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty’ 
(2002) 25 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 235 In SS Wimbledon 
the PCIJ appear to endorse the contrary view. According to the Court: ‘…The Court declines 
to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from 
performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any Convention 
creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign 
rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the 
right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.’ See: ; SS 
Wimbledon (Merits) [1923] Ser No 1 (PCIJ) 25. 
2 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Erosion of State Authority And Its Implications For Equitable 
Development’, International Economic Law With a Human Face (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1998) 31; On the impact of globalization on states see: Peter Malanczuk, ‘Globalization And 
The Future Role of Sovereign States’, International Economic Law With a Human Face (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 45–65. 
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public interest oriented policies for the successful delivery of the common 
good to their citizens. However, as the task of governance entails 
administration for public purpose, there is a risk of infringement of private 
interest or unfair treatment against private entities by states. The complex 
nature of an investor - state relationship further provides a lush ground for a 
flame of conflicts between public and private interest. Private interests in the 
context of International Investment Law connotes the interest of the foreign 
investors  as covered by investment treaties, while public interests are 
domestic or host state interests most often, tailored towards discharging 
public goods3 or compliance with other non-investment4 albeit international 
obligations.5 Thus, the need to strike a fair balance between public and private 
                                                 
3 On the relevance of public goods in the context of investment arbitration see: Francesco 
Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law’ (2009) 20 
European Journal of International Law 729 See also; Graham Mayeda, ‘International 
Investment Agreements between Developed and Developing Countries: Dancing with the 
Devil - Case Comment on the Vivendi Sempra and Enron Awards’ (2008) 4 McGill 
International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 189, 189. 
4 Areas seemingly conflicting or raising tension with investment treaty regime includes 
environmental regulations, human rights, public health regulations and tax regulations. On 
the environmental dimension see; Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental 
Regulation, Investment Protection and “Regulatory Taking” in International Law’ (2001) 50 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 811 On Human rights interaction see;; On 
human rights interaction see; Moshe Hirsch, ‘Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: 
Divergent Paths’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Francesco Francioni 
(eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 
2009) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578184.001.0001/ac
prof-9780199578184-chapter-5> accessed 8 December 2014; On public health interaction 
Valentina Sara Vadi, ‘Reconciling Public Health and Investor Rights: The Case of Tobacco’ in 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Francesco Francioni (eds), Human Rights in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578184.001.0001/ac
prof-9780199578184-chapter-19> accessed 8 December 2014; On tax regulation see; Abba Kolo, 
‘Tax Veto as a Special Jurisdictional and Substantive Issue in Investor-State Arbitration: Need 
for Reassessment’ (2008) 32 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 475. 
5 Moshe Hirsch, ‘Interactions between Investment and Non-Investment Obligations in 
International Investment Law’ (Social Science Research Network 2006) SSRN Scholarly Paper 
ID 947430 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=947430> accessed 8 December 2014. 
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interest becomes pertinent. One way of striking such a balance by courts and 
tribunals is by applying the principle of legitimate expectations. 
 
Under various domestic legal orders, there is a well-developed principle of 
legitimate expectations, which allows the courts and domestic tribunals to 
supervise, filter and control governmental activities.6 The principle is situated 
mainly in the domain of administrative law,7 through the instrumentality of 
‘reciprocal trust between citizens and their authorities’.8 Hence, this 
relationship between an individual and state transforms into a protected legal 
obligation. The content of this protection under domestic law entails that an 
individual is entitled to reasonably rely on the state of affairs created by 
public bodies. Individuals are not to be taken unawares through 
administrative or public actions or conducts. Similarly, official or public 
representations or conduct may legally generate individual’s expectations 
regarding the position of affairs thereby becoming a basis for reliance. The 
scope of the principle, though it varies from one jurisdiction to another, is 
well documented in European administrative law.9 Similarly, the principle is 
                                                 
6 Robert Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Hart 
Publishing 2000) 1. 
7 Prof A Bradley and Prof K Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (15 edition, 
Longman 2010) 753; See also Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, 
International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (OUP Oxford 2008) 234; See also 
International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation  v United Mexican States (NAFTA ‘Uncitral’) 
[paras 25–29] Walde traces the origin of legitimate expectations under the ‘good faith 
principle of treaty interpretation’, Administrative law, Comparative Contract Law, and 
International Economic Law, particularly WTO Jurisprudence. . 
8 Daphne Barak-Erez, ‘The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations and the Distinction between 
the Reliance and Expectation Interests’ (2005) 11 European Public Law 583, 6. 
9 For a comparative study of common law and civil law origins see; Thomas (n 6); See also; 
Soren Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (OUP Oxford 2000); The origin 
of legitimate expectations under english law is linked to the ‘principle of Wednesbury 
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closely related with the private law principle of estoppel under English law 
which connotes that in business and commercial transactions private entities 
can hold each other to their representations provided there is reasonable 
reliance.10  Thus, the idea of predictability, coherence and certainty are clearly 
at the heart of the shared conceptions of both public and private law 
dimensions of legitimate expectations. Legal certainty as a principle of law 
implies that, while placing their reliance on administrative representations or 
conduct, private persons should be able to plan their routine activities, 11 and 
Law should thwart against disruption of such plans except where there are 
compelling legitimate reasons. 
 
However, under International Law, the grounding of the principle of 
legitimate expectations is not solid and coherently formulated and applied 
like domestic legal systems.  Perhaps, the principle has been invoked and 
endorsed by PCIJ, ICJ, WTO12, ECJ, ECtHR and Investment Treaty Tribunals. 
Indeed, the transnational nature of the relationship between foreign investors 
and host countries makes the conception of investor’s legitimate expectations 
                                                                                                                                            
reasobaleness’ See Associated Provincial Picture Houses V Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 
223; Lord further expantiated on ‘Wednesbury principle’. See; Council of Civil Service Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; For a detailed discussion on the administrative law 
origin of the principle, see; SAD Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th Revised 
edition, Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 611–650. 
10 Under English law, abuse of power being the outcome of violation both public law 
legitimate expectations and private law estoppel has been identified as the common feature 
shared by both principles. As held by House of Lords per Lord Hoffman: ‘ There is of course 
an analogy between a private law estoppel and the public law concepts of a legitimate 
expectation created by a public authority, the denial of which may amount to an abuse of 
power…’ See: R (Reprotech (pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex County Council (2003) 1 WLR 348 [para 
34]. 
11 Schønberg (n 9) 68. 
12 Marion Panizzon, ‘Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation, and Fair Dispute Settlement’ (Hart ; Schultsess 2006). 
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a key factor. This is particularly so for determining less clear standards of 
treatment that ought to be accorded to foreign investors pursuant to 
international investment treaties.  
 
Historically, there were attempts by states to produce a global treaty 
regulating International Investment Law.13 Due to the complex nature of 
investor-state relationship, the multilateral efforts proved abortive and states 
resorted to bilateral investment treaties which currently regulate transnational 
investments.14 Bilateral investment treaties are species of the international 
ordering structure regulating investment. Most investment treaties provide 
for the obligation of state parties to treat foreign investors and their 
investments fairly and equitably. The scope of fair and equitable treatment 
has been interpreted to substantially, include the protection of legitimate 
expectations of the foreign investor.15 Both the treatment and the 
interpretation of legitimate expectations remain vague and unclear.16 
Although, investment treaty tribunals are constantly invoking the principle, it 
is yet not clear when governmental actions and conduct can be said to have 
galvanised investor’s legitimate expectations, and when same expectations 
can be said to have been breached by the state. Moreover, the term legitimate 
                                                 
13 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3 edition, Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 257–275. 
14 Sornarajah (n 13). 
15 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic   Partial Award (Watts, Fortier, 
Behrens) (PCA (UNCITRAL)) [302]. 
16 Sornarajah (n 13) 354–357; Peter D Cameron, International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit 
of Stability (OUP Oxford 2010) 171; For detailed criticism, see; Abhijit PG Pandya and Andy 
Moody, ‘Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration: An Unclear Future’ (2010) 
15 Tilburg Law Review 93; Trevor Zeyl, ‘Charting the Wrong Course: The Doctrine of 
Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law’ (2011) 49 Alberta Law Review 203. 
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expectations is neither mentioned nor defined in most of the bilateral 
investment treaties. Therefore, the reference to legitimate expectation in 
investment treaty text is a recent practice, mostly contained in the United 
States 2004 model BITs and Canadian model BITs.17 Therefore, the 
interpretation and its content are left at the hands of investment treaty 
tribunals.  
 
In broader terms, legitimate expectations under public international law refer 
to reliance of states on each other pursuant to a previous assurance or 
behaviour of another state.18 In the European community law perspective, it 
refers to predictable treatment in the application of law by government upon 
which an economic agent relies.19  In investment treaty arbitration, flowing 
from the above perspectives, the principle can be understood as reliance by 
foreign investor, caused by a state through actual representation, conduct or 
established legal framework, pursuant to which the foreign investor suffers 
damage or loss emanating from a negative measure by the state. In practical 
terms, two scenarios are envisaged namely, assurance scenario and legal 
framework scenario. Assurance scenario takes the form of a specific 
representation or conduct by the state, like state’s unilateral undertakings to 
                                                 
17 The Unites States Model BITs and Canadian Model BITs explicitly provides for 
‘investment-backed expectations’ in the context of expropriation. See: Annex B of US Model 
BIT 2004 , and Annex B 13 (1) of Canadian Model BIT. For criticism of US Model BITs See; 
Stephen M Schwebel, ‘The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise 
in the Regressive Development of International Law’, Justice in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2011) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793912.014>. 
18 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 1999) 107. 
19 Eleanor Sharpston, ‘Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality’ (1990) 15 European 
Law Review 103, 2. 
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the foreign investor,20 while legal framework scenario could emanate from 
overall legal and regulatory framework set up by the host state at the time the 
foreign investor is making its investment.21 The sources of legitimate 
expectations include investment treaties, state laws and regulations, policies, 
contracts, official communications, behaviour of the state or its regulatory 
organs. The following illustrates the chain of legitimate expectations. 
 
 
 
 
There are two conflicting views between foreign investors and host states 
surrounding arbitrating legitimate expectations.  From the foreign investor’s 
perspective, states are bound to honour their treaty obligations, uphold the 
principle of sanctity of agreements under international law and fulfil 
investment backed expectations.22 From the host states perspective, investors 
                                                 
20 W Michael Reisman and Mahnoush H Arsanjani, ‘The Question of Unilateral Governmental 
Statements as Applicable Law in Investment Disputes’ (2004) 19 ICSID Review 328, 328. 
21 Andrew Newcombe, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer 
Law International 2009) 279–289; Peter D Cameron, ‘Stability of Contract in the International 
Energy Industry’ (2009) 27 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 305, 326; Schreuer 
C. and Kriebaum U, ‘At What Time Must Legitimate Expectation Exist?’, A liber amicorum : 
Thomas Wälde: law beyond conventional thought (Cameron May 2009). 
22 This view represents Claimants arguments in all arbitrations where legitimate expectations 
is sought to be arbitrated. The legal ground in support of claimant’s perspective is the 
provision of fair and equitable treatment which includes investor’s legitimate expectations 
under the relevant BIT, and the law of the host state pursuant to which the claimant acquires 
legal right. See for instance; Glamis Gold v USA (NAFTA ‘UNCITRAL RULES’) [paras 561–
565]; For a wider perspective of foreign investor’s approach see; Gus Van Harten, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 136–143. 
Representation or legal 
framework 
Reliance 
Frustration Damage/Loss 
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must conduct their due diligence, particularly when socio-economic activities 
are inherently ever-changing, thus, regulatory and policy changes are 
inevitable in domestic public administration.23 The two divergent views 
represent the input that goes to investment treaty tribunals. The output is 
what gives birth to the research problem.  
 
1.1  Research Problem 
Two essential problems have been identified as follows: 
a. Uncertainty in the formulation of legitimate expectations by the 
investment treaty tribunals. 
b. Lack of clarity in the application of legitimate expectations in 
investment treaty arbitration arising from overlap between investor’s 
legitimate expectations and state’s legitimate regulatory function. 
 
Apart from the obligation to treat foreign investors fairly and equitably 
contained in most investment treaties, a step further towards fulfilling 
investor’s expectations is blurred with unclear formulations and inconsistent 
applications. Should the expectations test be subjective or objective? While 
protection of legitimate expectations is desirable should the interpretative 
emphasis be on the investor’s belief or on an autonomous test. More 
                                                 
23 This view represents Respondents positions in most of the arbitrations. The backing for the 
Respondents perspective, apart from disputing the existence of the obligation to fulfill 
investor’s legitimate expectations totally, takes the form of relying on the treaty exceptions 
provided for in the treaties. See Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic   
Partial Award (Watts, Fortier, Behrens) (n 15) [para 255]; Parkerings-Companiet AS v Republic of 
Lithuania ICSID Case NoARB/05/8 (ICSID) [para 303]; For a detailed host states perspective, 
see; Vicente Yu and Fiona Marshal, ‘Investors’ Obligations and Host State Policy Space’ 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2008). 
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debatable recently, is whether regulatory framework should form part of 
foreign investor’s legitimate expectations. There are no clear-cut answers to 
these questions. The outcome of the investment treaty tribunals’ analysis of 
legitimate expectations further added to the uncertainty and lack of clarity in 
the jurisprudence. The uncertainty regarding the formulation of investor’s 
legitimate expectations and lack of clarity in the application have been 
identified as the two key problems surrounding the investment treaty 
jurisprudence of legitimate expectations. Regarding the first problem of 
uncertainty of formulation of legitimate expectations, the tribunals have 
swayed between broad and narrow approaches. While some tribunals 
formulated the principle in a broader way, some tribunals formulated it in a 
narrower way. For example, in Tecmed v Mexico the tribunal undoubtedly 
formulated the principle in a broader way that:   
‘The foreign investor expects the host state to act in a consistent manner, free 
from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign 
investor, so that it may know beforehand  any and all rules and regulations 
that will govern its investments…”24 
 
A much narrower approach was however adopted in Saluka v Czech 
Republic. In the words of the tribunal: 
 
“…No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at 
the time the investment is made remain totally unchanged. In order to 
determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s expectations was 
                                                 
24 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v The United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB 
(AF)/00/2 (ICSID) [154] After Tecmed award many arbitral tribunals adopted directly or 
indirectly the tecmed broader notion of protection of investor’s legitimate expectations. See 
for instance:; CMS v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/8,; LG & E v Argentina ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/1. 
17 
 
justified and reasonable, the host state’s legitimate right subsequently to 
regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into 
consideration as well…”25 
 
Of recent, the coverage of investor’s legitimate expectations to include 
predictable legal framework was completely rejected by Continental 
Casualty v Argentina.26 In the tribunal’s view, even where there is promise as 
to stability by the host state, it would be unconscionable to expect the host 
state not to change the legal framework in cases of need.27  
 
Secondly, the problem of incoherence in the application of legitimate 
expectations is clearly manifest in the arbitral awards due to the absence of 
systematic approach in applying the principle. For instance, In International 
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation V United Mexican States28 while the 
tribunal was unanimous on the recognition of principle of legitimate 
expectations as part of fair and equitable treatment standard, they could not 
unanimously agree on its application to the case. In the wordings of the 
tribunal: 
                                                 
25 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic   Partial Award (Watts, Fortier, 
Behrens) (n 15) [305]; The tribunal is Methanex while rejecting Claimant’s case asserts that 
knowledge of instability in a sector or economy could disentitle the foreign investor from 
alleging violation of legitimate expectations pursuant to stable framework. See Methanex 
Corporation v USA (NAFTA ‘UNCITRAL 1976’) Part iv Ch. D p. 5; Other tribunals that 
adopted narrower conception of legitimate expectations includes; Glamis Gold v USA (n 22); 
PSEG Global Inc &Anor v Republic of Turkey ICSID Case NoARB/02/5 (ICSID); Parkerings-
Companiet AS v Republic of Lithuania ICSID Case No.ARB/05/8 (n 23). 
26 Continental Casualty v Argentina Case NoARB/03/9 (ICSID). 
27 Ibid para 258; See also Glamis Gold v USA (n 22) [620] Where the tribunal stresses on the 
speficity of an assurance or commitment before it can be accepted as capable of inducing 
expectations. 
28 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v United Mexican States Mexico (NAFTA 
‘Uncitral’). 
18 
 
‘The threshold for legitimate expectations may vary depending on the nature 
of the violation alleged under the Nafta and the circumstances of the case. 
Whatever standard is applied in the present case however-be it broadest or the 
narrowest – the tribunal does not find that the officio generated a legitimate 
expectation upon which EDM could reasonably rely in operating its machines 
in Mexico.’29  
 
The above reasoning led to separate opinion of Professor Thomas Walde. In 
his separate opinion while highlighting the differences with the majority view 
stated thus: 
 
“…They imply a very high level of due diligence, of knowledge of local 
conditions and government risk to be taken by the investor. I rather see the 
government as responsible for the message conveyed: i.e. how such conduct 
was reasonably understood by the investor…”30 
 
Therefore, the cumulative effect of general inconsistency and lack of clarity in 
the overall investment treaty regime attracts criticism of many awards 
particularly the Argentinean31 cases for lack coherent reasoning and 
contradictory findings. For the purpose of this research, the two problems 
identified represent the output of the two conflicting arguments between 
foreign investors and host states in investment treaty tribunals. The problem 
further illustrates the current state of the jurisprudence under investment 
treaty tribunals.    From a practical viewpoint, inconsistent and unpredictable 
                                                 
29 Ibid 148. 
30 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation  v. United Mexican States (n 7) [para 6]. 
31 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still Wait 
for a Payout’ <http://justinvestment.org/2009/07/argentine-crisis-arbitration-awards-pile-
up-but-investors-still-wait-for-a-payout/>; For a detailed analysis of the Argentinian cases, 
see; Jose Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A 
Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime’, Yearbook on International Investment Law & 
Policy 2008-2009 edited by Karl P. Sauvant (OUP USA 2009); Jürgen Kurtz, ‘ADJUDGING THE 
EXCEPTIONAL AT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: SECURITY, PUBLIC ORDER 
AND FINANCIAL CRISIS’ (2010) 59 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 325. 
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legal outcomes are incongruous to investment treaty jurisprudence as they 
will compound the already fragmented interpretations in the area. The few 
arbitral awards highlighted showed how arbitral tribunals have swayed 
between applying different approaches to interpret governmental 
actions/conduct and further determine whether investor’s expectations have 
been breached. Perhaps, one may add here some of the disadvantages or 
problems of such an approach includes uncertainty in the law; accusation of 
tribunals applying the concept of legitimate expectations to justify personal 
interpretative preferences;32 and threatening the legitimacy of the system.33 
 
1.2   Research Question 
The research seeks to determine how investment arbitration could balance the 
protection of investor’s legitimate expectations with state’s legitimate 
regulatory functions. Therefore the main research question is as follows: 
 
                                                 
32 In 2009 a group of renowned academics of Public International Law including Sornarajah, 
Van Harten and Muchlinski etc issued a statement on the investment regime alluding to some 
of the problems identified herein. see; ‘Public Statement on the International Investment 
Regime’ (2011) 8 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1657> accessed 11 December 2014. 
33 On legitimacy crisis, see; M Sornarajah, ‘A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’, Karl Sauvant ed., Appeals Mechanism in International Investment 
Disputes (Oxford University Press 2008) 39; ‘The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication 
System’ (2003) 19 Arbitration International 415; Susan D Franck, ‘Legitimacy Crisis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Publlic International Law through Inconsistent 
Decisions, The’ (2004) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521, 1521–1625; Noemi Gal-Or, ‘Investor and 
Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New Interpretation in the Legitimacy 
Debate, The’ (2008) 32 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 271, 271–302; Christopher M Ryan, 
‘Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of International 
Investment Law’ (2008) 29 University of Pennsylvania journal of international law 725, 725–
761. 
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‘How can investment treaty tribunals formulate and apply the  
principle of legitimate expectations taking into account the state’s 
legitimate regulatory and administrative functions?’ 
 
In trying to answer the main question, the following sub questions emerge as 
follows: 
 
- What are the criteria for determining legitimate expectations in 
investment treaty arbitration? 
- What are the factors to be considered in the determination of host 
state’s legitimate regulatory functions? 
 
The main line of argument in answering the questions stems from the role of 
margin of appreciation in defining the contours of legitimate expectations in 
International Investment Law, and the need for balancing between investor’s 
private interest and state’s public interest. The thesis will therefore engage in 
a triangular discourse between the foreign investors, host states and 
investment treaty tribunals, and explore how the jurisprudence of  ICJ, WTO, 
ECJ, ECtHR, IACHR, and ACHPR can help in balancing between investor’s 
legitimate expectations and state’s legitimate regulatory and administrative 
functions. 
 
 
1.3 Aims of the Research 
There are two broad aims intended to be achieved by this research, namely; 
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• To conduct a comprehensive research on legitimate expectations in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration - Gap filling. 
• To provide framework criteria for resolving the tension/conflict 
between foreign investor’s expectations and state’s legitimate 
administration in public interest – balancing overlap by suggesting a 
benchmark/criteria for determining when LE might be constituted and/or 
breached. 
 
There is no comprehensive study of legitimate expectations under investment 
treaty arbitration.34 The aim, therefore, is to fill this gap by conducting a 
comprehensive study of legitimate expectations in this area. The research 
would inquire deeply into the constituents of legitimate expectations, sources 
of the expectations, basis upon which expectations could be relied upon, and 
measures constituting frustration of legitimate expectations. The research will 
further determine how legitimate expectations can be identified, the process 
through which it is generated, and how it is breached.  The criteria to be 
identified in the formulation of legitimate expectations will assist in fulfilling 
this aim. It is hoped that this part of the research will put together all the 
fragmented views of legitimate expectations and fill the gap in literature. 
 
Moreover, both investor’s legitimate expectations and state’s legitimate 
regulatory functions are metaphorically viewed as two untamed tigers that 
                                                 
34 This fact is reflected in the forward note of Justice Stephan Schwebel contained in Professor 
Peter Cameron’s book on International Energy Investment Law. See; Cameron (n 16). 
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need to be arrested in a balanced way. The research therefore, would try to 
balance between fulfilling investor’s legitimate expectations and deference to 
states to regulate in the public interest. Thus, the overall aim of the research is 
to introduce a fair balancing structure within the investment treaty arbitration 
that would protect the legitimate expectations of the foreign investors on the 
one hand, and respects legitimate regulatory functions of the state on the 
other hand.  
 
1.4   Significance and Justification 
Quite expectedly, investor’s expectations are conceived as being the raison 
d’être of most investment decisions. In view of this general perception, the 
role these expectations play in the regulation of foreign investment, 
particularly at international level, is fundamental. In addition, a systematic 
study of legitimate expectations in international investment law is imperative 
due to the ubiquitous reliance and reference to the principle of legitimate 
expectations by investment treaty tribunals as a mechanism for finding 
investment treaty violations. While in some disputes it is the Claimant that 
usually alleges frustration of its legitimate expectations, in certain disputes it 
is the tribunal in its analysis that refers to the investor’s legitimate 
expectations to support findings of violation of treaty standards of protection. 
The requirement of legal certainty demands that investors need to know the 
relative threshold of their expectation to enable them design their investment 
fully aware of the associated risks. Host countries need to know their 
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limitations in terms their regulatory powers and their ability to respond to 
changing circumstances in the public interest. Practitioners in public service, 
private practice or in-house solicitors need to offer relative, but predictable 
legal opinion in matters regarding legitimate expectations in investment 
arbitration. Thus, the need for clarity in the area is momentous. 
 
There are several reasons why this research is significant.  First, due to the 
absence of a detailed study of legitimate expectations, a research of this nature 
that seeks to crack the formulation and application of the principle of 
legitimate expectations under international law, delineate its contours, would 
in a significant way try to fill the existing gap in the literature.  
 
Secondly, the seemingly inherent conflicts of norms in public/private 
interest, deserves a fairly balanced approach purposely to douse the existing 
tension or harmonize the conflicting principles. The absence of a systematic 
balancing framework between investor’s expectations and state regulatory 
functions is viewed in this research as a lacuna in the jurisprudence of 
investment treaty arbitration. Therefore, providing an analytical balancing 
tool would significantly aid investment tribunals to systematically balance 
between the investor’s expectations and state’s regulatory functions.  
 
Thirdly, as identified under the research problem, uncertainty in the 
formulation of legitimate expectations and lack of clarity in its application 
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bedevilling the investment treaty arbitration is opening a legitimacy 
quandary over the entire jurisprudence. Foreign investment due to its long 
term nature and demand cannot be divorced from the necessity of a 
predictable legal environment. Domestic public administration by its nature is 
ever-changing. The public at large have a legitimate concern over investment 
operations as they are likely to be affected by the conduct of the investor or 
even their governments in their territories. Therefore a study that seeks to 
address uncertainty and lack of clarity in the arbitral practice of the 
investment treaty tribunals would significantly assist in assuaging the 
concern of the community, of investors, community of states and the 
generality of citizens in either the host state where the investment is taking 
place, home state of the foreign investor where the investment originated, or 
even a third state connected with the treaty through most favored nation 
clause. The research contribution envisaged by this work is towards the 
harmonious development of international investment law in general, 
investment treaty arbitration in particular, and creating certainty of the rule of 
law in the system.  Thus, the significance of the work is global particularly, in 
view of the emerging conceptions of international investment law as specie of 
global administrative law.35 
                                                 
35 Benedict Kingsbury, Duke University. and School of Law., The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law (School of Law, Duke University 2005); Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan 
W Schill, ‘Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administration Law’ [2009] 50 Years of the New 
York Convention : [ICCA International Arbitration Congress] 5; Benedict Kingsbury and 
Stephan W Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory 
Actions in the Public Interest - the Concept of Proportionality’ [2010] International investment 
law and comparative public law 75; Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment 
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The review of the existing literature suggests that the principle of investor’s 
expectations, raises as many questions as it sought to answer. The notion 
straddles the entire chain of investment from making of an investment, fair 
and equitable treatment,36 expropriation37 up to dispute resolution and 
damages stage. The amorphous nature of fair and equitable treatment and the 
                                                                                                                                            
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of 
International Law 121. 
36 On Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, see; CH Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET): Interactions with Other Standards’ (2007) 4 Transnational Dispute 
Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1138> accessed 12 December 2014; Theodore Kill, ‘Don’t 
Cross the Streams: Past and Present Overstatement of Customary International Law in 
Connections with Conventional Fair and Equitable Treatment Obligations’ (2007) 106 
Michigan Law Review 853; Ignacio Pinto-Leon, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under 
International Law: Analyzing the Interpretation of the NAFTA Article 1105.1 by NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Tribunals’ (2006) 15 Currents: International Trade Law Journal 3; Mahnaz Malik, 
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (IISD 2009) Bulletin No. 3 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/best_practices_bulletin_3.pdf>; OECD, ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in International Investment Law’ (OECD Publishing 2004) 2004/03 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf>; Thomas J Westcott, 
‘Recent Practice on Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (2007) 8 The Journal of World Investment 
&amp; Trade 409; Jean Kalicki and Suzana Medeiros, ‘Fair, Equitable and Ambiguous: What 
Is Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law?’ (2007) 22 ICSID Review 24; 
J Roman Picherack, ‘Expanding Scope of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Have 
Recent Tribunals Gone Too Far, The’ (2008) 9 Journal of World Investment & Trade 255; 
Sebastian Lopez Escarcena, ‘The Elements of Fair and Equitable Treatment In International 
Investment Law’ (Leuven Centre for Global Governance 2010) Policy Brief No. 14; Graham 
Mayeda, ‘Playing Fair: The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ (2007) 41 Journal of World Trade 273; Jr D. Wallace, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment 
and Denial of Justice: Loewen v US and Chattin v Mexico’ (2006) 3 Transnational Dispute 
Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=753> accessed 13 December 2014. 
37 It is acknowledged here that direct expropriation cases have significantly reduced. Most of 
the cases now are on indirect expropriation. On indirect expropriation see; L Yves Fortier and 
Stephen L Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It 
When I See It, or Caveat Investor’ (2004) 19 ICSID Review 293; Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Regulatory 
Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State’ (2007) 8 Journal of World 
Investment & Trade 717; Steven R Ratner, ‘Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: 
Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law’ (2008) 102 American Journal of 
International Law 475; Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and 
Sustainable Development’, Best practices in promoting investment for development (OECD 2008) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/8/40311122.pdf>; Elyse M Freeman, ‘Regulatory 
Expropriation under NAFTA Chapter 11: Some Lessons from the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2003) 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 177. 
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interrelatedness of the standards is what enables the principle of legitimate 
expectations to encompass the entire chain of investment stages.38 Most of the 
literature on investor’s legitimate expectations dealt with the issue in a 
context-specific manner, adopting a narrow approach to the topic. Orrego 
Vicuna39 wrote on the necessity of balancing regulatory rights of the states 
and the rights of individuals in the context of regulatory authority and 
legitimate expectations. The work predicted two legal standards, namely, 
‘discretionary powers subject to judicial control’ and ‘legitimate expectations’ 
that are likely to influence constitutionalization, accessibility and privation of 
international dispute settlement. The work relies more on the jurisprudence of 
the World Bank Administrative Tribunal to strengthen the argument on the 
role of the principle of legitimate expectations. Vicuna’s foretelling regarding 
the emerging role of legitimate expectations in the context of global 
citizenship and global protection seem to materialize with the emergence of 
global administrative law,40 and other related approaches. Indeed, Vicuna’s 
approach is much broader in comparison with this thesis. However, his view 
on the need for an international mechanism to protect individuals from abuse 
of state powers without overruling state legitimate functions is relevant to 
                                                 
38 Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)’ (n 36). 
39 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, ‘Regulatory Authority and Legitimate Expectations: Balancing 
the Rights of the State and the Individual under International Law in a Global Society’ (2003) 
5 International Law FORUM Du Droit International 188; See also; Francisco Orrego Vicuna, 
‘Legitimate Expectation in the Case-Law of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal’ (2006) 5 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 41. 
40 On global administrative law see; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, 
‘Emergence of Global Administrative Law, The’ (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 
15. 
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this research and will be pursued.  Chester Brown41 provides preliminary 
thoughts on the justification of invoking protection of legitimate expectations 
as a general principle of law under international law. After a brief review of 
the application of legitimate expectations under national legal systems, and a 
few international tribunals, he pointed out the need to distinguish between 
the principle of legitimate expectations on the one hand and cases of 
unilateral declarations and estoppels on the other hand, on the ground that 
the former deals with a relationship between unequal parties (i.e. State v 
individual), while the later deals with relationship between equal parties (i.e. 
State v state or private parties in contract). Chester’s work is indeed 
preliminary and very specific due to its limitation to the recognition of 
legitimate expectations as a general principle of law. The illuminating 
distinction between legitimate expectations and cases of unilateral 
declarations and estoppel however, will be examined further since all the 
three principles could be analogized from the principle of good faith under 
international law. Nick Gallus42 examines the origin of BIT standards of 
treatment, and why states sign BITs purposely to determine the relevance of 
the host state level of development in the application of minimum standards 
of treatment to contracting states. Relying on the obligation of states to fulfill 
investor’s legitimate expectations, he argues for the incorporation of the host 
                                                 
41 C Brown, ‘The Protection of Legitimate Expectations As A ’General Principle of Law’: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts’ (2009) 6 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) 
<http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1303> accessed 24 
November 2014. 
42 N Gallus, ‘The Influence of the Host State’s Level of Development on International 
Investment Treaty Standards of Protection’ (2006) 3 Transnational Dispute Management 
(TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=895> 
accessed 13 December 2014. 
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state level of development in the analysis of legitimate expectations in 
particular and international standard of treatment as a whole. The article 
assumes the obligation of fulfilling investor’s legitimate expectations without 
examining the diverse views in the area, and the factors giving rise to the 
expectations. His focus on the inexactness of legitimate expectations as the 
basis for considering the influence of the host state level of development is 
relevant to this research and will be examined further in the light of the 
framework set out for this research. Prof James Crawford,43 in his work on 
the relationship between treaty and contract has identified legitimate 
expectations as one of the principles where there is tension between treaty 
text and contract. After reviewing the doctrinal arguments, along with two 
distinct sets of arbitral awards each taking a divergent approach, he favors a 
more restrictive approach on the determination of investor’s legitimate 
expectations. According to Crawford, there is a tendency by the arbitrators in 
the expansive application of legitimate expectations to rewrite ‘the 
arrangements agreed between the parties or override the ‘source of the 
applicable law’.44 Newcombe and Paradel45 in their book on standard of 
treatments under international investment law dealt with legitimate 
expectations largely under fair and equitable treatment. In their view, 
legitimate expectations are one of the overlapping elements used by 
investment treaty tribunals to analyze the overarching standard of fair and 
                                                 
43 James Crawford, ‘Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ (2008) 24 Arbitration 
International 351. 
44 Ibid 374. 
45 Newcombe (n 21) 279–289. 
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equitable treatment. They contrasted procedural legitimate expectations 
mostly recognized in certain domestic jurisdictions, with a more robust 
approach by investment treaty tribunals where substantive expectations, 
expectations as to due process in decision making and expectations as to 
protection of economic rights and interests are all covered by the investment 
treaty jurisprudence. In their analysis, they largely relied on the arbitral 
awards. The section devoted to legitimate expectations in the book provide a 
useful background reading to this research. Marrion Panizzon46 in her book 
on the Good Faith under the WTO Jurisprudence considered legitimate 
expectations as a core principle for her analysis. In a chapter to protection of 
legitimate expectations as GATT-specific Good Faith she traces the foundation 
and development of legitimate expectations from Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of treaties, GATT 47 to WTO Jurisprudence. Panizzon 
attributed the relevance of the principle of legitimate expectations in the 
WTO, largely due to the existence of gap and lacunae in the substantive 
principles and the consequent need to fill the gap and mend the lacunae. 
Drawing on her detailed analysis of various WTO cases, Panizzon identifies 
limitations set up by the appellate body to the application of legitimate 
expectations. Although, the book is solely dedicated to the WTO, it is relevant 
to this research, particularly because it  deals with the root of legitimate 
expectations under international law and the concern raised by  WTO 
scholars on the need for a harmonized rather than a fragmented international 
law. Similarly, the WTO case law referred to in the book will provide an 
                                                 
46 Panizzon (n 12). 
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illuminating insight to learn from the WTO approach. Pandya and Moody47 
reviewed the award of SDF (Services) Limited v Romania.48 They identified 
three critical stages in the award as a step towards ‘controlled approach’. In 
their view,  representation, balancing, and deference are the key lessons to be 
learnt from EDF arbitral award and the English law application of legitimate 
expectations. Indeed, their review is critical to this research in view of its 
relevance and in-depth analysis. However, their approach of using English 
law alone to formulate their controlled approach for the use by international 
arbitrators is what this research finds as an insufficient approach to capture 
the global concern regarding the formulation and application of legitimate 
expectations. Ioana Tudor49 in her book, on fair and equitable treatment, 
treated legitimate expectations as one of ‘actual situations in which the fair 
and equitable treatment has been applied’. After observing that notion of 
legitimate expectations in cases of compensation and indirect expropriation, 
she concentrated her work on the nexus between legitimate expectations and 
fair and equitable treatment. Her analysis shows that the main uphill task in 
the formulation of legitimate expectations is in identifying the criteria for 
reasonableness involved. This tedious exercise led investment tribunals to 
solely limit their analysis to case-by case approach. In her view, there are 
exceptional cases whereby the determination of the legitimacy of investor’s 
expectations is presumed. She concluded her analysis by ascribing lack of 
                                                 
47 Pandya and Moody (n 16). 
48 SDF (Services) Limited v Romania ICSID Case NoARB/05/13 (ICSID). 
49 Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Foreign Investment Law 
(1 edition, Oxford University Press 2008). 
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transparency and good faith on the part of the state as the causes for violating 
investor’s legitimate expectations. While her analysis is useful for providing 
background study to this research, her approach does not address the concern 
identified by this research, particularly, the exclusion of cases of indirect 
expropriation from her analysis.  Santiago Montt’s50 work on state liability is 
germane to this research. The work analyses the jurisprudence of state 
liability using global administrative and constitutional law framework. The 
work also uses the comparative method to analyze the scope of property 
rights in bilateral investment treaty generation. His analysis of property rights 
between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ led to a closer examination of BIT standards 
including legitimate expectations. While admitting that the protection of 
investor’s legitimate expectations is a recent phenomenon in the 
jurisprudence of investment treaty arbitration, he classified the expectations 
into ‘weak sense’ and strong sense’ expectations. Drawing inference from EU 
law, Montt concluded his analysis by identifying ‘reasonableness’ and 
‘legitimacy’ of expectations as a crux to every analysis of the protection of 
legitimate expectations, and therefore, a gateway to a balancing approach by 
arbitrators. Apart from the relevance of the whole work to this research, the 
specific analysis of legitimate expectations is also relevant. On how the 
balancing proposed by Montt should be applied, is one of the crucial points 
where the work fell short of the pressing demands formulated by this 
research. Professor Schreuer and Ursula, wrote on the relevance of ‘time’ in 
                                                 
50 Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in the Bit Generation (Intl Specialized Book Service Inc 2011). 
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the determination of legitimate expectation. ie ‘at what point in time does the 
investor’s legitimate expectation commence’.51 While their finding on the 
need for tribunals to adopt a multifaceted approach to ascertain the ‘relevant 
time’ requirement is useful for this research, their focus however is very 
specific and somewhat narrow for this research. Also Elizabeth Snodgrass52 
gave a detailed account of the justification of using the principle of legitimate 
expectation as a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations. 
Elizabeth’s work, however, apart from its narrow approach of not looking at 
other international regimes that applies legitimate expectations, further left 
out the need for balancing investors’ expectations and public interest 
unequivocally to further research. Michael Reisman and Arsanjani53 in a 
brief article examined the likelihood of the binding character of state 
unilateral statements in the context of investment arbitration. Their work, 
however, apart from being devoid of an in-depth analysis regarding reliance 
on such unilateral undertakings, is limited to actual undertakings while the 
scope of legitimate expectations currently under review includes expectations 
arising from an established regulatory framework.  Walter while analyzing 
the tentacles of legitimate expectations contends that the plethora of different 
contexts, in which arbitral tribunals employ the principle of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ in international investment dispute resolution, may imply that 
                                                 
51 Schreuer C. and Kriebaum U (n 21). 
52 Elizabeth Snodgrass, ‘Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations - Recognizing and 
Delimiting a General Principle’ (2006) 21 ICSID Review 1. 
53 Reisman and Arsanjani (n 20). 
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the concept is a panacea for all unresolved matters.54 Indeed, this may not 
necessarily reflect the actual position. As he rightly pointed out ‘the precise 
contours of the concept, the conditions for its application and its legal 
foundations remain only scarcely explored’.55 Further it may be notoriously 
difficult for an arbitrator to establish what is legitimate and what is not, this at 
times being contingent on his different ‘cultural traditions and subjective 
convictions’.56  Walters’s work admittedly is germane to this research not for 
its answers, but for the thoughts raised in the last part. As admitted by 
Walter, the work was intended to give an overview.57 
 
Furthermore, Muchlinski refers to investor’s conduct as being central to 
defenses against investors’ claims. Muchlinski argues that arbitral tribunals 
will make use of such principles as good faith and responsible business 
practice, which include, inter alia, a duty to invest with adequate knowledge 
of risk, to render opinions as to breach of investor’s legitimate commercial 
expectations, which fall under the purview of a broader notion of fair and 
equitable treatment.58 Muchlinski further asserts that the fair and equitable 
treatment can be encapsulated, inter alia, by addressing the question of 
whether a host state and investor, to his best standard of care and due diligence, are 
                                                 
54 A von Walter, ‘The Investor’s Expectations in International Investment Arbitration’ (2009) 6 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1361> accessed 25 November 2014. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor - The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 527, 556. 
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keeping to the ‘underlying bargain’ between them.59 While Muchlinski’s 
proposal is apt, the paper is silent on how investment tribunals could 
determine investors’ expectations. Cameron underlines the importance of 
‘stability and predictability of the legal and business framework’, being a 
dimension to the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment standard, 
which create relevant investor expectations as a result of the host state’s 
promises. He also stresses the obscure nature of this notion as it begs the 
question as to whether the promises have ever been made and, if yes, how 
extensive these promises are.60   But no mention was made regarding 
balancing criteria to be used by investment treaty tribunals in the 
determination of investor’s legitimate expectations. Sharpston noted on the 
regulatory framework, that a prudent business operator must be aware of the 
likely regulatory changes affecting their sector. Sharpston’s work is quite 
relevant in view of the comparative approach adopted in this research. It 
must be noted, however, Sharpston’s work does not analyse a single 
investment treaty arbitral award.61  
 
Similarly, in the jurisprudence of creeping expropriation there is an extensive 
scholarship on regulatory takings with no bright line test between regulatory 
expropriation and legitimate regulation.62 While the jurisprudence is germane 
to the study of legitimate expectations as it relates to the appraisal of state 
                                                 
59 Muchlinski (n 58). 
60 Cameron (n 21) 326. 
61 Sharpston (n 19) 128. 
62 Fortier and Drymer (n 37). 
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legitimate regulatory powers, the study is insufficient to capture the demand 
of balancing between an investor’s expectations and state’s legitimate 
regulatory functions, particularly when the constituents of investor’s 
expectations fell short of the requirement of  expropriation. 
 
It is submitted that while acknowledging that some writings have touched on 
the principle of legitimate expectations, no comprehensive attempt was made 
to analyse the principle of legitimate expectations from the perspective of 
balancing it with state’s legitimate regulatory functions in investment 
arbitration in a systematic way. Hence, the review of the existing scholarship 
seems to overwhelmingly suggest that a growing proportion of research is 
revealing the inadequacies of the very legal foundations of concepts such as 
‘legitimate expectation’. More importantly, another conclusion from this 
review is that this research is crucial to bridge the current gap in order to 
justify the reasoning of arbitral decisions. It is necessary also to  preclude 
potential criticism, which might arise as a result of claims that issues of public 
policy are left in the hands of private arbitrators.63  
 
 
1.5  Analytical Framework 
The principle of margin of appreciation developed mainly in human rights 
jurisprudence64 provides a useful tool for analysis in this research. The term 
                                                 
63 Walter (n 54) 34; Harten (n 22) 152–184. 
64 Human rights protection mechanisms are divided into universal and regional. At the 
universal level the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights is the main 
instrument, while at the regional level there is African charter on Human and Peoples Right, 
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margin of appreciation has been broadly understood as ‘a line at which 
international supervision should give way to a state party’s discretion in 
enacting or enforcing its laws.’65 It also refers to the latitude or discretion 
afforded to domestic state organs by the international judicial organs in 
complying with their obligations.  
 
The notion of margin of appreciation as understood in general international 
law is a mechanism through which flexibility can be manifested in the 
operation of law with the aim of balancing competing obligations within the 
international community. The principle is deployed mostly in the areas of law 
where there is a lack of legal precision or the norms are warped with legal 
indeterminacy. As a judicial balancing principle within the inherent powers of 
judicial bodies, it does not require specific authorisation or explicit mention; it 
is inferred from a legal norm as a logical consequence.66  
 
The principle has been applied mostly in the three major areas of international 
law, namely, Humanitarian law, WTO jurisprudence, and Human rights.67 In 
                                                                                                                                            
European Convention on Human Rights and Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 
Apart from International and three major regional mechanisms for protection of human 
rights, there are other human rights mechanisms such as Arab League, South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Organisation of Islamic Conference 
(OIC). See; Prof Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2 edition, Longman 2009) 
352–396. 
65 Wing-wah Mary Wong, ‘Sunday Times Case: Freedom of Expression Versus English 
Contempt-of-Court Law in the European Court of Human Rights’ (1984) 17 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 35, 58; Howard C Yourow, The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1996) 13–15. 
66 Jean-Pierre Cot, ‘Margin of Appreciation’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(2007). 
67 Ibid.,  
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the field of humanitarian law the application of the principle relates to 
balancing international law norms on prohibition of use of force on one hand, 
and the justification for using the same for self-defense, in good faith and as a 
necessary measure. Most of the International Court of Justice jurisprudence 
on the principle of margin of appreciation falls within this area. The nature of 
the humanitarian cases is interstate. Therefore, the jurisprudence of 
humanitarian law is of little relevance to this research due to its peculiarity of 
belonging to a different domain and the nature of the contested issues as 
belonging to the public - public and not public-private issues. The WTO 
jurisprudence on standard of review developed by the WTO Panels and the 
Appellate body can be synonymised with margin of appreciation.68  The core 
concern in the WTO standard of review is balancing between the relinquished 
authority by the member states to the WTO jurisdiction, and the retained 
authority by the states. Some of the doctrinal writings in the area examined, 
among other things, concerns whether the WTO is a system of total review or 
total deference? Is it a system of ‘different states, different policies’? Or a 
system of ‘one world, one policy’?69 Regardless of various perspectives on 
these questions, the WTO jurisprudence70 indicates prevalence of judicial 
review with some restraints on the member states.71 Therefore,  the 
jurisprudence of, both, the panels and the Appellate body are relevant and 
                                                 
68 Stefan Zleptnig, ‘The Standard of Review in WTO Law: An Analysis of Law, Legitimacy 
and the Distribution of Legal and Political Authority’ (2002) Vol 6 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-017a.htm>. 
69 AT Guzman, ‘Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review in WTO Disputes’ (2009) 
42 Cornell Int’l LJ 45. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Yuval Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ 
(2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 907, 929. 
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will be referred to, to the extent of their relevancy in clarifying the legal 
principles involved in this research.  
 
The principle of margin of appreciation developed largely in the 
jurisprudence of human rights is quite germane and very useful tool 
identified in the analysis of legitimate expectations. The basis of using margin 
of appreciation to analyse the scope of protection to be afforded to foreign 
investors under legitimate expectations is founded on the analogy between 
individual rights under the human rights jurisprudence and investor’s right 
under international investment law, particularly, the human rights 
jurisprudence that deals with right to property. Thus, the right based 
approach shall be looked at as the “gateway” of legitimate expectations, and 
will be examined in the light of margin of appreciation.  
 
It is expected, that transposing margin appreciation to investment treaty 
arbitration would enable the tribunals to recognise the basic freedom of the 
states to legislate in the general economic interest whilst also taking into 
account the legitimate expectations of private economic operators for 
legitimate stability in the legal framework for the purposes of investment. 
Indeed, in investment Treaty context, the tribunals have controverted over the 
recognition and the relevance of the doctrine. While some tribunals have 
rejected the relevance of the doctrine completely, others have acknowledged 
its relevance at least in the assessment of situations deserving necessary 
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measures by states. However, to date, no investment treaty tribunal has yet 
offered a clear and systematic application of the doctrine, particularly in the 
blurred areas dealing with violation of fair and equitable treatment, indirect 
expropriation or more profoundly the principle of legitimate expectations. 
This is critical to the jurisprudence, particularly in the case of findings of 
violation of legitimate expectations due to its inherent interface with a public 
interest dimension of regulatory and administrative functions of states within 
the national legal orders of states. 
 
1.6  Methodology 
• Doctrinal Research: 
• Comparative Research:  
Legitimate expectations under investment treaty arbitration can be 
approached from various perspectives; this work employs doctrinal analysis 
and a comparative approach from a legal perspective. In essence, the 
jurisprudence of investment treaty tribunals would be analysed, and 
particularly the aspect of arbitral awards, dealing with fair and equitable 
treatment and indirect expropriation. The reason for focussing on the arbitral 
awards is because international investment law is largely developed through 
arbitral awards. As late Professor Thomas Walde stated; 
“…modern international investment law develops now mainly out of cases, 
and less out of treaties. Treaties may provide a jurisdictional basis, a structure 
of argument and major concepts to start and categorize the required more line 
of enquiry, but the way treaty language develops into operative law- i.e. 
specific principles and rules governing case law. This is the normal way law 
develops – with codifications either laying a foundation of concepts and 
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structure of arguments at the beginning or, towards the end, collecting and 
restating evolved case law.”72 
 
 
Moreover, all sources of public international law that could accommodate the 
principle of legitimate expectations would be doctrinally analysed to justify 
the application of the principle. In the systematic construction of investor’s 
legitimate expectations, the knowledge of the investor regarding certain 
elements such as the peculiarities of the host country, the time factor, sources 
of the expectations (person creating the expectation), reliance, changing 
circumstances, and conduct of the investor would be analysed. 
 
Moreover, relying on the comparative approach, the jurisprudence of 
investment treaty tribunals would be compared with General International 
Law, WTO, and Human rights jurisprudence. The focus is to analyse most 
importantly, the jurisprudence of PCIJ, ICJ, WTO Panels and Appellate body, 
ECJ, the European court of human rights, and other regional human rights 
systems such as the African Court of Human and People’s Rights, and the 
Inter-American system of human rights. The comparative approach would 
enable the research to first, analyse how the principle of legitimate 
expectations is formulated and applied in the aforementioned adjudicative 
bodies. Secondly, transpose the principle of margin of appreciation to balance 
between investor’s legitimate expectations and states legitimate regulatory 
                                                 
72 (†) TW Wälde, ‘International Investment Law: An Overview of Key Concepts and 
Methodology’ (2007) 4 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) 4 
<http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1025> accessed 1 
January 2014. 
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functions. The central theme adopted in the research question is, injecting 
margin of appreciation in the determination of investor’s legitimate 
expectations and states legitimate regulatory function can provide a judicial 
guide for balancing the normative conflict of private and public demands in 
the analysis of fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriations. 
Therefore, the margin of appreciation, as a legal and judicial analytical tool, 
can facilitate drenching the tension between private and public interests and 
resolution of the conflicting legal principles. 
 
Indeed, the overall methodology entails analysis of  fair and equitable 
treatment and indirect expropriation provisions in bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties,  national constitutions, legislations, guidelines or 
regulatory framework, contractual undertakings, nature of the governmental 
measure and all factors giving raise to investor’s legitimate expectations or 
state’s regulatory functions in the light of margin of appreciation. 
 
 
 
1.7  Scope and Limitations 
 
The scope of the research is limited to the principle of investor’s legitimate 
expectations founded on the general provisions of fair and equitable 
treatment contained in the bilateral investment treaties. None admitted 
investments or property rights below treaty protections do not fall within the 
coverage of this work. The research is further limited to the intersection 
42 
 
between domestic administrative systems and international investment law to 
the extent they relate to adjudication and dispute settlement. Mere Policy 
formulations of administrative systems will not fall within the purview of this 
research, except where such policies constitute a clear state measure affecting 
foreign investor. Furthermore, the research is limited to how investment 
treaty tribunals formulate and apply the principle of legitimate expectations 
and state regulatory functions, therefore detailed foundational arguments and 
theories of property rights or legitimacy in governance are outside the 
purview of this work.  
 
Indeed, another limitation to the study is the differences in the treaty text. 
This limitation, supports the legal adage that treaty binds only its parties. 
Same limitation also applies to arbitral awards as they bind only the parties to 
the award. Therefore, it is difficult to justify a generic study of various 
investment treaties and arbitral awards. However, the limitations 
notwithstanding, treaty text regarding substantive protections are the same in 
most bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. Similarly, the adjudicatory 
method (the crux of my research) seems to debunk this reasoning as well, as 
tribunals do rely on their previous awards, regardless of the parties involved. 
Therefore, the differences can be surmounted on the basis of relevancy and 
commonality of the treaty substantive principles73 and common methodology 
in the reasoning of investment treaty tribunals. 
                                                 
73 For instance in Duke v Ecuador the tribunal relies on Azurix v Argentina and CMS v 
Argentina on the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment and hold that the standard are 
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Lastly, there is an inherent limitation applicable to most comparative studies 
that; the comparators may not match in all respects. This limitation is 
acknowledged, except the research is relying on functionalism where the 
main focus is on the outcomes. In addition, in this type of research (ie 
comparative judicial practice) there are concerns of  potential judicial law 
making given the latitude of  the discretionary powers of an adjudicator in 
comparative judicial analysis, thus, susceptible to abuse.  In legal research, 
however, adjudicators are notoriously known for relying on precedents, and 
where none exist, they transpose from precedents decided in other regimes. 
Therefore, the role of adjudicators is no longer passive but active. In the 
wordings of Sir Elihu lauterpacht: 
‘Judicial law-making is a general phenomenon in societies where justice is 
administered by judicial tribunals….international tribunals, by the very nature of 
the judicial function, are not confined to a purely mechanical application of the 
law.’74 
 
 
 
1.8 Structure of Thesis 
                                                                                                                                            
the same. see; Duke v Ecuador Case No ARB/04/19 [para 364]; For instance in Duke v Ecuador 
the tribunal relies on Azurix v Argentina and CMS v Argentina on the interpretation of fair 
and equitable treatment and hold that the standard are the same. See para 364. As to why 
arbitrators rely on previous awards, Bjorklund attributed the reliance on what she termed 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ pressures. In the case of the former the arbitrator’s concern is 
protecting the reputation and their expertise, while in the case of the later, their concern is 
borne by the ethical sense to create a predictable jurisprudence and fulfil the legitimate 
expectations of the public. see; Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as 
Jurisprudence Constante’, International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline 
(Bloomsbury Publishing 2008) 265–280. 
74 Elihu Lauterpacht, ‘The Absence of an International Legislature and the Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of International Tribunals’, International Law: Volume 5 , Disputes, War and 
Neutrality, Parts IX-XIV: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht (Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 210. 
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The thesis is divided into three parts containing a total of seven chapters. Part 
One contains chapters one and two. Chapter one deals with the general 
introduction of the research, the scope of the research to be carried out, and 
the introduction of the analytical framework of the research.  Chapter two 
examines the doctrine of the margin of appreciation as the analytical 
framework of the thesis. The chapter traces the origin and development of the 
doctrine from both domestic and international law corpus. The chapter 
identifies the key functions of the doctrine to evaluate its suitability in 
analyzing investor’s legitimate expectations.  
 
Part two of the thesis contains chapters three, four, and five respectively. 
Chapter three examines the principle of legitimate expectations as formulated 
and applied by investment treaty tribunals. The chapter identifies the basis 
for applying legitimate expectations in general, and the conception of the 
principle in international investment law. The objective of the chapter is to lay 
proper foundation for providing an analytical account of how investment 
treaty tribunals formulated and applied the principle of investor’s legitimate 
expectations. Chapter four analyses the conception of legitimate expectations 
in general international law and WTO. The jurisprudence of PCIJ, ICJ and 
early international tribunals on “expectation-related” principles are reviewed 
with a view to distill relevant and common elements in the adjudication of 
such principles. In addition, the jurisprudence of WTO on legitimate 
expectations is also examined. Chapter five traces the conception of legitimate 
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expectations in EU law with specific emphasis on the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
and ECtHR. The jurisprudence of both Courts provides a useful comparative 
tool in understanding the problems bedevilling the coherent application of 
the principle in investment treaty jurisprudence.  
 
Part three contains chapters six and seven. In Chapter six the thesis assembles 
the totality of elements needed for coherent formulation of investor’s 
legitimate expectations and more importantly, the lessons learnt from 
chapters four and five. The chapter further proposes the new conception of 
the investor’s legitimate expectations from the prism of margin of 
appreciation. In developing the proposal, the thesis dwells on answering the 
research question posed by the thesis as a whole. The chapter concludes with 
a synthesis of the new methodology towards the formulation and application 
of investors’ legitimate expectations. Chapter seven provides an overall 
conclusion of the research. 
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Chapter II:    Analytical Framework  - The Doctrine of Margin of 
Appreciation 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the doctrine of margin of appreciation as an analytical 
lens through which the concept of “legitimate expectations” could be 
explained and applied by investment treaty tribunals. The doctrine of margin 
of appreciation as developed in PCIJ/ICJ, WTO, ECJ and regional human 
rights courts could provide a useful tool for analysing legitimate expectations 
in investment treaty arbitration. The doctrine is broadly understood in the 
arena of multilateral integration arrangements, as ‘a line at which 
international supervision should give way to a state party’s discretion in 
enacting or enforcing its laws.’75 In this context, it entails the latitude or 
discretion afforded to domestic state organs by international judicial organs in 
determining the level and manner of individual national compliance with the 
international legal arrangement. This Chapter seeks to first, trace the 
evolution of the doctrine of margin of appreciation in international law. 
Secondly, it examines the theoretical basis upon which the doctrine is based, 
and thirdly analyses the application of the doctrine by the international courts 
and tribunals. The central argument adopted in this chapter is the proposition 
that margin of appreciation is a suitable tool for analysing the operation and 
the reach of legal rights and could further aid international courts and 
                                                 
75 Wong (n 65) 58; Yourow (n 65). 
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tribunals to strike a balance vertically and horizontally between competing 
rights or obligations among parties, including parties to an investment 
dispute. 
 
2.1 Overview of the Doctrine 
The doctrine of margin of appreciation is a judicial balancing method that 
introduces flexibility in the operation of law with a view to balance competing 
rights and obligations. As a balancing method, it is normally inferred from 
legal norms as a logical consequence within the inherent powers of judicial 
bodies.76  International Courts and tribunals have inherent powers to apply 
judicial tools in the administration of justice. These powers include the ability 
of the courts and tribunals to apply general principles of law and to 
objectively administer justice, all within their overall ‘judicial functions’.77  
 
Historically, the doctrine is traced back to administrative and constitutional 
laws of various civil law jurisdictions.78 The French administrative law 
concept of ‘marge d’ appreciation’79 and the German administrative law 
concept of Beurteilungsspielraum80 have been identified as bedrocks to the 
current understanding of margin of appreciation under international law. 
                                                 
76 Jean-Pierre Cot (n 66) 1. 
77 Chester Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2009) 
60–82. 
78 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality 
in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia nv 2002) 2–3. 
79 Richard Clayton QC and Hugh Tomlinson QC, The Law of Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP 
Oxford 2009) 314. 
80 Juliane Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law: Civil 
and Common Law Approaches with Special Reference to the American and German Legal Systems 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 218. 
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Both the French and German systems have a matured system of 
administrative and constitutional law and are quite rich in judicial review.81 
The French concept of ‘marge d’ appreciation’ refers to a method of reviewing 
legality of administrative action and exercise of discretionary powers.82 
Similarly, the German concept of Beurteilungsspielraum refers to limited 
judicial review and deference to administrative bodies. Kokott describes the 
German concept as ‘material limitations of the scope of judicial review’ since 
at times the courts must ratify administrative decisions due to the closeness of 
the administrative agencies to the problems in dispute than the courts. 83 
English law, on the other hand, is arguably not a strong competitor with civil 
systems in the fields of administrative law and constitutional law. However, 
the principles of ‘reasonability’ and ‘discretion’ have been considered as 
closest to proportionality84 which is an element in the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation.  
 
Under International law, the doctrine of margin of appreciation has been 
developed extensively by the European Court of Human Rights. As 
Macdonald pointed out, the doctrine ‘is now the primary tool of the Court’85 
in the application of the European Convention on Human rights. In addition 
to the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, 
                                                 
81 Thomas (n 6) 12. 
82 Yourow (n 65) 14. 
83 Julian Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law: Civil 
and Common Law Approaches with Special Reference to the American and ... on the Settlement of 
International Disputes) (Brill 1998) 219. 
84 Thomas (n 6) 88. 
85 R. St. J. Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’, The European System for the Protection of 
Human Righs (Kluwer 1993) 88. 
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(ECJ),86 the International Court of Justice (ICJ),87 the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)88, and other regional human rights courts and 
commissions have all directly or indirectly recognised the doctrine. 
 
The basis of applying the doctrine of margin of appreciation include inherent 
powers of courts and tribunals, relevant enabling provisions of law, and 
general principles of law. First, the inherent powers of courts as a source of 
applying margin of appreciation denotes that international courts and 
tribunals have powers to apply the doctrine as an attribute of their 
adjudicative function, or pursuant to their implied powers.89 Secondly, 
treaties and statutes establishing international courts and tribunals do provide 
for their adjudicative powers.90 Thirdly, the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation could be placed within the general principles of law, thereby 
                                                 
86 Case- 265/87 Bela Muhle Josef Bergmann KG v Grows-farm GmbH & co KG [1977] ECR 01211, 
1215. 
87 SS Lotus (Fr V Turk), [1927] PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7); Oil platforms (Islamic Republic of 
Iran v United States of America), Judgement, (ICJ Reports); Germany v United States (La Grand) 
ICJ, [2001] ICJ Rep 466 (ICJ); for the analysis of ICJ’s reference to margin of appreciation see; 
Shany (n 71) 907–940. 
88 European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos or Products Containing Asbestos 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Appellate Body) [paras 168–175]; (Appellate Body) [para v (c)]; Brazil-
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres WT/DS332/AB/R (Appellate Body) [para 210]. 
89 Shany (n 71) 911; On inherent powers of court generally see; Brown, A Common Law of 
International Adjudication (n 77); Weis Freidl, ‘Inherent Powers of National and International 
Courts: The Practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal’ in Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum 
and August Reinisch (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century (Oxford University 
Press 2009) 185–199 
<http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571345.003.0012> accessed 
14 December 2014. 
90 International Court of Justice  Statute Article 38; Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) 1868 U.N.T.S. 279, Article 17.6; 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401; 33 ILM 1226 (1994) Article 11; European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,  2007/C 
306/01, 2007 Article 5; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States (opened for Signature 18 March 1965, Entered into Force 14 
October 1966) (the ICSID Convention) 1965 Article 42. 
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forming part of applicable principles in international adjudication. Indeed, the 
later approach appears to be the approach taken by ECJ regarding its 
application of proportionality.91  
 
Margin of appreciation as a judicial construct is difficult to describe in 
abstract terms. Of recent, the doctrine has attracted diverse scholarship in 
international law. Different perspectives emerge on the correct label to the 
doctrine. Is it margin of appreciation, Proportionality, or a combination of 
both?  William W. Burke-White and Andreas von Staden92 are of the view that 
margin of appreciation encompasses proportionality. In particular, margin of 
appreciation consists of legitimacy test, suitability test, necessity test, and 
proportionality test. They further argued that the fourth test, i.e., 
proportionality, should be light since strict proportionality can only be 
materialised in a constitutional setting where socio—political matters are 
contextually framed. 
 
Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews93 on the other hand, describe the same 
methodological tests as proportionality balancing. They argued that 
proportionality analysis consists of: a) Legitimacy, b) Suitability, c) Necessity 
and d) Proportionality (strict). Indeed, the point of departure between the two 
                                                 
91 Jurgen Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Revised edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 
710–716. 
92 WW Burke-White and A Von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The 
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’ (2009) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 
283. (Hereinafter, Burke-White and Von Staden)  
93 AS Sweet and J Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 
47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 72. 
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contending views lies in the last stage of the exercise.  Burke-White and Von 
Staden clearly disregarded strict proportionality as it is likely to favour 
private right against public interest, in addition to capacity lacking by 
international courts and tribunals to engage in such exercise. Alex Stone 
Sweet and Jud Mathews favours strict proportionality. According to the later 
view, strict proportionality would enable the courts and tribunals to engage 
in a creative balancing that does not severely restrict private right. Indeed, 
their divergent account on the doctrine is not new. In the context of human 
rights, there exists a discussion on the relationship between margin of 
appreciation and proportionality much before the current attraction to the 
doctrine. According to Macdonald: 
“Much of the discussion of the margin of appreciation by the court and 
commentators illustrates a disappointing lack of clarity. Being concerned with 
the appropriate scope of review, the margin is not susceptible of definition in 
the abstract, as it is, by its very nature, context-dependent. To search for its 
‘ambit’ or ‘scope’ in the abstract again misunderstands its nature and leads to 
tautology...”94 
 
Contextually, while I do not differ substantially with the two contending 
accounts, however, their divergent structural account of margin of 
appreciation deserves further enquiry. In what follows in this chapter, I try to 
move the discussion further, by deconstructing the existing accounts of the 
doctrine as mere functional elements with the aim of properly yielding the 
various individual tests directly from the judicial cases to be analysed. 
 
2.2 Function of the Doctrine 
                                                 
94 R. St. J. Macdonald, (n 85) 85. 
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As noted earlier, the function of margin of appreciation is essentially to enable 
courts and tribunals engage in the balancing exercise as between contending 
rights and duties of parties on a dispute.  Judicial balancing refers to process 
of evaluating competing interests and values as opposed to mechanical 
application of law. In judicial parlance, balancing is not without opposition 
since its inception in international adjudication. In Belgian linguistics cases95 
where the majority of the court opts for balancing Judge Terje dissented on 
the ground that balancing approach could move the court into the middle of 
internal politics of the member states. 
 
The balancing function of margin of appreciation is in two dimensions, 
namely, vertical and horizontal. In the vertical sense, the function of margin of 
appreciation is to balance between the powers of international 
courts/tribunals and sovereignty of states. This is also referred to as deferential 
balancing. While in the horizontal sense, the balancing takes place as between 
competing interests at stake (proportionality balancing).  
 
a. Vertical (Deferential) balancing: 
The Vertical or Deferential balancing element of margin of appreciation deals 
specifically with balancing between sovereignty of states and judicial powers 
of international courts and tribunals. The concern in deferential balancing is 
how to delineate the scope of review to be exercised by the international 
courts or tribunals. This type of balancing has its roots in the competence of 
                                                 
95 Belgium v Belgium A 6 (1968); EHRR 252, [101]. 
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various administrative state organs in particular, and the overall conception 
of state as regulatory state.96 Domestic public bodies are empowered by law 
to administrate in the public interest. Therefore, their space of legality, 
manoeuvre and administrative latitude needs to be defined and recognised by 
international adjudicators. Hence, deferential balancing enables an 
adjudicator to accord domestic executive, legislative and judicial bodies their 
margin of respect. As remarked by some commentators, this form of 
balancing is informed by the recognition of the tension, domestic regulatory 
bodies are confronted with in terms of balancing between competing interests 
at the domestic level and the need to protect private rights.97 In determining 
deferential balancing, International courts and tribunals are normally 
concerned with the prima facie legitimacy of the state measure.  
 
b. Horizontal (Proportionality) Balancing) : 
Horizontal (Proportionality) balancing element of margin of appreciation 
deals with  competing interests notably as concerning  preference and weight 
to be given between private right or interest and overall public interest. Thus, 
this function is concerned with legality of a state measure purportedly in the 
public interest and the justification of interference with a private right or 
interest. The function entails that while public bodies are empowered by law 
to act in the public interest, in the event such  act collides with a private 
interest, the courts must evaluate the action taking into the private interest 
                                                 
96 Montt (n 50) 183. 
97 AM Slaughter and LR Helfer, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ 
(1997) 107 YALE LJ 273, 316. 
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and balance the competing interests at stake. International courts and 
tribunals have developed numerous tests to balance such competing interests. 
In particular, the courts apply suitability, necessity, and proportionality tests. 
Suitability test requires  the state measure  to suit the purpose sought to be 
achieved, while Necessity test would  justify the state measure only ‘if no less 
restrictive measure exists to achieve its objective’.98 Lastly, proportionality is 
simply the actual evaluation of the challenged measure against the private 
interest in issue. 
 
Accordingly, margin of appreciation is wide enough to accommodate both 
deference and proportionality within its vertical and deferential functions. In 
the following section, the theoretical basis of the doctrine is explored to lay 
foundation for examining how international courts and tribunals applied the 
doctrine. 
  
2.3 Theoretical basis of Margin of Appreciation 
According to Allot, legal theories can be structured in three interactive levels 
to explain a legal phenomenon.99 These levels are practical theory, pure 
theory, and transcendental or theory of theory. This thesis proposes in what 
follows to use Allots structural classification of theories to explain the 
theoretical basis of margin of appreciation. 
a. Practical theory: 
                                                 
98 Schwarze (n 91) 858. 
99 Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford University Press 2001) 31. 
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Practical theory consists of set of ideas explaining why certain actions are 
willed.100 In the context of this work, the practice of international courts and 
tribunals in applying the doctrine of margin of appreciation represents the 
willed action. In deducing such ideas explaining why the application of 
margin of appreciation, international courts and tribunals though not 
engaging in making legal theories are bound to state at least immediate 
reasons behind their judgements and decisions. Some of the reasons offered 
by the courts include Institutional competence, Democratic legitimacy and 
Diversity.  
 
i. Institutional competence 
Institutional competence as a practical theory to the application of margin of 
appreciation recognises that courts and tribunals generally are institutionally 
incapacitated to engage in scrutinizing complex public interest dimension of 
many regulatory and administrative functions of states. Hence, margin of 
appreciation becomes not only due but necessary in order for the relevant 
state functionalities to effectively perform their functions without strict legal 
interference from courts and tribunals. Institutional competence theory 
further recognizes that while some policy issues are technical, others are 
highly scientific and require specialised expertise which courts could do no 
more beyond interpreting simplified evidence in those issues. Similarly, 
international courts and tribunals, many a times are not better placed to 
engage in full scrutiny of public interest issues due to time constraint. Certain 
                                                 
100 Ibid. 
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public measures are time-bound. Their scrutiny and evaluation, however, 
could take longer time beyond what is ordinarily at the disposal of an 
international courts and tribunals. In United Kingdom v Council (Working 
time Directive), the ECJ while applying the doctrine of margin of appreciation 
held: 
“The Council must be allowed a wide discretion in an area which, as here, 
involves the legislature in making social policy choices and requires it to carry 
out complex assessments.’101 
 
ii. Democratic Legitimacy 
In democratic setting, both legislative and executive functions are carried out 
pursuant to the democratic mandate given to those engaged in executing 
public functions. Consequently, public and other sovereign functions are 
clothed with democratic legitimacy and therefore presumed as functions 
underpinned by collective public choices made by representatives of 
individuals.102 While individual members of society reserve their right to 
express their discontent on political choices made on their behalf against their 
representatives in democratic polls, they do not possess any retaliatory tool 
against judicial bodies, particularly, international adjudicators, when the later 
meddled into such domestic policies. Therefore, margin of appreciation as a 
judicial balancing tool is needed to supplement public choices made by 
people through their representatives without arbitrarily sacrificing private 
right. More importantly however, national authorities are much closer to 
                                                 
101 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council (Working time Directive) (1996) 1-5755 ECR para 58. 
102 Shany (n 71) 920. 
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people and their surroundings than an international judge or arbitrator. In 
James v United Kingdom the Court held: 
“…because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national 
authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to 
appreciate what is in the ‘public interest’…”103 
 
iii. Diversity 
One of the practical theories that could assist in explaining the doctrine of 
margin of appreciation is that of diversity and its corollaries, such as 
pluralism and heterogeneous nature of global communities. At least, in the 
context of human rights, all the regional courts/commissions in express or 
implied terms subscribe to the diversity argument as a justification for 
flexibility, a term which margin of appreciation is associated with. A diverse, 
plural and multicultural society could satisfy its international obligations and 
commitments in various means. An international adjudication conceived in a 
diverse framework could equally appeal to the diversity and pluralism of its 
surroundings. In CRP and Anor v Nigeria, the African Commission while 
analyzing the provisions of the African Charter on Human Rights concluded 
that “The African Charter should be interpreted in a culturally sensitive way…”104 
 
Indeed, the above mentioned practical theories are not exhaustive. They 
however provide a moderate premise upon which further enquiries could be 
made  relative to the practical theories of margin of appreciation. What 
                                                 
103 James v United Kingdom [1986] EHRR 126 [para 46]. 
104 CRP and Anor v Nigeria [2000] AHRLR 235 [26]. 
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appears to be the ‘core’ in the practical theories is balancing between 
competing interests, and the need to respect legitimate public choice. 
 
b. Pure Theory: 
According to the Allot’s structure of legal theories, pure theory consists of a 
set of ideas explaining the content and meaning of practical theory.105 Indeed, 
the practical reasons offered by courts and tribunals regarding diversity, 
democratic legitimacy, and institutional competence, etc., have all been 
contextually referred to, as explanations why international courts and 
tribunals should strike a balance  in both vertical and horizontal dimensions.  
Balancing as pure theory to the doctrine of margin of appreciation 
presupposes that rights are not absolute106 otherwise there wouldn’t be a need 
for balancing. The structure of rights as contained in treaties, conventions and 
national laws clearly depicts their non-absoluteness. Derogations, restrictions, 
justified limitations are all attestations to the non-absoluteness of rights.  As 
rhetorically captured; 
“Rights are not worded sufficiently precisely to prevent value conflict; nor are 
legal principles sufficiently clear, autochthonous, and hierarchical to overcome 
the dependence of human rights adjudication on foundationalist values, and 
neither can they escape the normative dilemmas and conceptual ambiguities 
attendant to those foundationalist values.”107 
 
                                                 
105 Allott (n 99) 31. 
106 Alan Gerwith though admitted the popularity of ‘non-absoluteness of right’ provides a 
criticism to the theory of non-absoluteness of right. See; A Gewirth, ‘Are There Any Absolute 
Rights?’ (1981) 31 The Philosophical Quarterly 1, 1–16. 
107 G Beck, ‘The Mythology of Human Rights’ (2008) 21 Ratio Juris 312, 345. 
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In understanding the theory of balancing, it needs to be reiterated that both 
vertical and horizontal balancing of margin of appreciation fall within the 
overall judicial balancing108 often described as ‘judicial law making’.109 
Without delving into the judicial law making debate, for long however, the 
notion of declaratory theory of law has been rejected vehemently in judicial 
parlance.110 In the  balancing (both proportional and vertical) an adjudicator is 
undoubtedly exerting and engaging in an intellectual creativity in trying to 
balance competing claims beyond mechanical application of law. Therefore, it 
needs to be clarified that even in the application of vertical balancing an 
adjudicator is also engaging in judicial balancing by refraining and exercising 
deference. This perception is linked to the theory of judicial law making that 
considers, confined, restricted or even avoided the application of law as 
equally law-making in the negative sense.111 
 
                                                 
108 On judicial balancing generally see; M NOVAK, ‘Three Models of Balancing (in 
Constitutional Review)’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 101., F Schauer, ‘Balancing, Subsumption, and 
the Constraining Role of Legal Text’ [2009] University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series 
133., J Bomhoff, ‘Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic 
Topic in Comparative (constitutional) Law’ [2008] Hastings International and Comparative 
Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2008, TICOM Working Paper on Comparative and Transnational 
Law No. 2008/5.,  
109 A von Bogdandy and I Venzke, ‘Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as 
Lawmakers’ (2003) 429 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 461. 
110 EW Thomas, The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) 25; According to Roscoe Pound ‘…it was assumed that the 
function of the judge consisted simply in interpreting an authoritatively given rule…and in 
mechanically applying the rule so given and interpreted. This assumption has its origin in the 
stage of the strict law in the attempt to escape from the overdetail on the one hand, and the 
vague sententiousness on the other hand, which are characteristic of primitive law.’ See; 
Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd 2003) 
124–147. 
111 Thomas (n 118) 3 an analogy can also be drawn with ‘erroneous non-exercise or minimal 
exercise of jurisdiction by a competent court or tribunal in a matter it ought to have exercise 
jurisdiction. Such refusal is often challenged on the ground of use of excess of power. 
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Indeed, the theory of balancing is never without dissent. While they bear 
numerous depictions such as formalism versus pragmatism, activism versus 
restraint, and so on, it suffices here to admit that there exist proponents to 
balancing and opponents to balancing. The major theoretical arguments are 
quite difficult to appraise into distinct categories as they overlap. The 
theoretical arguments of Hart112 and Dworkin113 are quite instructive in this 
regard. In his criticism to positivism particularly, the Hartian conception of 
principles and discretion,114 Dworkin argued that principles must be 
distinguished from rules. Rules operate in ‘all or nothing’ fashion. Therefore, 
a purported conflict or tension between rules could be resolved through 
validity knock-out where one of the rules will invalidate the other. However, 
principles do not operate in ‘all or nothing’ fashion, but rather as standards to 
be observed. Their very nature suggests that they are likely to collide, or 
generate tension in an interactive setting. In the event of such conflict, as they 
possess relative ‘weight dimension’, they could be balanced by ascribing their 
relative value.  
 
A step further in the crystallisation of inherent balancing dimension115 of 
principles is contained in the works of Robert Alexy.116 Like Hart/Dworkin 
                                                 
112 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law Series), 2nd Ed. (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 
1997) 124–147. 
113 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978) 14–46. 
114 For an analytical account of Hart/Dworkin debate on discretion see; M Klatt, ‘Taking 
Rights Less Seriously. A Structural Analysis of Judicial Discretion’ (2007) 20 Ratio Juris 506, 
122. 
115 For Habermas/Alexy debate in the context of balancing in the jurisprudence of ECtHR see; 
S Greer, ‘“ Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights: A Contribution to the 
Habermas-Alexy Debate’ (2004) 63 The Cambridge Law Journal 412, 412–434. 
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debate, Alexy’s theory was much refined in the context of responding to 
Jürgen Habermas.117 According to Habermas, the whole idea of judicial 
balancing strip constitutional right off their priority over other claims, as they 
reduced the rights to irrational balancing, whose outcome is not a product of 
right/wrong argument, but  a mere value judgement.  Alexy on the other 
hand developed a structured theory of constitutional right. The basis of 
balancing theory starts with distinction between rules and principles. Like 
Dworking, to Alexy while rules are norms that must either be obeyed or not, 
principles on the hand are ‘optimization requirements that can be fulfilled to the 
greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities.’118 Following 
Dworkian ‘weight dimension’ of principles, in the event of conflict or tension 
between competing principles, the task is for the courts or tribunals to engage 
in the exercise of ascribing relative ‘weight dimension’ through optimisation.  
 
Both Dworkian and Alexy’s theorisation of principles as optimization will be 
used in this research as defining face of the theory of margin of appreciation. 
Indeed, other propositions made by Alexy include clarifying the application 
of proportionality and its structured tests of suitability, necessity and 
proportionality. He largely drew the explanations from the jurisprudence of 
                                                                                                                                            
116 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2010); R Alexy, 
‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131, 131–140; R Alexy, 
‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 2, 2. 
117 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (New edition, Polity Press 1997) 238–257. 
118 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 116) 47. 
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German constitutional court where proportionality is applied as a balancing 
tool. 
 
However, balancing as pure theory explaining practical reasons for applying 
margin of appreciation is in itself short of explaining why certain values 
should be prioritised over others.  
 
c. Transcendental Theory: 
Transcendental theory or theory of theory consists of ideas explaining pure 
theory and thereby creating a link between structures of ideas and 
consciousness.119 It explains both pure and practical theories. This thesis 
submits that the transcendental explanation of both pure and practical 
theories of margin of appreciation needs to exist in an unfixed inclination that 
attracts all in an ideal scenario. This is basically to suit the transcendental 
environment where ideas ought not to be adjudged. Justice/fairness could 
offer a transcendental explanation to balancing due to non-absoluteness of 
rights and ‘diversity’ ‘democracy’ and ‘competence’, all as explanations why 
courts and tribunals should apply the doctrine of margin of appreciation to 
balance competing interests. In Belgian Linguistics Case, the court caught a 
glimpse of the transcendental theory as follows: 
“…The Convention therefore implies a just balance between the protection of 
the general interest of the Community and the respect due to fundamental 
human rights while attaching particular importance to the latter.”120 
 
                                                 
119 Allot (n 107) 34. 
120 Belgium v Belgium A 6 (1968); EHRR 252, (n 95). 
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Similarly, in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden, the court further refers to the 
transcendental just/fairness as follows: 
“…the court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights…”121 
 
Accordingly, a transcendental justice as the theory of theory, in this context, 
refers to the attraction or appeal to justice or fairness an international court or 
tribunal would generally develop in order to settle dispute. Particularly, in 
disputes that could not be resolved at the level of validity where certain rules 
could rule-away others. While this genealogy of theoretical basis of margin of 
appreciation is aimed at providing an explanation why International courts 
and tribunal deploy the doctrine of margin of appreciation as a balancing tool, 
a look into the application of the doctrine is hoped to describe how the courts 
have in practice applied the doctrine.   
 
2.4 Application of Margin of Appreciation before International Courts 
and Tribunals: 
The doctrine of margin of appreciation has been applied mostly in the four 
major areas of international law, namely, use of force, international economic 
law, European Community law, and human rights law. Therefore, the 
relevant case law of ICJ, WTO, ECJ, and regional human rights courts 
(particularly ECtHR) will be examined as follows.  
 
                                                 
121 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
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a. International Court of Justice (ICJ)    
One of the cases in which the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
had the opportunity to fully apply the doctrine of margin of appreciation was 
the case of France v Turkey (The Lotus Case)122. Unfortunately, the matter as 
formulated by both France and Turkey, pursuant to their special agreement 
was limited to the issue of jurisdiction of Turkey. The special agreement 
provides: 
“(1) Has Turkey, contrary to article 15 of the Convention of Lousanne of July 
24th, 1923, respecting conditions of residence and business and jurisdiction, 
acted in conflict with the principles of international law – and if so, what 
principles – by instituting, following the collision which occurred on August 
2nd, 1926, on the high seas between the French steamer Lotus and the Turkish 
steamer Boz-Kourt…criminal proceedings in pursuance of Turkish law…”123  
 
While deciding the case in favour of Turkey, the court unequivocally stated 
that the wide measure of discretion afforded to states by international law is 
limited in certain cases only by prohibitive rules.124 Indeed, the lotus case is 
one of the earliest cases in which the international court categorically 
recognises the ‘measure of discretion’ concept. 
 
On the other hand,  the court was constrained not to examine the status of the 
Turkish penal code, the steps taken by Turkish authorities against the French 
officer, or the nature of the criminal proceedings, in order to possibly 
ascertain whether there was a denial of justice or not. As it was apparent in 
                                                 
122 S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), (n 87). 
123 Ibid para 2. 
124 Ibid para 46. 
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the case, first, there was an inquiry set up by the Turkish authorities.125 
Secondly, the aim behind arresting the French officer pending trial as stated 
by the PCIJ was to allow the criminal prosecution to take its normal course.126 
Thirdly, both the French national and his Turkish Counterpart were tried, 
sentenced and convicted, though the Turkish counterpart to ‘a slightly more 
severe penalty.”127 Thus, but for the limitation on the jurisdictional 
competence of the PCIJ, the court could have gone further to examine the 
proportionality of the steps taken by Turkish authorities. 
 
Similarly, in Germany v United States (LaGrand),128 two German citizens 
were tried and sentenced to death by the Arizona Court in the United States. 
After the execution of one of them, the German authorities instituted an 
action against the United States before the International Court of Justice 
alleging violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. 
Judgement was entered in favour of Germany. One of the declarations sought 
before the court by Germany was a specific court order compelling United 
States to give assurances that upon recurrence of similar incidence, they will 
offer effective review and remedies to the victims. The Court held disagreeing 
with German submission in part as follows: 
“…In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent upon 
the United States to allow the review and reconsideration…This obligation 
                                                 
125 Ibid para 16. 
126 Ibid para 17. 
127 Ibid para 19. 
128 Germany v United States (La Grand) ICJ, (n 87). 
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can be carried out in various ways. The choice of means must be left to the 
United States.”129  
 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran v United States (Oil Platform case),130 United States 
argued that their attack on the Iranian oil platforms owned and operated by 
the National Iranian oil company was a measure necessary to protect United 
States’ essential security interest, and therefore should be afforded a measure 
of discretion.  Iran on the other hand, argued that the attack was in violation 
of its freedom of commerce protected under the Treaty of Amity, Economic 
Relations And Consular Rights, a bilateral treaty between the two countries. 
The ICJ decided the case in favour of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The oil 
platform case was described as a weak case for margin of appreciation in 
terms of its ‘rejection’ of the doctrine.131 I submit, however, a fresh look at the 
case would reveal otherwise. The main issues the court was confronted with 
were allegations made by Iran of violation of article x which provides for 
freedom of commerce, and the purported justification of same pursuant to 
article xx which provides for non precluded measures of the same treaty as 
argued by the United States. The court in its analysis deliberately132 started 
with a reverse approach by looking at the purported defence offered by 
United States pursuant to article xx. The approach is typical of margin of 
appreciation analysis when a state measure is complained of. The essence is to 
define the zone of legality by applying legitimacy test to ascertain the 
                                                 
129 Ibid para 125. 
130 Oil platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgement, (n 87) 161. 
131 Shany (n 71). 
 
132 Oil platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgement, (n 87) [para 37]. 
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‘superficial’ legality of the measure in question. Indeed, the court found that 
the measure in question was the use of armed force by the United States the 
basis of which is prohibition under international law.133 This begs for 
justification on the party relying on it.  Secondly, when use of force is resorted 
to, as self-defence under international law, it must be conditional upon ‘the 
state concerned having been the victim of an armed attack’.134 Thirdly, in such 
a situation, the burden is on the United states to show that the oil platforms 
‘were a legitimate military target open to attack in the exercise of self-
defence’.135 None of the above was discharged by the United States to the 
satisfaction of the court. Therefore, it could be understood from the 
judgement (though remotely) that the cumulative effect of resort to use of 
force by US, and the failure to satisfy the condition precedent for resorting to 
the use of force under international law clearly severed the basis upon which 
good faith could be extrapolated into the Non Precluded Measure (NPM) 
clause in the treaty pursuant to which US sought the margin to be applied. 
The following passage in the judgement could be understood in that context: 
“…The Court does not however have to decide whether the United States 
interpretation of Article xx, paragraph 1 (d), on this point is correct, since the 
requirement of International law that measures taken avowedly in self – 
defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, 
leaving no room for any ‘measure of discretion’.136 
 
Similarly, the dissenting opinion of Judge Elaraby and the separate opinion of 
Judge Koojimans seem to confirm the above understanding. Elaraby in his 
                                                 
133 Ibid para 43–44. 
134 Ibid para 57. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid para 73. 
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dissenting opinion identifies use of force as the determinant issue in the case. 
While stressing the importance of the principle of prohibition of use of force 
under International law pursuant to Article 2 (4) of the United Nations 
Charter, he concluded that the principle reflects the rule of ‘jus cogens’ from 
which no derogation is permitted. Accordingly, ‘A clause in a commercial 
treaty cannot possibly be invoked to justify the use of force.’137 Koojimans138 
also in his separate opinion alluded to the impact of use of force in the case as 
it relates to the issue of measure of discretion. He conceded to the view that 
use of force is subject to strict legal norms due to the peremptory nature of its 
prohibition which explains the limitation to applying same in favour of 
United States in the case. 
 
Therefore, it could be argued that the jurisprudence of PCIJ, and ICJ on 
margin of appreciation even after Oil platform’s case wasn’t as bleak as it was 
often described. In fact, the jurisprudence set out the outer limits for the 
operation of the doctrine in international adjudication. As rightly pointed out 
by Koojimans and Elaraby, the test for ‘jus cogens’ and use of force are strict, 
which resonates well with the majority position.  
 
b. World Trade Organisation (WTO Law): 
In the context of international economic law, the relevance of margin of 
appreciation goes into the framework of the WTO jurisprudence. The WTO 
                                                 
137 Oil platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Dissenting Opinion, (ICJ) 134. 
138 Oil platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Dissenting, (ICJ) 103. 
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jurisprudence on standards of review139 especially as developed by   the 
Appellate Body provides a transposable platform to margin of appreciation 
due to the affinity and functional relevance between the two.  The core 
concern in WTO standards of review is balancing between the relinquished 
authority by the  Contracting Parties to the WTO jurisdiction and the retained 
authority by the states on one hand, and the need to balance the competing 
interests in the claims before the WTO judicial bodies.140 This concern is 
analogous with the vertical and horizontal elements of balancing in the 
application of margin of appreciation.  
 
Article 11 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) arguably set out a uniform approach to the 
generality of judicial reviews to be undertaken by WTO judicial bodies. The 
article provides as follows: 
“A panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, 
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability 
of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.”141 
 
While article 11 DSU provides for a general charter,namely, ‘objective 
assessment’142 for undertaking judicial review exercise by the WTO judicial 
                                                 
139 On standard of review in WTO see: Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute 
Resolution (OUP Oxford 2003).  Guzman (n 69). 
140 Guzman (n 69) 7. 
141 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401; 33 ILM 1226 (1994) (n 90). 
142 According to the  Appellate Body in US-Cotton Yarn, para 476, WT/DS192/AB/R the 
review pursuant to Article 11 refers to: 
“…whether the competent authority has evaluated all relevant factors;…whether the 
competent authority has examined all the pertinent facts …whether an adequate explanation 
has been provided as to how those facts support the determination;…whether the competent 
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bodies, the structure of various agreements and the nature of contested values 
therein cannot be totally disregarded. Those specific agreements could hinder 
or even militate against the general approach set out by article 11 DSU. As the 
Appellate Body held in EC – Hormones   case, while stressing the relevance of 
the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures  (SPS Agreement) as follows: 
“The standard of review appropriately applicable in proceedings under the SPS 
Agreement of course, must reflect the balance established in that Agreement between 
jurisdictional competences conceded by the members to the WTO and the 
jurisdictional competences retained by the members for themselves. To adopt a 
standard of review not clearly rooted in the text of the SPS Agreement itself, may well 
amount to changing that finely drawn balance; and neither a panel nor the Appellate 
Body is authorized to do that.”143 
 
A cursory analysis of the following specific agreements that either contain 
specific judicial review provisions or provide for justified exceptions to WTO 
law is pertinent in order to reveal the nature of judicial review in the WTO.144 
These agreements are: 
i. Anti-dumping Agreement; 
ii. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreements; 
                                                                                                                                            
authority’s explanation addresses fully the nature and complexities of the data and responds 
to other plausible interpretation of the data. However, panels must not conduct a denovo 
review of the evidence nor substitute their judgment for that of the competent authority.”   
143 Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),  para 115, WT/DS/26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (1998) Available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/ec-
hormones%28ab%29.pdf     
144 Proportionality stood out in many judicial reviews under WTO particularly in the context 
of necessity test, though received with mixed reactions. For positive response See;M Andenas 
and S Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality: WTO Law in Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 42 Texas 
International Law Journal 370. For a view point rejecting the relevance of proportionality in 
WTO Law, See; A Desmedt, ‘Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2001) 4 Journal of International 
Economic Law 441.  J Neumann and E Turk, ‘Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World 
Trade Organization Law after Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines’ (2003) 37 Journal of 
World Trade 199. See generally on ‘necessity’ test under WTO, DH Regan, ‘The Meaning of 
“necessary”in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost–benefit Balancing’ 
(2007) 6 World Trade Review 347.   
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iii. Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreements; 
iv. General exceptions (GATT & GATS); 
 
i. Anti-dumping Agreement: 
The essence of anti-dumping agreement is to provide justification for states to 
adopt measures that could otherwise contravene WTO law for the purpose of 
protecting their domestic industries against harm from dumping.145 Pursuant 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and Anti-
dumping Agreement, states are free to impose anti-dumping measures 
provided they comply with WTO law. The anti-dumping framework reflects 
balancing between trade liberalisation and promotion with public interest 
dimension of protecting domestic industries against harmful trade practices. 
The nature of anti-dumping disputes involves the determination of 
consistency of the anti-dumping measure embarked upon by a WTO member 
state with the Anti-dumping Agreement146 and GATT 1994.147 The framework 
for adjudicating anti-dumping measures is contained in Article 17.6 which 
provides as follows: 
(i) In its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine 
whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether 
their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the 
establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and 
objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, 
the evaluation shall not be overtuned; 
                                                 
145 Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 508. 
146 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade(GATT) 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf  
147 GATT article IV. 
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(ii) The panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the agreement 
admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the 
authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests 
upon one of those permissible interpretations.148  
 
Flowing from article 17.6, the mandate of WTO panel is not to engage in a 
fresh evaluation of the measure adopted by the member states, but to ensure 
the measure is objective and unbiased. This approach clearly underscores the 
deference dimension of margin of appreciation where, legitimacy of measure 
is reviewed superficially without undue intrusion into domestic regulatory 
and administrative space of states. More importantly, the article provides for 
explicit deference to the states when their evaluation of facts and their 
interpretation of law could be accommodated, notwithstanding other 
alternative conclusions and interpretations to the contrary. In US-Cotton Yarn 
the appellate body after defining the parameters of article 17.6 remarked; 
“…panels must not conduct a denovo review of the evidence nor substitute 
their judgement for that of the competent authority.” 149 
 
ii. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreements:   
Technical regulations, standards and conformity procedures under TBT 
Agreement are aimed at balancing between domestic regulations for the 
protection of quality of products, protection of life, health and environment 
on one hand, and prevention of disguising same as a protectionist tool in the 
                                                 
148 GATT Article 17.6 Anti-dumping Agreement 
149 US-Cotton Yarn  WT/DS192/AB/R (2001) PARA 74, available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-yarn%28ab%29.pdf  
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context of WTO jurisprudence.150 Thus, the agreement seeks to ensure that, 
while domestic regulations, standards, and conformity assessment 
procedures could be a means of protecting product and their consumers, they 
do not however constitute trade barriers. The agreement provides, among 
other things, that products be accorded the most favoured nation, and national 
treatments, the fundamental norms of the WTO system. Similarly, 
international standards must guide the domestic technical regulations. The 
general framework for TBT Agreements undoubtedly calls for balancing of 
contested values contained in the agreement. The preamble to the agreement 
captures the balancing dilemma as follows: 
“…Recognising that no country should be prevented from taking measures 
necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health, or of the environment, or for the protection of 
deceptive practices, at the level it considers appropriate, Subject to the 
requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination…or a disguised restriction 
on international trade…” 
  
Clearly, the determination of TBT measures and the level of protection are 
relinquished to domestic regulatory space.151 The agreement further provides 
for a list of legitimate objectives pursuant to which states could apply 
technical regulations. These objectives include, national security, prevention 
of deceptive practices, protection of human health and safety, animal and 
plant life or health, including environmental objectives. In addition to the 
non-exhaustiveness of the list of legitimate policy objectives in which 
technical regulations may be set, the liberty accorded to states to determine 
                                                 
150 Bossche (n 145) 806–832. 
151 Ibid 805. 
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the legitimate policy objectives embraces deference to states by recognising 
their jurisdictional competence similar to vertical balancing under margin of 
appreciation. 
 
Similarly, while prescribing to the member states not to adopt technical 
regulations with a view to creating obstacles to international trade, provides 
for a necessity test that “…technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive 
than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-
fulfilment would create.”152 Indeed, the determination of necessity reflects the 
proportionality balancing, since the WTO panels would have to examine 
upon complaint whether the adopted legitimate objectives have complied 
with the necessity test enshrined in the TBT Agreement. In EC – Asbestos the 
Appellate Body confirmed both the deferential and proportionality balancing 
as follows: 
“…it is undisputed that WTO members have the right to determine the level 
of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation….it 
seems to us perfectly legitimate for a member to seek to halt the spread of a 
highly risky product while allowing the use of a less risky product in its 
place.”153 
 
Indeed, the Appellate Body went further to examine whether there are other 
alternative measures available (pursuant to necessity test), before concluding 
                                                 
152 Article 2.2 TBT Agreement 
153 European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos or Products Containing Asbestos, 
para 168, WT/DS135/AB/R, (2001) Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135abr_e.pdf  
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that “France could not reasonably be expected to employ any measure if that measure 
would involve a continuation of the very risk that the Decree seeks to “halt”.” 154 
 
iii. SPS Agreements: 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreements, like TBT they are aimed at balancing 
between protecting public health generally, with particular reference to 
human beings, animals, plants and environment on one hand, and avoiding 
trade protectionism on the other hand. The structure of the SPS Agreement 
unequivocally confirms the sovereign right of states to determine and 
implement SPS measures.155 In this regard, Article 2 (i) and (ii) provides; 
“Members have the right to take sanitary and Phytosanitary measures 
necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health…” 
“Members shall ensure that any sanitary or Phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary…” 
 
Like in TBT agreements, the explicit recognition of the sovereign right of 
states to take SPS measures reflects the vertical balancing which defers to 
states to decide on the legitimate aim to be pursued. Similarly, the 
proportionality balancing is also reflected in the necessity test which seeks to 
ensure SPS measures taken by states are necessary to the purpose sought to be 
achieved, thus, reflecting means-end relationship. 
 
iv. General exceptions (GATT & GATS); 
                                                 
154 Ibid., para 174 
155 On the prerogative of states to set levels of protection See; M Ming Du, ‘Autonomy in 
Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality?’ (2010) 13 
Journal of International Economic Law 1077. 
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Both GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides 
for general exceptions pursuant to which states can adopt and enforce 
measures otherwise inconsistent with their WTO substantive obligations.156 
These exceptions include measures for the protection of human, animal or 
plant, life or health, public morals, and national treasures. These exceptions 
enable states to discharge their domestic obligations in terms of fulfilling non-
trade, albeit societal values. In resorting to such exceptions, states must 
ensure their adopted measures are not arbitrary, discriminatory or trade 
restrictions in disguise.157 The structure of the exceptions provides a platform 
for balancing between trade values and non-trade values. In addition to the 
general exceptions, GATT, GATS and TRIPS158 provide for essential security 
exceptions.159 The essential security exceptions enable states to take security 
measures either for domestic or international security notwithstanding their 
trade restrictive nature. Similarly, states are free to adopt exceptional 
measures otherwise discriminatory to other WTO member states in 
furtherance of economic integration agreements.160 This exception for 
economic integration agreements under WTO law is in deference to the 
proven value of such agreements in terms of facilitating trade and reciprocal 
favourable trade treatments among states that adhered to them161. GATT and 
GATS provide for another trade restrictive measure to safeguard balance of 
                                                 
156 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade article XX, and General Agreement on Trade in 
Services article XIV. 
157 ibid 
158 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm8_e.htm  
159 GATT article XXI, GATS article XIV, and TRIPS article 73. 
160 GATT article XXIV, and GATS article V. 
161 Bossche (n 145) 696. 
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payments of member states.162 The balance of payment exception is aimed at 
balancing between trade liberalisation and safeguarding external financial 
position and balance of payments of states that decides to invoke such 
measures. More importantly, the measure targets developing countries as it 
explicitly recognises their need for ‘economic development’.163 WTO law 
further provides for additional exception allowing states to adopt and 
implement emergency safeguard measures for the protection of domestic 
industries where such industries are injured or likely to be injured by over 
importation of like or competitive products.164This form of measure like all 
the previous exceptions is based on the recognition of balancing between 
trade liberalisation and economic reality of member states.  
 
In summary, the framework of WTO law intersects the need for balancing of 
contested values between trade and non-trade values. WTO law further 
incorporates both vertical and horizontal balancing in the considered 
agreements. The freedom of states to determine the exceptional measures and 
the appropriate level of protection at the domestic regulatory and 
administrative stage reflect the vertical balancing of margin of appreciation 
where the ‘legality zone’ of states is demarcated and respected. In addition to 
that, the authority of the panels and appellate bodies to examine and review 
                                                 
162 GATT article XII, and GATS article XII. 
163 GATT article XVIII. 
164 GATT article XIX. See also Agreement on Safeguards available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeint.htm  
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the ‘necessity’ ‘reasonability’ ‘least restrictiveness’ of the measures 
demonstrate the horizontal balancing of margin of appreciation.  
 
c. European Union Law  
In the context of European law, the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) recognises the functional elements of margin of appreciation. 
First, proportionality analysis is the hallmark in the judicial review tools in 
the jurisprudence of ECJ.165 Secondly, the notion of ‘deferential review’ is a 
popular device used by European court of justice in its proportionality 
analysis to defer to the choices made by European commission or the member 
states.166 Indeed, unlike in the WTO law, the resort to the functional elements 
of margin of appreciation in the ECJ’s jurisprudence has been considered as 
recourse to ‘unwritten law’.167 Of course, this can be explained from the 
foundational basis pursuant to which the court engages in its review analysis.  
ECJ’s adjudicative tools are mostly recognised as part of general principles of 
the European Union legal order having been drawn from various domestic 
legal systems of the member states. However, much prior to the current 
structure of European Union law, one of the founding European Union law 
                                                 
165 Jürgen Schwarze and Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
European Administrative Law (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
2006) 678–866. 
166 Richard Gordon, EC Law in Judicial Review (Oxford University Press 2007) 292–297. 
167 On the source of proportionality under EU law. See Jürgen Schwarze, supra, p. 710-716  
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treaties, the Treaty of Paris of 1951168 provides for judicial review analogous 
to the doctrine of margin of appreciation. Article 33 (1) provides: 
 
“…the court may not review the conclusions of the High Authority (European 
Commission), drawn from economic facts and circumstances, which formed 
the basis of such decisions or recommendations, except where the High 
Authority (European Commission) is alleged to have abused its powers or to 
have clearly misinterpreted the provisions of the treaty or of a rule of law 
relating to its application…” 
 
Currently, the traces of margin of appreciation in ECJ are embedded in the 
framework pursuant to which European Union law is structured. The 
supreme treaty, namely, the treaty of Lisbon169 explicitly provides for respect 
to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.170 Similarly, the protocol 
on the application of subsidiarity and proportionality further provides for 
both substantive and procedural steps towards the application of subsidiarity 
and proportionality principles.171 More importantly, both the treaty and the 
protocol empower the ECJ with adjudicative powers to determine violations 
of subsidiarity and proportionality within the EU legal order. Thus, it can be 
argued that the two principles permeate the entire European Union law 
                                                 
168 Paris Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, 261 
U.N.T.S. 140. Expired 23 July 2002. Information at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm       
169 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/c306/01, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/476258d32.html [last accessed 6 October 2011].  
170 Ibid, Treaty of Lisbon Article 5. 
171 Lisbon Protocol No. 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity ad 
Proportionality, available at see http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-
treaty/protocols-annexed-to-the-treaties/657-protocol-on-the-application-of-the-principles-
of-subsidiarity-and-proportionality.html  (last accessed  6 October 2011) 
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framework. In this regard article 5 (1) of the Lisbon treaty is quite instructive. 
It provides as follows: 
“The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. 
The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only 
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States 
in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not 
conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” 
 
 
Therefore, the combine structure of the Lisbon treaty and the protocols 
annexed to the treaty embraces balancing in both its vertical and horizontal 
dimensions. Vertical balancing within EU legal order can be linked to, and 
understood from, the principle of subsidiarity that characterises the European 
Union law. The principle requires that EU institutions should not overstep 
their conferred competence, and while performing their functions, diversity 
and local circumstances shall be reflected where appropriate. While 
subsidiarity is not strictly similar with margin of appreciation, however, it 
provides a basis where vertical balancing dimension of margin of 
appreciation could be discerned in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Indeed, many 
cases before the EU courts involve matters regarding the determination of 
competence, and/or policy implementation, between the member states and 
the Union, particularly where both EU and member states enjoined dual 
competences, or matters regarding competition where private companies 
appealed against administrative decisions such as mergers. In Germany v 
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Commission,172 the European Commission annulled the German national 
allocation plan in respect of greenhouse gas emission on the ground that it 
contravenes directive 2003/87/ec. Germany, however, successfully 
challenged the annulment decision by the commission on the ground that the 
commission had overstepped its review power and encroached upon the 
freedom of Germany. In its judgement regarding competence between 
member states and the commission, and the extent of judicial review, the 
court concluded that both Germany and the Commission are entitled to some 
form of margin of appreciation. 173 The court further delineated the scope of 
its review against the decision of the commission as follows: 
“…the court of first instance cannot take the place of the Commission where 
later must carry out complex economic and ecological assessments in this 
context….the court is obliged to confine itself to verifying that the measure in 
question is not vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers, that the 
competent authority did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion…”174 
 
Similarly, horizontal balancing is also contained in the EU legal order in the 
like manner vertical balancing is reflected. Both Article 5 of the Lisbon treaty 
and the protocol for the application of subsidiarity and proportionality 
provides for this form of balancing. In this respect, article 5 (4) of the treaty 
provides: 
“Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaties. The 
institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid 
                                                 
172 Case T-374/04 Germany v Commission (2007) E.C.R. II-4431 Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004A0374:EN:HTML (last accessed 
6 October 2011) 
173 Germany v Commission Para 77 
174Supra,  Para 81 
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down in the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.” 
 
Indeed, horizontal balancing as applied by ECJ in summary denotes that the 
‘means’ deployed to attain a given ‘end’ should not exceed what is necessary 
to attain the end. The adjudicatory nature of proportionality balancing within 
EU law entails balancing between public need for a given measure and the 
effect the measure could have on a right holder. The court developed the 
multi-layered expressions of ‘necessity’ ‘suitability’  ‘proportionality’ and 
‘manifestly inappropriate’ to ensure a structured balancing exercise and 
coordinate the test regarding means-end relationship. In Agrana Zucker GmbH 
v Bundesminister fur Land-und forstwirtschaft, Unwelt und Wasserwitschaft,175 
Agrana Zucker challenged the regulatory measure that restructures sugar 
industry by raising charges against sugar producers and tasking them in 
particular, to pay EUR 15,908,561.77 into the temporary restructuring scheme. 
The ECJ while analysing the regulatory measure in issue, summarised the 
current contours and application of proportionality balancing. According to 
the court, the contours of proportionality as a general principle of EU Law 
denotes that measures must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary for 
attaining their legitimate objectives, and disadvantages as a result of the 
                                                 
175 Case C – 309/10 Agrana Zucker GmbH v Bundesminister fur Land-und forstwirtschaft, 
Unwelt und Wasserwitschaft (2011) E.C.R. 00000 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62010J0309:EN:NOT (last accessed 6 
November 2011). 
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measure must not be disproportionate to the aims. In the event of several 
appropriate choices, resort must be made to the least onerous.176  
 
However, in the implementation of horizontal balancing, a distinction must 
be made between areas where public bodies enjoy a wide measure of 
discretion and areas where they do not. This is important because, it appears 
in the ECJ case law, proportionality is the leading judicial review tool that 
encompasses some traces of deference.177   As in Agrana Zucker, the ECJ 
having combined both vertical and horizontal elements concluded that in EU 
law, the EU legislature enjoys wide discretionary margin in matters of 
common agricultural policy, and the relevant proportionality test is ‘manifest 
inappropriateness’. The court held as follows: 
“…what must be ascertained is not whether the measure adopted by the 
legislature was the only measure possible or the best measure possible, but 
whether it was manifestly inappropriate.”178  
 
Accordingly, the jurisprudence of EU law as adjudicated by ECJ undoubtedly 
embraces some form of margin of appreciation. More importantly, the 
jurisprudence recognises the balancing function of the doctrine and the 
proportionality and deference elements therein.  Indeed, the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ is far from being totally uniform due to the distinctive nature of the 
cases and the diversity of values the court is grappling with in its 
adjudicatory role. As the ECJ applies the doctrine in as diverse areas as free 
                                                 
176 Agrana Zucker para 42 
177 J Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2011) 17 
European Law Journal 80, 90. 
178 Agrana Zucker para 44. 
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movement of persons and goods, freedom of establishment and services, 
agricultural market, competition etc, it is expected that factors surrounding 
the relevant measures and legislations are likely to influence the application 
of the doctrine.  
 
d. Regional Human rights Courts: 
As earlier stated, the doctrine of margin of appreciation has been largely 
developed in the context of human rights adjudication. The nature of human 
rights adjudication in most cases involves the determination of whether 
human rights should always trump or they should pave way to some justified 
exceptions. The dilemma between upholding guaranteed right and allowing 
derogatory and restrictive measures, could be viewed as what steered the 
current role of margin of appreciation in human rights adjudication. Regional 
Human rights adjudications are treaty based. All the individual rights are 
contained in the relevant regional conventions and their protocols. These 
Conventions are: 
a. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental freedoms.179 
b. American Convention on human rights.180  
c. African Charter on Human and peoples’ rights.181 
                                                 
179 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, (ECHR), 4 November, 1950 Europe. T.S. No. 5; 213 Available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=06
/10/2011&CL=ENG     
180 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, (ACHR), “pact 
of San Jose” Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html  
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i. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): 
As earlier noted the doctrine of margin of appreciation is largely and 
substantially developed by the jurisprudence of ECtHR. Under the European 
Convention, while contracting states are under obligation to secure the rights 
and freedoms enshrined in the convention for everyone in their respective 
jurisdictions,182 the European court of human rights is empowered to ensure 
observance of the commitments by the contracting states. Therefore the 
application of the doctrine can be said to emanate from the powers of the 
court to ensure compliance with the standard of rights and freedoms 
contained in the Convention, and the need to delineate the extent to which the 
Court would scrutinise domestic measures.183 
 
The doctrine of margin of appreciation has been developed by the ECtHR 
primarily to enable the Court balance competing interests that appear 
inherent in the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention 
contains provisions dealing with fundamental rights, freedom of expression, 
personal liberty, protection of property etc.184 The Convention also provides 
for restriction and derogation from satisfying those rights and freedoms due 
to circumstances outlined in the limitation clauses.185 Such limitations include 
                                                                                                                                            
181 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 
(“Banjul Charter”), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/rule_prot/africancourt-humanrights.pdf   
182 ECHR Ibid, Article 1. 
183 QC and QC (n 79) 35. 
184 ECHR Ibid, Articles 2-15. 
185 ECHR Ibid, Articles 8-11 and 15-18. 
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limitations provided by law, measures necessary in a democratic society, 
protection of public safety, public order, public health and morals, freedom of 
others, etc. The reconciliation between realisations of the enshrined rights 
with the legitimate restrictions is what provides a nurturing ground where 
the doctrine of margin of appreciation was developed. 
 
In its application of the doctrine, the court balances between its judicial 
autonomy and the regulatory/administrative autonomy of the member states 
on one hand (vertical), and also balances between the competing interests 
among the parties on the other hand (horizontal). This approach adopted by 
the ECtHR of engaging in dual balancing was the premise upon which the 
functional elements of margin of appreciation were deduced and based. 
Regarding vertical balancing the court consistently maintained that national 
authorities are better placed to assess domestic issues than an international 
body.186 Similarly, in the horizontal balancing the court repeatedly 
maintained that margin of appreciation enables the court to examine further 
whether public measures are ‘proportionate’. Because the application of 
margin of appreciation goes simultaneously with European supervision by 
ensuring that national authorities based their measures on ‘acceptable 
assessments’. 187  
 
                                                 
186 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1EHRR 737 
187 Case of Vogt v Germany (1995) para 52 available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=695889&portal=hbk
m&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649  (last 
accessed 6 October 2011) 
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The doctrine is applied by the court in three broad situations. First, in the 
context of public emergency the Convention provides for derogation.188 The 
application of margin of appreciation in this context connotes balancing 
between the public values to be protected and the guaranteed rights 
threatened or likely to be threatened by the derogation.189 In Aksoy v 
Turkey190 the ECtHR while applying the doctrine in the context of derogation 
stated that, it falls within the responsibility of contracting states to determine 
the threat justifying the derogation. According to the court, national 
authorities are better placed in such an exercise than an international judge.  
Secondly, the court has applied the doctrine of margin of appreciation in the 
context of limitations ‘necessary in a democratic society’.191 This is where the 
application of the doctrine is much more divergent. 192 In Hatton and Ors v 
United Kingdom193 the applicant alleged violation of article 8 which provides 
for respect to family and privacy at home due to noisy night flights at 
Heathrow airport. The Grand Chamber while applying the doctrine and 
rejecting the claim concluded that the overall economic well – being of the 
country here (covered by article 8 (2)) outweigh the individual right sought to 
                                                 
188 Article 15 ECHR 
189 Pieter Van Dijk and others, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(4th Revised edition, Intersentia Publishers 2006) 1055. 
190 Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 553 
191 Article 8-11 ECHR 
192 As a commentator remarked, “the court here is dealing with different rights, different 
claims in respect of the same right, by applicants in different situations, and with different 
justifications advanced by states at different times, such variation is inevitable…” See; JG 
Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (New ed 
of 2 Revised ed, Manchester University Press Melland Schill Studies 1995) 144. 
193 Application No. 36022/97 Case of Hatton and Others v United Kingdom (2003) Available 
at http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/COU/Full/En/COU-157043.pdf  
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be protected by article 8 (1).194 The third instance where the doctrine of 
margin of appreciation is applied by ECtHR is pursuant to ‘Public interest 
exception’.195 Public interest exceptions had been generally interpreted by the 
Court to attract wider margin of appreciation.196 In James v United Kingdom 
the court provides a justification why such margin should be wide.  
“…The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to 
the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide 
one, will respect the legislature’s judgement as to what is ‘in the public 
interest’ unless that judgement be manifestly without reasonable 
foundation.”197 
 
Regrettably however, the application of the doctrine by the court was never 
consistent. While acknowledging this problem, in Hatton v United Kingdom 
the court recognises two conflicting approaches to the application of margin 
of appreciation as follows: 
 
“…on the one hand the government claim a wide margin on the ground that 
the case concerns matters of general policy, and, on the other hand, the 
applicant’s claim that…the margin is narrow…This conflict of views on the 
margin of appreciation can be resolved only by reference to the context of a 
particular case”198 
 
Flowing from Hatton, it appears there is no ‘one cap fit all’ definition or 
application of the doctrine that could apply in all conceivable scenarios. In 
furtherance to the relevance of context in the application of margin of 
appreciation, Zehentner v Austria is quite instructive. The court explained 
                                                 
194 Ibid., Para 120 
195 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR 
196 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1EHRR para 62, Mellacher v Austria (1990) 12 EHRR 
para 53.  
197 James and Ors v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR para 46 
198 Hatton And  Ors v United Kingdom (supra) para 103 
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further why the inconsistent formulation of the doctrine. While margin of 
appreciation must be accorded to national authorities as they are better placed 
and have continuous contact with the vital forces in their countries, the court 
added; 
“This margin will vary according to the nature of the Convention right in 
issue, its importance for the individual and the nature of the activities 
restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued by the restrictions. The 
margin will tend to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the 
individual’s effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights. Where general social 
and economic policy considerations have arisen in the context of Article 8, the 
scope of the margin of appreciation depends on the context of the case, with 
particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the 
personal sphere of the applicant”199 
 
Therefore, margin of appreciation as context-dependent appear to defy any 
attempt to generalise its application. In view of these diverse approaches 
adopted by the Court due to the peculiar nature of the exceptions provided 
under the Convention, cases of margin of appreciation pursuant to public 
interest exception which exhibit, tension with property rights and legitimate 
expectations could be clustered so as  to discern common principles applied 
by the ECtHR.   
 
ii. Inter-American Court/Commission 
The Inter-American system of Human rights like European human rights 
system consist of fundamental rights such as right to life, privacy, right to 
liberty, right to property, etc., which states are obliged to protect pursuant to 
the American Convention on Human Rights. Similarly, the Convention like 
                                                 
199 Case of Zehentner v Austria [2009] ECtHR Application no. 20082/02, 52 2011 EHRR 22 [57]. 
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many human rights instruments contain provisions for justified restriction 
and derogation from the rights. Such exceptions include necessary measures 
for public security, public health, morality, right of others, etc. While mere 
provision for the restrictive and derogatory measures is a reflection towards 
balancing between competing interests, hardly could an argument be 
sustained that either the Court or the Commission has fully incorporated the 
doctrine as part of their routine adjudication tools. As the president of the 
Commission rightly remarked in this context: 
“…The Inter-American institutions have (deliberately) never imported the 
European notion of the margin of appreciation, but nevertheless I believe that 
we will increasingly find ourselves in need of some functional equivalents to 
it, in order to manage diversity with the same measured skill…”200 
 
However, notwithstanding the above caveat, the jurisprudence of the Court 
and the Commission has shown not only traces of the doctrine, but I submit 
application of the doctrine in some respect. In Walter Humberto Vasquez 
Vejarano v Peru 201 the commission unequivocally confirms that ‘margin of 
appreciation goes hand in hand with Inter-American supervision’. Similarly, 
in Advisory opinion on the proposed amendments to the naturalisation 
provision of the Constitution of Costa-Rica202  The court also confirms its 
recognition of the margin of appreciation accorded to them by the Convention 
                                                 
200 Paolo Carozza, Fifty Years of the European Court of Human Rights viewed by its Fellow 
International Courts (2009). Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/3B662702-
FFDB-4187-AAC5-6B926725DF35/0/30012009PresidentCarozzaSeminar_eng_.pdf  
201Case No. 11.66  Walter Humberto Vasquez Vejarano v Peru (1999) para 55 available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/48-00.html   
202 Proposed amendments to the naturalisation provision of the Constitution of Costa-Rica, 
Advisory opinion OC-4/84, (1984) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. para 62 at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4d.htm  
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‘The Court is fully mindful of the margin of appreciation which is reserved to 
states…’. 
 
Moreover, a typical reflection of vertical balancing and positive recognition of 
margin of appreciation was in Rioss Montt v Guatemala.203 The applicant a 
retired military officer and former head of the Guatemalan government, 
alleged violation of his right to be elected as Guatemalan president pursuant 
to article 23 of the Convention. Guatemalan authorities on the other hand, 
argued that the refusal to allow Mr Montt to contest was pursuant to article 
186 of the Guatemalan Constitution, which prohibits leaders of coup d’etat 
etc., from contesting an election. The Commission found in favour of the 
Guatemalan Government on the ground that the refusal to allow Mr Montt is 
a democratic choice made by the Guatemalan people as enshrined in their 
constitution and ‘that it was necessary to maintain such grounds’.204 The 
commission stated that: 
“The commission considers that the context of Guatemalan and International 
Constitutional law in which this condition of ineligibility is placed is the 
appropriate dimension for analysis of the applicability of the Convention in 
general…and from which the margin of appreciation allowed by international 
law can emerge.”205 
 
Similarly, the application of proportionality balancing, though described as 
‘rudimentary’206 is quite prevalent in the inter-American jurisprudence of 
                                                 
203 Case No.10.804 Rios Montt v Guatemala (1993) at  
http://wfrt.net/humanrts/cases/30%5E93gua.pdf (last accessed 6 October 2011) 
204 Ibid, para 38 
205 Ibid, para 24 
206 Arai-Takahashi (n 78) 187. 
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necessity and exceptions to private rights in balancing competing interests. 
Article 30 of the IACHR is quite instructive here, as it provides a uniform test 
of restriction which applies to the entire Convention in addition to the 
peculiar restrictions appended to individual provisions. The article provides 
as follows: 
“The restrictions that pursuant to this Convention may be placed on the 
enjoyment or exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be 
applied except in accordance with laws enacted for reasons of general interest 
and in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have been 
established.”207 
 
As a commentator argued here, article 30 differentiates IACHR with other 
human rights Conventions as they do not contain such a general restriction 
provision.208 The jurisprudence of restrictions under the Convention as 
developed by the Court pursuant to article 30 requires satisfaction of the 
following conditions:209 
a. The restriction must be in accordance with a law.210 
b. The restriction must be legitimate.211 
c. The restriction must be necessary.212 
d. The restriction must be proportionate.213  
 
                                                 
207 Article 30,  IACHR 
208 Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Amaya Ubeda de Torres and Rosalind Greenstein, The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: Case Law and Commentary (OUP Oxford 2011) 552. 
209 For a general discussion on the conditions see; Ibid 552–558.  
210 Article 30, IACHR 
211 Artcle 13 (2), IACHR, Case of  Kimel v Argentina (2008) para 58 
212 Kimel v Argentina (2008)  para 72-86 
213 Ibid., para 81-95 
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Reflecting on the above conditions, the Court in Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v Paraguay214 ordered the state to assess legality, necessity and 
proportionality of expropriation or otherwise. Similarly, In Kimel v 
Argentina215 the Court found against Argentinian authorities for fining and 
imprisoning Mr Kimel the sum of 20,000 pesos and 1 year Imprisonment as 
‘overtly disproportionate’.216 
 
Despite the recognition and application of the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation, in the Inter-American human rights jurisprudence is not as 
developed as that of the European Court’s system, the basis for the 
progression of the doctrine is undoubtedly set in motion. More importantly, 
the recognition in the Convention of right to property217 subordinated to the 
interest of society and tied with justified deprivation further attests to 
common features of regional human rights Conventions. Therefore, tension 
between the protection and the justified deprivation could provide a basis for 
further contextual analysis.    
 
iii. African Court/Commission 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right (ACHPR), like ECHR and 
IACHR provides for protection of individual rights as enshrined in the 
                                                 
214 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (2005) para 217. Available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_125_ing.pdf   
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Charter along with various limitations. In what distinguishes the Charter 
from other Human rights instruments, the Charter does not contain a general 
derogation clause entitling member states to suspend their human rights 
obligations as in the European or Inter-American context.218 However, in 
addition to peculiar restrictions contained in the individual articles,219 the 
Charter provides for a general limitation clause. Such limitations include 
‘right of others’ ‘collective security’, ‘morality’ and ‘common interest’. 220  
 
Indeed, the jurisprudence of the African Court / Commission is quite new 
compared to the matured jurisprudence of the European system. The express 
application of margin of appreciation finds its way into the African 
jurisprudence in Prince v South Africa221 the applicant who alleged violation 
of his freedom of religion, occupation, lost on all counts on the ground that 
the subject matter of his right (the Rastafarian faith which allows use of 
cannabis) is illegal under South African law. More illuminating in the case 
                                                 
218 TRG Van Banning and Netherlands Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Human Rights 
Reference Handbook (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993) 167. 
219 Individual restrictions include ‘arbitrary deprivation’, ‘laid down by law’, ‘subject to law 
and order’ ‘necessary restriction provided by law.’ ‘public need in the general interest’ etc. 
Articles, 4, 6, 8, and 14 ACHPR 
220 Article 27 (2), ACHPR provides; “The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common 
interest.” 
221 Communication 255/2002, Garreth Anver Prince v South Africa (2004) AHRLR 105 
(ACHPR 2004), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-subject/440-
south-africa-prince-v-south-africa-2004-ahrlr-105-achpr-2004.html (last accessed 6 October 
2011), See; CRP And Ors v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 227, para 54, See also; CRP And Anor v 
Nigeria  (1998)  AHRLR 191, para 54 where the Commission held; “The African Charter 
should be interpreted in a culturally sensitive way taking into full account the differing legal 
traditions of Africa and finding expression through the laws of each Country.” For criticism 
on the ‘culturally sensitive’ interpretation See; Killander, Magnus, Interpreting Regional 
Human Rights Treaties (September, 06 2011). SUR International Journal on Human Rights, 
Vol. 7, No. 13, pp. 145-169, December 2010 . Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923206  
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was South Africa heavily relied on the principles of subsidiarity and margin 
of appreciation in its defence. In its Judgement The commission having found 
in favour of South Africa stated that both subsidiarity and margin of 
appreciation like in any regional human rights system, they form part of the 
African Charter and therefore states are disposed in striking a fine balance 
between competing interests in their domestic sphere. However, the 
commission cautioned against ‘implied restrictive construction’ of margin of 
appreciation, where states might assume to have an unfettered discretion. In 
other words, the mandate of the commission to supervise on the member 
state discretions must not be inhibited by the operation of both margin of 
appreciation and subsidiarity.222 
 
The above illustrates the application of the doctrine in the African context at 
its formative stage. Strikingly, the court has captured both the vertical and 
horizontal balancing contained in the doctrine. While the vertical balancing is 
reflected in the recognition of South Africa’s right to determine its national 
rules, policies and guidelines regarding its obligation under the Charter223, the 
horizontal balancing is also reflected in subjecting South Africa’s discretion to 
the Court’s supervision.224 Similarly, although, to date, prince, appear to be 
the only case where the doctrine is expressly applied, the potential for the 
operation of the doctrine in the context of property right is quite high. More 
importantly, article 14 of the Charter like its European and inter-American 
                                                 
222 Prince v South Africa para 53 
223 Ibid., para 51 
224 Ibid., para 53 
97 
 
counterparts, while guaranteeing right to property also provides for justified 
restrictions within the ambit of public interest. Therefore, the need to balance 
contested values pursuant to article 14 is likely to offer a meaningful 
contribution in analysing the doctrine contextually. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
An attempt has been made in this chapter to trace the evolution of the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation, and explore some theoretical explanations 
about the doctrine. It can be said that the doctrine as applied in both its 
deferential and proportionality sense functions in a manner that enables 
adjudicators to engage in balancing.  While undoubtedly the doctrine is 
suitable for international adjudication, such as investment treaty arbitration, 
the application of the doctrine is far from uniform. Apart from the divergent 
conceptions of the doctrine, the lack of uniformity even within a particular 
adjudicative body, the diversity of contested values have all cumulatively 
affect a comprehensive postulation of the doctrine. The challenges of diverse 
conceptions, lack of uniformity and diversity could be abridged by deducing 
the application of the doctrine from the perspective of a specific value or 
right. Indeed, for the purpose of investment treaty arbitration, more 
particularly, in the context of understanding investor’s legitimate 
expectations, cases of property right and economic related matters are quite 
germane, and could provide a suitable guide in shaping the formulation and 
application of investor’s legitimate expectations. Before proposing the role of 
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margin of appreciation in analyzing investor’s legitimate expectations, it is 
priori to trace and provide an analytical account of legitimate expectations as 
understood and applied by investment treaty tribunals.  The essence, is to 
bring to the fore the gaps that need to be filled in through the application of 
margin of appreciation. 
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Chapter III:  Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration – I:   
The Quest for Coherence 
 
 
3.0  Introduction 
The current trend in investment treaty arbitration posits that the principle of 
legitimate expectations assumes a dominant spot in the determination of fair 
and equitable treatment standard. As the principle articulated by the 
investment treaty tribunals, it entails that investors are entitled to rely on 
assurances/legal framework as representations made by host states and in the 
event of negative alteration of such representations,  investors can seek legal 
redress and demand compensation. The problem sought to be unravelled by 
this chapter is on the ‘content of the investor’s legitimate expectations,’ 
particularly the scenarios and elements giving rise to such expectations. While 
some tribunals have interpreted the principle in a narrow way, others have 
adopted a broad formulation and application of the principle. The aim of the 
chapter is to provide an analytical account of the principle as understood by 
investment treaty tribunals with the aim of  establishing that the current 
conception of legitimate expectations by investment treaty tribunals is 
ambiguous, incoherent  and lacking in clarity. While the tribunals have 
swayed between narrow and broad approaches in their formulation and 
application of the principle, both approaches  have further led to uncertainty 
in the jurisprudence. The embedded assumption concluded with explicitly is 
there is a need for investment treaty tribunals to look outward the regime to 
help in developing the normative content of the principle of legitimate 
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expectations, particularly, from the general international law and other 
mature specialised international law regimes. 
 
In investment treaty context, the practice of investment treaty arbitration 
shows the significance of protection of investor’s legitimate expectations in 
the determination of violations of treaty standards of protection contained in 
the BITs, particularly the standard of fair and equitable treatment in both 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties.225 The Principle requires states 
to respect those expectations of individuals which the states themselves 
through their action or conduct created. The exact scope of the principle is yet 
                                                 
225 The standard of fair and equitable treatment was first referred to in the following 
instruments, namely article 11 (2) of the Havana Charter for International Trade organization 
of 1948, the economic agreement of Bogota, united states treaties on friendship, commerce 
and navigation, Abs-Shawcross draft convention on investments abroad, and OECD Draft 
convention on the protection of foreign property, and now virtually all bilateral and 
multilateral investment treaties. OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law, OECD Working paper on International Investment (OECD Publishing, 2004), 
3–7, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf; F. A. Mann 
described fair and equitable treatment as “so general a provision is likely to be almost 
sufficient to cover all conceivable cases, and it may well be that other provisions of the 
agreements affording substantive protection are no more than examples or specific instances 
of this overriding duty.” See; F. A. Mann, Further Studies in International Law (Oxford 
England : New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 238; There is an on-going controversy as 
to whether fair and equitable treatment standard is equivalent to international minimum 
standard recognised under customary international law, or just a mere treaty creature and 
therefore autonomous, with no link to international minimum standard. In the context of 
NAFTA, the Commission issued a binding interpretation that fair and equitable treatment 
does not go beyond international minimum standard. Two recent monograms in this area 
renewed the controversy. Iona while criticizing the idea of equating fair and equitable 
treatment with international minimum standard concluded that such an exercise would 
circumscribe the coverage of fair and equitable treatment and thereby limit its application. 
See: Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Foreign Investment 
Law, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 67; 67On the other hand, 
Santiago Montt while criticizing the “autonomous” nature of fair and equitable treatment 
labelled the effort of equating fair and equitable treatment with Neer test as “deliberate” 
leading to misconception in the jurisprudence. According to Montt, fair and equitable 
treatment is synonymous with international minimum standard but not limited to the 
description in Neer’s case due to the peculiarities of denial of justice claims. See: Santiago 
Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administrative 
Law in the Bit Generation (Intl Specialized Book Service Inc, 2011), 307–310. 
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not clear due to vague, inconsistent and contradictory findings among the 
tribunals.226 Ironically, while Claimants are increasingly relying on the 
principle to frame their claims, tribunals are interpreting the principle to 
justify their findings; the contours of the principle remain unsettled. In 
addition, the scope of applying the principle, continue to raise the tension of 
overlap with a public interest dimension of the state’s regulatory and 
administrative functions, particularly in highly regulating areas such as 
human rights, public health, environment, and necessity or public choice. The 
underlying assumption of the chapter is, given the infancy of the investment 
treaty regime, the ad-hoc nature of the investment treaty tribunals, and 
complex nature of legitimate expectations, among other things there is a need 
for investment treaty tribunals to search amongst the matured international 
law regimes where the principle of legitimate expectations features and 
transpose the normative content of the principle.  
 
The chapter begins by tracing the genealogical development of the principle 
and consequent migration from domestic legal systems to international 
investment law. Secondly, the chapter traces the basis for invoking the 
principle by adjudicatory bodies. Next, it provides an analytical account of 
the principle as understood and applied by investment treaty tribunals. The 
                                                 
226 See for instance: Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v The United Mexican States ICSID 
Case No ARB (AF)/00/2 (ICSID) [para 154]; CMS v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/8,; LG & E v 
Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/02/1; Occidental Exploration and Production Company v  The 
Republic of Ecuador  Case No UN3467 (LCIA); contrast with Methanex Corporation v USA 
(NAFTA ‘UNCITRAL 1976’); Glamis Gold v USA (NAFTA ‘UNCITRAL RULES’); PSEG Global 
Inc &Anor v Republic of Turkey ICSID Case NoARB/02/5 (ICSID); Parkerings-Companiet AS v 
Republic of Lithuania ICSID Case NoARB/05/8 (ICSID); SDF (Services) Limited v Romania ICSID 
Case NoARB/05/13 (ICSID). 
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aim is to trace the conception of legitimate expectations in investment treaty 
arbitration and identify the essential elements of the principle recognized and 
applied by the tribunals in the determination of investor’s legitimate 
expectations.  The chapter concludes with the challenges of the current 
formulation and application of the principle, and a proposal for a lasting 
solution in the quagmire of formulation and application if investor’s 
legitimate expectations. 
  
3.1 From domestic Law to International Investment Law 
Before examining the principle of legitimate expectations under investment 
treaty arbitration, it must be pointed out that the principle is generally not a 
new phenomenon in legal parlance. It evolved like many other general 
principles of law, from various domestic legal systems. 227 In England, Lord 
Denning MR is credited to set role, the conception of the principle under 
English law.228 In the case of Schimdt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs229 
Lord Denning used the phrase ‘legitimate expectations’ to refer to some form 
of right or interest to be heard before administrative bodies. Although, 
schimdt’s case dealt with procedural right, the protection of legitimate 
                                                 
227 For a general survey of legitimate expectations in national legal systems see; Elizabeth 
Snodgrass, “Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations - Recognizing and Delimiting a 
General Principle,” ICSID Review 21, no. 1 (March 20, 2006): 25–30, 
doi:10.1093/icsidreview/21.1.1; Hector A. Mairal, “Legitimate Expectations and Informal 
Administrative Representations,” in International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, 
ed. Stephan W. Schill (Oxford University Press, 2010), 415–418, 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589104.001.0001/acp
rof-9780199589104-paper-13. 
228 Robert Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Hart 
Publishing 2000) 47. 
229 Schmidt & Anor v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1968] EWCA Civ 1 (EWCA (Civ)). 
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expectations now covers both procedural right and arguably substantive 
rights.230 Since schimdt, the doctrine has evolved within England and 
significant number of commonwealth countries.231 Similarly, in Germany the 
concept of ‘vertrauensschutz’ which refers to protection of confidence is said to 
have inspired the principle of legitimate expectations in European Union 
law.232 Other countries that have either directly recognised the doctrine or 
have some traces of its operation include United States of America, Spain, and 
some Latin American Countries.233 
 
French legal system on the other hand, doesn’t seem to recognise the 
principle.234  The reason being, not far from the associated criticisms of the 
principle that it could undermine the principle of legality of administrative 
functions, and restricts the exercise of discretionary powers vested in 
administrative bodies.235 It can be argued however, that certain elements of 
the doctrine of vested rights ‘droits acquis’, as provided for under the French 
law, have touched on some aspects of legitimate expectations and functions in 
an analogous manner with the principle.236  
 
                                                 
230 Coughlan & Ors, R (on the application of) v North & East Devon Health Authority [1999] EWCA 
Civ 1871 (EWCA (Civ)) 622; William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th 
edn, OUP Oxford 2009) 446. 
231 For Indian Perspective See Usha Antharvedi, ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Actions 
and Principles’ <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1104955> accessed 24 November 2014; For 
South African perspective See MA Ikhariale, ‘The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations: 
Prospects and Legal Problems in Constitutional Litigation in South Africa’ (2001) 45 Journal 
of African Law 1, 1–12. 
232 Thomas (n 4) 42. 
233 Mairal (n 3) 415–418. 
234 Soren Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (OUP Oxford 2000) 114–117. 
235 ibid 114. 
236 Snodgrass (n 3) 27. 
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 The conception of legitimate expectations in various domestic legal systems 
is certainly not uniform. There are few, and in some cases wide variations 
between domestic legal systems. Without deemphasizing the differences, the 
general idea to be deduced from the overall function of the principle in 
various domestic legal systems reveals that, regulatory and administrative 
bodies have to function with a sense of responsibility not to over-step the 
limits set by the law, taking into account that individuals in a given polity are 
entitled to rely and plan their lives with the understanding that public 
authorities would function within the law.  
 
Under International law, the concept of legitimate expectations is not a recent 
practice as it has been invoked and referred to in various contexts. In the field 
of international investment law, the concept currently plays a significant role. 
In the Expropriated Religious Properties in Portugal award, the tribunal 
referred to the concept of legitimate expectations of the parties to the 
arbitration in the following words: 
“…the following settlement of the claims, the subject of the present arbitration, 
appears as just and equitable and of a nature to satisfy the respective legitimate 
expectations of the parties,...”237 
 
                                                 
237 Great Britain, Spain and France v Portugal  Permanent Court of Arbitration (Hague Tribunal) 
Award rendered  on Sept 2 and 4 1920 (Elihu Root, Johnkerr Lohman, Charles Lardy) Hague Court 
Rep; In the Aminoil award, the tribunal relied on the principle of legitimate expectations in 
assessing compensations to be paid. See:: Kuwait v Aminoil Award (1982) 21 Int Leg Mater 
ILM; For a commentary on Aminoil award, see: Martin Hunter and Anthony Sinclair, 
‘Aminoil Revisited Reflections on a Story of Changing Circumstances’, Weiler Todd, 
International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral 
Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May 2005). 
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In addition, publicists have argued, that rules of customary international law 
entails legitimate expectations, and not only that ‘may be all rules of 
international law involve legitimate expectations’.238 According to Byers, the 
principle of legitimate expectations simply means: 
“…states are legally justified in relying on each other to behave consistently with 
previous assurances or patterns of behaviour-if those assurances or patterns or 
that behaviour is of a type, and takes place within a context, such that it is 
considered legally relevant by most if not all states.”239 
 
The reference to legitimate expectations by the early tribunals and scholars of 
public international law shows that for long, the relevance of the principle has 
been recognised and in some instances applied in international law.240 In 
investment treaty context, the principle as applied under fair and equitable 
treatment and indirect expropriation claims can arguably be described as a 
new phenomenon in investment treaty arbitration. It evolves from the overall 
functions of the arbitrators and the tribunals as a whole in the determination 
of disputes before them.241 The tribunals, functioning within a wider context 
of international tribunals, rely on the various interpretative tools, such as 
Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, and the generality of sources of 
international law in interpreting the provisions of the bilateral/multilateral 
                                                 
238 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 1999) 107. 
239 ibid. 
240 C Brown, ‘The Protection of Legitimate Expectations As A ’General Principle of Law’: 
Some Preliminary Thoughts’ (2009) 6 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) 2 
<http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1303> accessed 24 
November 2014. 
241 According to Douglas, ‘…A tribunal would be on safer ground by making reference to the 
principle of estoppel or legitimate expectations to give content to the fair and equitable 
standard of treatment, rather than appealing to the policy of achieving “greater economic 
cooperation” between the contracting states to the treaty…’Zachary Douglas, The International 
Law of Investment Claims (1 edition, Cambridge University Press 2009) 84. 
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investment treaties, and ‘interleaving flesh’ into the treaty provisions, 
especially the major standards of national treatment, most favoured nation, 
full protection and security and fair and equitable treatment.242 The later, 
being the gate-way to the current prominence of legitimate expectations was 
admittedly vague and hard to define save by reference to certain principles 
clarifying its content.243 Legitimate expectations as the most prominent244 and 
more encompassing245 of all the principles becomes the pinnacle of framing 
claims alleging violation of fair and equitable treatment and indirect 
expropriation. The nebulous nature of fair and equitable treatment and the 
degree of subjectivity involved in its interpretation is the root cause to the 
current role and prominence of legitimate expectations in investment treaty 
arbitration.246 
 
3.2 Justification and Juridical basis 
                                                 
242 For a comprehensive account of standards of treatment under investment treaties, See: 
Andrew Newcombe, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer 
Law International 2009) 147–377; See also: August Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment 
Protection (OUP Oxford 2008). 
243 Some of the principles embraced by fair and equitable treatment standard apart from 
‘legitimate expectations’ includes, denial of justice, transparency, due process, unjust 
enrichment, arbitrariness, Good faith, Freedom from coercion and harrassment etc, See: 
Tudor (n 1) 154–180; See: Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International 
Investment Law (2 edition, OUP Oxford 2012) 133–149. 
244 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic   Partial Award (Watts, Fortier, 
Behrens) (PCA (UNCITRAL)) [para 302]. 
245 Vandevelde is a critique to the view that legitimate expectations encompass the entire fair 
and equitable treatment elements. ‘…the legitimate expectations doctrine is best understood 
as referring to the situation where the security principle is breached by host-state conduct 
inconsistent with prior promises or assurances on which the investor relied, rather than as a 
complete theory of the fair and equitable treatment standard…’ See: Kenneth J Vandevelde, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (OUP USA 2010). 
246 Douglas (n 17) 84 The exception to this assertion is where a treaty unequivocally provides 
for the protection of legitimate expectations. See: Article B 4 (a) (ii) of United States Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaties of 2004, Available at 
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/doc/2004_update_US_model_BIT.doc. 
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The justification for invoking investor’s legitimate expectation can be viewed 
from two Perspectives. The first is substantive perspective, while the second is 
the procedural or juridical perspective. Substantive justification is important 
due to the need for a plausible theory to justify the formulation and 
application of legitimate expectations and accommodate the entire conception 
of the principle. Fairness derivation from justice augments the theory that 
focusses on the prevalence of manifest disappointment resulting in harm, 
damage or loss inflicted upon a private entity, despite reliance on public 
bodies to the contrary.  Here, the general sense of fairness and equity dictates 
that unjustified damage, harm or loss should be prevented, erased or 
compensated. This idea stems from the general moral anathemization of 
unjustifiable harm which invariably is in accord with the Kantian notion of 
humanity and associated components of dignity, respect and confidence. In 
practical terms, otherwise non-moral explanation, it goes without saying that 
an expectation frustrative measure resulting in loss to a foreign investor may 
have the effect of precluding society at large from the value of utilizing such 
investment, including influencing investor’s decision in future.  Therefore, 
reliance justification is not far from the synergy between 
public/administrative law on one hand and justice, equity or fairness on the 
other hand.247 The logic behind this sense of fairness lies partly in the role of 
                                                 
247 On the interface between public law and equity see: Chief Justice Robert French, ‘The 
Interface between Equitable Principles and Public Law’ (29 October 2010) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-
justices/frenchcj/frenchcj29oct10.pdf>. 
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the ‘protection’ towards strengthening positive reliance and confidence 
between public and private entities otherwise theorised as ‘reliance theory’.248 
 
Another substantive justification attributed to the invocation of legitimate 
expectations is the role of the ‘protection’ in terms of promoting regulatory 
and administrative certainty and predictability. This idea of legal certainty 
and predictability as leading commentators argued, is rooted in the ‘rule of 
law theory’.   Other justifications offered include trust, confidence, equity and 
good faith theory. 
 
The second dimension to the justification is the procedural or juridical 
element that rationalises the recognition and protection of legitimate 
expectations from a pure legal viewpoint. Here, protection of investor’s 
legitimate expectations like any other legal principle must derive its 
legitimacy from the recognised sources of law. This process entails subjecting 
the principle to rigorous legal scrutiny, to establish the legality, scope, and 
above all possible limitation if any. It is the procedural justification that 
characterizes investment treaty tribunal’s engagement with the principle of 
legitimate expectations.  
 
                                                 
248 ‘Reliance theory is originally a private law notion which underpins contractual obligations. 
For the expansive role of reliance in legitimate expectations context See: Daphne Barak-Erez, 
‘The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations and the Distinction between the Reliance and 
Expectation Interests’ (2005) 11 European Public Law 583. 
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A contending juridical justification for applying legitimate expectations by 
investment treaty tribunals is the purported recognition of the principle as a 
general principle of law. The basis for this contention lies in the recognition of 
the principle in various national laws which could derivatively be elevated to 
the general principles of law. As argued by Elizabeth, ‘legitimate expectations 
can be justified as reflecting a ‘general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations’.249 As is customary with most of contested general principles of law, 
the issue of universality and unanimity in its recognition and the underlying 
divergence among states would remain a hurdle. In view of these concerns, 
some scholars quarried on the divergent conceptions of the principle, while 
others went further to contend250 that legitimate expectations can be justified 
only where the host state’s legal system provides for the application of the 
principle (necessary application to the foreign investment as a host state law), 
or where it is applied as an appropriate standard of compensation under 
international law. 
 
 
Indeed, most of the investment treaty tribunals seem to justify their 
application of legitimate expectations pursuant to the good faith principle 
                                                 
249 Snodgrass (n 3) 2. 
250 According to Sornarajah, ‘…where a state inveigles a foreign investor by holding out 
promises and does not fulfill those promises through the creation or recognition of rights 
entailed in the expectations created by those promises, it is accepted by developing countries 
which articulated the notion of appropriate compensation that the foreign investor must be 
paid full compensation for the denial of the rights which are created by the promises…’ See 
M Sornarajah, ‘The Neo-Liberal Agenda in Investment Arbitration: Its Rise, Retreat and 
Impact on State Sovereignty’, Shan, Simons and Singh (ed), Redefining Sovereignty In 
International Economic Law ((Hart Publishing 2008) 221. 
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under International law. Given this assertion by the tribunals, the next section 
shall examine the arbitral contention of rooting legitimate expectations 
pursuant to the Principle of good faith. 
 
3.3 Good Faith as foundational basis for legitimate expectations 
 
The obligation to act in good faith has been generally regarded as a general 
principle of law recognised under international law. Although good faith has 
many manifestations,251  In  Nuclear Tests case the ICJ underscores the 
relevance of good faith in the context of undertaking legal obligations as 
follows: 
“One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal 
obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith….Just as the 
very rule of pacta sunt Servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, 
so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by 
unilateral declaration.”252 
 
 
In the context of investment treaty arbitration, article 31 (1) of the VCLT can 
be regarded as the gate-way through which the tribunals usually invoke the 
concept of good faith in both its interpretive and substantive sense.253 Article 
31 (1) provides that “treaties must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
                                                 
251
 On various manifestations of good faith, see; Robert Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources of International 
Law (With Special Reference to Good Faith)’ (2006) 53 Netherlands International Law Review 1 See 
also;; Thomas Cottier and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations in the WTO’ [2007] Challenge of WTO law : collected essays; AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘The 
Concept of Good Faith in International Investment Disputes - the Arbitrator’s Dilemma’ (2012) 2012 
Amicus Curiae 16; Marion Panizzon, ‘Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: The Protection of 
Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation, and Fair Dispute Settlement’ (Hart ; Schultsess 
2006). 
252
 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) Judgement, [1974] ICJ Rep 457 [49]. 
253
 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation  v United Mexican States (NAFTA ‘Uncitral’) 
[paras 10 & 25]. 
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its object and purpose”.254 While interpreting the treaty standard of fair and 
equitable treatment and the governmental conduct giving rise to compliance 
or violation of the standard, investment treaty tribunals seem to find solace in 
resorting to good faith and its associated principles particularly, the principle 
of legitimate expectations.255 Good faith principle is a recognized principle of 
law from antiquity256 to the modern era.257 According to Thunderbird award, 
good faith is an international customary law principle.258 In his separate 
opinion in Thunderbird, the late professor Walde concluded that although 
legitimate expectations is not explicitly mentioned in the treaty, it is however, 
recognized as part of the good faith principle, therefore a general principle of 
law and a guiding principle for interpreting fair and equitable treatment. 
Subsequent tribunals have continued to justify recourse to good faith 
generally by drawing an analogy with the role of the principle under 
domestic legal systems. For instance, In Malicorp v Egypt, the tribunal 
provides for the justification as follows: 
“It is indisputable,…that the safeguarding of good faith is one of the 
fundamental principles of international law and the law of investments. As in 
domestic law, the principle fulfils a complementary function; it allows for 
                                                 
254 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html 
[accessed 29 May 2014] s Article 31 (1). 
255 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2 (n 2) [para 154]. 
256 The notion of good faith is said to be practiced by ‘…all ancient civilisations as a means of 
recognising the integrity of promises made both within a social order and in the international 
realm…” See ‘International Law in Antiquity | Public International Law’ (Cambridge 
University Press) 52 <http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/law/public-
international-law/international-law-antiquity> accessed 25 November 2014. 
257 ‘Charter of the United Nations’ s Article 2 (2) 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/> accessed 25 November 2014. 
258 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v United Mexican States Mexico (NAFTA 
‘Uncitral’) 147. 
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lacunae in the applicable laws to be filled, and for that law to be clarified by 
the specific application of existing principles.”259  
 
Indeed, the crux of invoking the concept of good faith as the foundational 
basis of investor’s legitimate expectation lies in the neglection or paying lip 
service to the other side of good faith. In other words, while good faith could 
be resorted to as justification for the protection of investor’s legitimate 
expectations, could same concept  justify violations of investor’s legitimate 
expectations in good faith? 
 
Thus, in testing the justification of rooting legitimate expectations pursuant to 
good faith principle, some commentators wondered, whether an 
administrative and frustrating measure in good faith could ever be in 
violation of investor’s legitimate expectations rooted in the notion of good 
faith.260 Indeed, the dilemma in the puzzle is how one good faith could 
invalidate another good faith.   
 
3.4  Scenarios of legitimate expectations in investment treaty Awards 
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 Reference to legitimate expectations in investment treaty arbitration is 
confined to investor’s legitimate expectations. The principle is formulated 
using various expressions such as ‘legitimate expectations’ ‘basic 
expectations’ ‘reasonable expectations’ and ‘investment-backed expectations’. 
There are two main scenarios, giving rise to investor’s legitimate 
expectations.261 First, is where a state makes clear and unequivocal 
representations to a foreign investor, or conduct itself in a specific way, 
thereby forming the basis upon which the foreign investor relies and invests. 
The basis for this scenario is the initial representation/conduct that arose 
from the host state.  The second scenario is where the state offers stable and 
predictable legal framework as the basis upon which the foreign investor 
relies and invests. Unlike the first scenario, the basis for this is the entire 
regulatory framework put in place by the host state. In both scenarios, 
adverse and frustrating measures are likely to result in loss or damages to the 
investor thereby violating investor’s expectations. There is no demarcation 
line between the two main scenarios. As nothing prevents investor’s from 
relying on both from a single set of fact, provided each can be supported. In 
fact, in many cases, the scenarios are either mixed or frustrated by a single 
administrative/regulatory measure.  A hybrid scenario, though controversial 
is where the representation element of the legitimate expectations crystallizes 
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into a contract or license given to a foreign investor.262 Although a discussion 
of the latter will be intersected within the two main scenarios, a typical 
exemplification of this scenario is an investment agreement which provides 
for stabilisation clause.  Stabilisation clauses are generally regarded as a 
contractual device for protecting foreign investment.263Although the precise 
effect of the clause is unclear, the purpose is clearly to reinforce the principle 
of sanctity of contracts. One of the locus classicus arbitrations of stabilisation 
clause is Kuwait v Aminoil.264 The dispute arose when the government of 
Kuwait sought to terminate a sixty years concession with Aminoil. The 
stabilisation clause in the concession contract provides as follows: 
“The Sheikh shall not by general or special legislation or by administrative measures 
or by any other act whatever annul this Agreement except as provided in Article 11. 
No alteration shall be made in terms of this Agreement by either the Sheikh  or the 
Company except in the event of the Sheikh and the company jointly agreeing that it is 
desirable in the interests of both parties to make certain alterations, deletions or 
additions to this Agreement.”265 
 
 
The tribunal held regarding stabilisation clause that although the clause no 
longer retains its ‘absolute character’ nonetheless it provides a basis for 
legitimate expectations as to damages which the tribunal need to recognise. 
According to the tribunal; 
“For assessment of that equilibrium itself, and of the legitimate expectations to which 
it gives rise, it is above all the text of the contract that signifies, and it is of moment 
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that this text should be precise and exhaustive. But it is not only a question of the 
original text; there are also the amendments, the interpretations and the behaviour 
manifested along the course of its existence, that indicate (often fortuitously) how the 
legitimate expectation of the Parties are to be seen, and sometimes seen as becoming 
modified according to the circumstances.”266 
 
 
Since  Aminoil’s reference to legitimate expectations in the context of 
compensation, the scenario remains unclear as to the connection between 
stabilisation clause and investors legitimate expectations. Undoubtedly, not 
only stabilisation clause, the totality of investment contracts could generate 
investor’s legitimate expectations as to performance and compliance with the 
agreed terms. However, where such contract or clause exists, hardly would 
the tribunal’s bother to ascertain any form of expectations beyond the 
contractually agreed terms. Moreover,  stabilisation clauses are purely a 
contractual product, while investor’s legitimate expectations emanates from 
treaty domain. As a commentator warned, “reference to a general vague standard 
of legitimate expectations is no substitute for contractual rights.”267 In Total S.A. v 
Argentina the tribunal delineates the function of stabilisation clause and 
narrows it only to a contract by refusing to acknowledge license as a source of 
stabilisation clause. According to the tribunal; 
“…it is not correct to qualify and treat the TGN Licence provisions as 
stabilisation clauses agreed between Total and Argentina. Stabilisation clauses 
are clauses, which are inserted in state contracts…with the intended effect of 
freezing a specific host State’s legal framework at a certain date, such that the 
adoption of any changes in the legal framework at a certain date, such that the 
adoption of any changes in the legal regulatory framework of the investment 
concerned…would be illegal.”268 
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Similarly, the tribunal in Parkerings v Lithuania and many other awards 
have clearly distinguished ‘expectations’ of compliance with contractual 
clauses and the Principle of legitimate expectations. According to the tribunal 
in Parkerings: 
“The expectation a party to an agreement may have of the regular fulfilment of 
the obligation by the other party is not necessarily an expectation protected by 
international law. In other words, contracts involve intrinsic expectations 
from each party that do not amount to expectations as understood in 
international law. Indeed, the party whose contractual expectations are 
frustrated should, under specific conditions, seek redress before a national 
tribunal.”269 
 
Therefore, while presence of stabilisation clause in the relationship between 
foreign investor and host state could have presented a crystal and upper level 
scenario of legitimate expectations, the practice has shown that where reliance 
is placed on stabilisation clause hardly would the tribunals embark on the 
analysis of ascertaining violation or otherwise of investor’s legitimate 
expecatations. The reason may not be far from the discussion above, that the 
specifity of such contractual commitments as a whole, may not pave way for 
the extrapolation of a principle more particularly when the tribunals are 
cautious not to substitute contractual and even treaty agreements with 
external principles or concepts. As the ad hoc Committee in MTD v Chile 
cautions: 
“The obligations of the host State towards foreign investors derive from the terms of 
the applicable investment treaty…..A tribunal which sought to generate from such 
expecatations a set of rights different from those contained in or enforceable under the 
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BIT might well exceed its powers, and if the difference were material might do so 
manifestly.”270   
 
 
The two main scenarios of investor’s legitimate expectations will be examined 
in the light of the arbitral awards. The analysis will seek to establish from the 
awards, the recognition among tribunals, of the fundamental requirements of 
investor’s legitimate expectations, and the facts giving rise to such 
requirements. 
 
a. Representation/Conduct based scenario: 
Legitimate expectations pursuant to state representations or conduct may 
arise where a state through oral or written representations or conduct gives 
an assurance to a foreign investor that galvanises investor’s expectations. 
These assurances may be conveyed through letters, electronic 
communications, circulars, statements by competent administrative bodies, or 
any other form of communication adopted by the state.  In Thunderbird v 
Mexico the tribunal formulated this form of legitimate expectations as 
follows: 
“…legitimate expectations relates, within the context of the NAFTA 
framework, to a situation where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates 
reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or 
investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that a failure by the 
NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could cause the investor (or 
investment) to suffer damages.”271  
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The fact giving rise to the above formulation is that the claimant obtained a 
written representation regarding the legality of its investment under the 
Mexican laws.  Subsequently, the Mexican government through an 
administrative order revoked the business permit of the claimant on the 
ground that the investment is in violation of the Mexican laws which prohibit 
gambling and luck games. The tribunal after formulating the notion of 
investor’s legitimate expectations (supra) concluded that, in view of the 
investor’s knowledge of the existing Mexican laws regarding gaming, and 
investor’s refusal to disclose fully the ‘chance’ element in its game machine, 
no legitimate expectation is generated  upon which the foreign investor could 
reasonably rely.272  
 
In a separate opinion, Prof Thomas Walde however, disagrees with the 
majority members of the tribunal and opined that the Mexican government 
should be held liable for violating investor’s legitimate expectations. In his 
separate opinion, he opined: 
“Investors need to rely on the stability, clarity and predictability of the 
government’s regulatory and administrative messages as they appear to the 
investor when conveyed-and without escape from such commitments by 
ambiguity and obfuscation inserted into the commitments identified 
subsequently and with hindsight…”273 
  
 
In Tecmed v United Mexican States, the tribunal formulated the principle 
rather widely as follows: 
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“ …in light of  the good faith principle established by international law, 
requires the contracting parties to provide to international investments 
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor 
expects the host state to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and 
totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may 
know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investment, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative 
practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such 
regulations…”274 
 
The nature of investor’s expectations in Tecmed is mixed derived from both 
representation/conduct and regulatory and administrative framework of 
Mexico. The fact giving rise to the above broad formulation arose from a 
revocation of the investor’s unlimited mining license, and replacement of the 
license with a limited license. According to the tribunal, where Mexican state  
through its public authorities refused to renew and extend the investor’s 
permit to enable the investor operate its landfill, notwithstanding an 
expectation to the contrary ‘belongs to the wider framework of the general 
conduct’275 of the state which affects directly the investor and the investment 
in issue. The tribunal considered the principle of legitimate expectations in 
both fair and equitable treatment and expropriation analysis. The nature of 
investor’s legitimate expectations as outlined by the tribunal include, the basic 
expectations the foreign investor had that its investment was lawful and will 
extend over a long term including renewal of required licenses to operate.276 
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Similarly, the subsequent political and social pressure notwithstanding, the 
investor is entitled to expect the host state to abide by its representations or 
conduct regarding its previous decisions on the issuance of the permit and the 
same will not be arbitrarily revoked.277 
 
In Waste Management Inv, v The United Mexican States278 The tribunal, 
though having found no violation of fair and equitable treatment, examined 
the elements that could give rise to violations of fair and equitable treatment. 
According to the tribunal, and in line with SD Myers,279 Mondev,280 ADF,281 
and Loewen,282 regarding the minimum standard of treatment of fair and 
equitable treatment, concluded that it is relevant in applying the standard 
first, there has to be a representation and breach of the representation in the 
form of conduct (frustrative)283 attributable to the host state. Secondly, the 
claimant must have reasonably relied on the representation.284 Lastly, the 
claimant must suffer harm from the conduct. The tribunal’s finding on 
expropriation was evaluated in the light of the surrounding circumstance in 
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which the investment was made.285 In particular, the tribunal noted that 
international law of expropriation is not meant to eradicate normal 
commercial risks or bad business decisions.286 
 
In MTD v Chile287 the claimant alleged that the respondent galvanises its 
expectations by approving the investment project, proposing a location for the 
project and further signing a contract. The claimant further alleged that same 
expectations were frustrated by the respondent due to the subsequent 
disapproval of the project location after the claimant had already committed 
its investment.288 The Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the 
disapproval by the ministry of Housing and Urban Development was due to 
realisation that the project location conflicts with urban development policy.  
Thus, a prudent investor should conduct rigorous due diligence to acquaint 
itself with local laws, regulations and administrative process relevant to its 
investment.289 The tribunal, applying the Tecmed formulation of legitimate 
expectations found that: 
“Approval of a project in a location would give prima facie to an investor the 
expectation that the project is feasible in that location from a regulatory point 
of view…the inconsistency of action between two arms of the same 
Government vis-à-vis the same investor even where the legal framework of the 
country provides for a mechanism to coordinate.”290 
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The tribunal concluded by stressing the obligation of the state to conduct itself 
in a coherent and consistent manner, regardless of how vigilant the foreign 
investor is.291 
 
The respondent dissatisfied with the award proceeded to the annulment 
committee, challenging the award on the ground that the tribunal exceeded 
its limit by applying the Tecmed formulation of legitimate expectations as the 
standard for determining fair and equitable treatment violation.  The 
Committee cautioned the tribunal’s approach of relying heavily on the 
investor’s legitimate expectations, on the ground that host state’s obligations 
do not emanate from the investor’s expectations but from the investment 
treaties.292 More importantly, however, the Committee confirms the relevance 
of legitimate expectations in the determination of treaty standards. The 
committee held: 
“Legitimate expectations generated as a result of the investor’s dealings with 
the competent authorities of the host State may be relevant to the application 
of the guarantees contained in an investment treaty.”293  
 
b. A framework based Scenario: 
Investors’ legitimate expectations could emanate from the overall legal and 
regulatory framework set up by the host state at the time of making an 
investment. The framework, based scenario simply refers to the stability and 
predictability of the legal framework of the host states. The idea stems from 
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the overall inherent nature of a positive investment climate that capital flows 
and thrives in a legal and administrative environment that is stable and 
predictable. States on one hand, normally design their regulatory and 
administrative framework as part of governance policy. Foreign investors on 
the other hand, in addition to their desire for a stable and predictable legal 
and administrative framework do rely on the framework offered by the host 
state in their investment decisions. Therefore, loss or damages, caused by a 
host state’s frustrative measure arising from investor’s reliance on the 
framework offered by the host state, is likely to violate  investment treaty 
provisions relating to fair and equitable treatment. In this sense, stable and 
predictable legal framework is linked to the treaty obligation of treating 
foreign investment fairly and equitably. 294 One of the locus classicus awards 
on stable legal framework, is Metalclad295 where incoherence and lack of 
coordination and transparency between federal, state and municipality led to 
violation of Metalclad’s legitimate expectations that it would be treated fairly 
and justly. According to the tribunal: 
“Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for 
Metalclad’s business planning and investment. The totality of these 
circumstances demonstrates a lack of orderly process and timely disposition in 
relation to an investor of a party acting in the expectation that it would be 
treated fairly and justly in accordance with NAFTA.”296 
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Most of the cases against Argentina, pursuant to their economic crisis fall 
within this category. For instance, in CMS v. Argentina297, LG & E v. 
Argentina298 and Sempra v Argentina299 and Enron Corporation v Argentina300 
most of the tribunals held that measures introduced by Argentina during its 
economic crisis violated investors legitimate expectations of stable and 
predictable legal framework. The Enron award is enlightening in this regard, 
as it captures the findings in both CMS and LG & E.  Enron instituted the 
claim against Argentina regarding certain tax assessments allegedly imposed 
by some provinces in respect of a gas transportation company in which Enron 
participated through a number of corporate arrangements. In addition, Enron 
registered an ancillary claim with respect to the refusal of the Argentinean 
Government to allow tariff adjustments in accordance with the United States 
Producer Price Index. Later, Enron suspended the original claim and 
continued with the ancillary claim. One of the causes of action invoked by 
Enron is violation of legitimate expectations regarding stable and predictable 
legal framework pursuant to Article II (2) (a) of the US-Argentine BIT which 
provides for fair and equitable treatment. According to Enron, the relevant 
guarantees contained in the Argentinean legislation, and the ‘frustrative’ 
measures adopted by Argentina, violated ‘every commitment’ made in its 
own legislative acts, such as the Gas Law, Gas Decree and the License.  
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On its own side, the Argentinean Government argued that violation of FET 
standard should be evidenced and be premised on ‘inconsistency in State 
action, radical and arbitrary modification of the regulatory framework, or 
endless normative changes to the detriment of the investor’s businesses. It 
followed that none of the foregoing was ‘present in the instant case where the 
measures adopted were eminently reasonable in the light of the economic 
crisis described and the changes in the economic conditions of the country’.301  
The Tribunal having made references to the findings of OEPC, CMS, LG&E 
Energy Corp v. Argentine Republic tribunals concluded that a key element of 
fair and equitable treatment is the requirement of a ‘stable framework for the 
investment’. It followed that measures taken by the Argentinean Government 
have significantly changed the regime under which the investment was 
initially undertaken and implemented.302 Therefore, the Tribunal found 
Argentinean Government in breach of investor’s legitimate expectations with 
respect to the FET due to the removal of stable and predictable framework 
that induced the investment of Enron.303      
 
In addition to the Argentinean cases, three other cases all brought against 
Ecuador illustrates the framework scenario form of investor’s legitimate 
expectations and its recognition in investment treaty arbitration. These cases 
are OEPC v. Ecuador,304 MCI Power Group v Ecuador305 and Duke v. 
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Ecuador.306 In all the three cases, the tribunals have recognized that stable and 
predictable legal regime forms part of investor’s legitimate expectations and is 
linked to fair and equitable treatment.307  In OEPC, the claimant succeeded in 
establishing that failure on the side of the Ecuadorian government to refund 
VAT charges to the claimant violated investor’s legitimate expectations since, 
the refund, forms part of the overall legal and business framework upon 
which the investment was made.308 The MCI Power tribunal on the other 
hand, recognises the obligation of fulfilling legitimate expectations but, 
stresses the need of establishing clarity and exactness of the expectations as 
opposed to mere claimant’s perception or believes.309   The fact in Duke 
captures the formulation of legitimate expectations and raises some salient 
issues regarding setting a limit to the protection of investor’s expectations. 
The central argument regarding fair and equitable treatment was that 
Ecuador failed to maintain stable and predictable framework for the 
Claimants’ investment, and failed to act transparently and in accordance with 
the Claimants’ reasonable and legitimate expectations. Claimant argued that 
investment was undertaken ‘with the reasonable and legitimate expectations 
that the Government of Ecuador would act strictly in accordance with its laws 
and contractual obligations’. The Claimant further contended that Ecuador’s 
commitments were demonstrated in written and oral assurances 
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communicated by high-ranking government officials at the pre-investment 
stage, which, as the Claimant alleged, were not complied with. Meanwhile, 
Ecuadorian Government denied the claims and objected, stating that the 
Claimants had neither evidenced that their expectations were built upon the 
State’s conduct, nor that such expectations were destroyed ‘as opposed to 
merely upset’ as a result of obscure State conduct.310 The Tribunal relying on 
the formulations of legitimate expectations in the CMS, Tecmed, Occidential v. 
Ecuador, LG&E v. Argentina cases, noted that the stability of the legal and 
business environment is directly linked to the investor’s justified 
expectations.311 The Tribunal held that:  
“…. such expectations are an important element of fair and equitable treatment. At 
the same time, it is mindful of their limitations. To be protected, the investor’s 
expectations must be legitimate and reasonable at the time when the investor makes 
the investment. The assessment of the reasonableness or legitimacy must take into 
account all circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, 
but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in 
the host State. In addition, such expectations must arise from the conditions that the 
State offered the investor and the latter must have relied upon them when deciding to 
invest”312 
  
In addition to the above, the award raises some salient issues. First, the 
tribunal noted that a single hail of legitimate expectations may not necessarily 
work for all claimants in a situation where there is more than one claimant as 
revealed before the tribunal.313 The reason being their expectations may not 
necessarily be identical. Secondly, the tribunal alluded to a view where the 
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requirement of the reasonableness of legitimate expectations can be deemed 
regardless of the potency of establishing lack of vigilance and prudence on the 
side of the foreign investor.314 
 
In all the awards considered above, the claimants mostly succeeded either in 
full or in part in establishing a violation of their legitimate expectations.  
 
Indeed, there is controversy regarding the recognition of this form of 
legitimate expectations particularly among the commentators.315 In addition, 
although considerable numbers of investment tribunals have recognised this 
form of expectations, others took a diametrically opposite position. For 
instance, in Gami,316  EDF,317 Glamis,318 and Parkerings,319 the tribunals 
appear to begin to tame the broad formulation and application of legitimate 
expectations.  One of the methods deployed by the tribunals is by stressing 
the internal scrutiny tests regarding legitimacy on the expectations sought to be 
protected and heightening the ascertainment of the totality of all the relevant 
elements required in establishing the existence of legitimate expectations. In 
Gami Investments, Inc v. The Government of United Mexican States the 
Claimant argued that it suffered losses due to the failure of the respondent to 
enforce export quotas, which frustrated its legitimate expectations that ‘the 
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government shall announce annually individual export quotas for all mills 
and shall promptly enforce non-compliance’. According to the tribunal, the 
claimant failed to establish violation of legitimate expectations under fair and 
equitable treatment due to the absence of a clear and unambiguous 
affirmation in the Mexican regulatory regime as perceived by the foreign 
investor.320 Moreover, according to the tribunal, the role of investment treaty 
tribunals is not to evaluate the propriety or otherwise of host state’s 
regulatory frameworks, but to assess how the existing regulatory framework 
had been applied to the foreign investor.321   The tribunals held thus: 
“International law does not appraise the content of a regulatory programme 
extant before an investor decides to commit. The inquiry is whether the state 
abided by or implemented that programme. It is in this sense that 
government’s failure to implement or abide by its own law in a manner 
adversely affecting a foreign investor may but will not necessarily lead to a 
violation of Article 1105…”322 
 
The tribunal clearly brought to light the ‘time factor’ in the analysis of 
investor’s legitimate expectations.323 
 
Similarly, in EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania324 The Claimant alleged that 
the conduct of Romania with regards to its investments violated Romania’s 
obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment. Romania on the other 
hand, objected to the claims of EDF arguing that fair and equitable treatment 
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is an objective legal standard; comply with, which is heavily fact-dependent 
and case-specific, and more importantly, emphasis should be put on the 
investor’s objective legitimate expectations and not the subjective stance 
thereof. Arguing further, Romania noted that the claimant could not have had 
legitimate expectations that its contractual rights ‘would exist beyond the 
expiration of their specified term, much less that such contracts would be 
renewed regardless of commercial considerations’.325     
 
The Tribunal made it clear that it shared the view expressed by previous 
tribunals regarding the recognition of legitimate expectations as a whole. It 
noted, however, that: 
“The idea that legitimate expectations, and therefore FET, imply the stability of the 
legal and business framework, may not be correct if stated in an overly-broad and 
unqualified formulation.  The FET might then mean the virtual freezing of the legal 
regulation of economic activities, in contrast with the State’s normal regulatory 
power and the evolutionary character of economic life. Except where specific promises 
or representations are made by the State to the investor, the latter may not rely on a 
bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any 
changes in the host State’s legal and economic framework. Such expectation would be 
neither legitimate nor reasonable.”326 
 
The tribunal concluded that such expectations cannot be solely subjective and 
merely interpret the investor’s standing. In the Tribunal’s view, expectations 
at the time the investment was made, as well as all the circumstances of the 
case should be examined with due regard to the host state’s regulatory 
powers in the public interest. In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal held in 
favor of the Respondent.   
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In Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States of America,327 The State of California 
imposes more reclamation requirement contrary to the initial legal and 
business framework in which the claimant invests. The claimant argued that 
claimant measure, through federal and state actions, expropriated its mining 
rights and was further denied fair and equitable treatment by violating its 
legitimate expectations to transparent and predictable legal and business 
framework. The Tribunal noted the practice of previous tribunals and agreed 
with International Thunderbird that:  
“ …legitimate expectations relate to an examination under Article 1105(1) in 
such situations where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable and 
justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in 
reliance on said conduct … In this way, a State may be tied to the objective 
expectations that it creates in order to induce investment.”328  
 
However, the tribunal departed from most of the previous tribunals by 
rejecting any form of legitimate expectations pursuant to the stable and 
predictable framework. According to the tribunal: 
“…a violation of Article 1105 based on the unsettling of reasonable, 
investment-backed expectation requires, as a threshold circumstance, at least a 
quasi-contractual relationship between the State and the investor, whereby the 
state has purposely and specifically induced the investment.”329 
 
Applying the above formulation the tribunal held that the subsequent 
regulatory and administrative measure ‘…was not arbitrary or manifestly 
without reasons; was not blatantly unfair or evidently discriminatory; nor did it 
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repudiate expectations formed by a quasi-contractual relationship or evidence a 
complete lack of due process’.330  
 
Indeed, the Glamis award contributed in setting a threshold of quasi contract 
in the requirement of investor’s legitimate expectations. This in a way 
explains its concurrence with Thunderbird, which defines legitimate 
expectations based on representation/conduct scenario. In addition, the 
tribunal’s emphasis on additional qualifiers such as ‘purposely’ and 
‘specifically’ in relation to the host states’ inducement to the foreign investor 
could by the wordings of the tribunal elsewhere,331 make the standard of 
inducement more stringent. 
 
Lastly, In Parkerings v Lithuania332  the Claimant alleged that its legitimate 
expectations of stable legal and business environment have been violated by 
the Lithuanian authorities due to their failure  to respect and protect the legal 
and economic integrity of their agreement. According to the tribunal, whilst 
host state’s explicit or implicit representations are conducive to and create 
legitimate expectations on investor’s part, in the absence of such explicit 
assurance ‘the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the agreement are 
decisive to determine if the expectation of the investor was legitimate.’333 It 
was further held that while an investor does have a right to a ‘certain stability 
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and predictability of the legal environment’, the investor must demonstrate 
that ‘it exercised due diligence and that its legitimate expectations were 
reasonable in light of the circumstances.’334 More importantly, the tribunal 
unequivocally places the burden of anticipation of framework changes on the 
investor. Accordingly,  
‘… an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could change, and thus 
structure its investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal 
environment.’335 
 
Flowing from the awards considered under the two scenarios, a prima facie 
investor’s legitimate expectations plea need to satisfy the following 
fundamental requirements: 1. Representation or ‘conduct’ from the host state. 
2. Reliance ie ‘reliance on the said conduct’ by the foreign investor. 3. 
Detrimental measure in form of frustration, or ‘failure…to honour’. 4. 
Damages ie (the foreign must have suffered damage or loss as a result of the 
measure). In addition, the requirement of stable legal and administrative 
framework is another fundamental requirement to framework scenario as 
highlighted in the Argentinean and Ecuadorian cases. It is still debatable 
whether; the requirement of stable legal and administrative framework could 
substitute the requirement of representation or conduct where there is none. 
As Parkerings, Glamis, EDF, and Gami suggest, anything short of 
representation or conduct could hardly satisfy the legal requirement of 
‘representation/conduct capable of inducing reliance’. 
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In addition to the fundamental requirements, there are sub-elements which 
need to be factored into the analysis of legitimate expectations. For instance, 
the tribunal in Waste management factored ‘surrounding circumstance’ in its 
analysis and hinted at the hazard of mixing ordinary business and 
commercial risk with an expropriatory measure  both of which must be 
separated. The tribunal in Parkering stresses the obligation of the foreign 
investor to conduct its due-diligence.336 This requirement, on the face of it 
contradicts MTD tribunal which in a way deemphasizes the role of investor’s 
vigilance and prudence ‘in investment decision making’ as a factor in the 
analysis of legitimate expectations.337 Similarly, while some of the tribunals 
adopted a generous analysis of the sub-elements leading to a broader 
formulation and application of the principle, others particularly the later 
tribunals have squeezed the sub-elements in their analysis to a much 
narrower formulation and application of the principle.  
 
Therefore, the role of the sub-elements appears very crucial to the formulation 
and application of legitimate expectations. As most of the awards kick-started 
the process of unveiling the sub-elements, it becomes necessary to examine 
the sub-elements critically under the umbrella of their fundamental 
requirements which have now been established as a sine - quo non to 
legitimate expectations plea. In doing that, the following posers that lingered 
from the current survey of the awards will be tested. For instance, what are 
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the constituent elements of the fundamental requirements of legitimate 
expectations? In other words, what constitutes representation/conduct? What 
constitutes reliance? What are the essential characteristics of frustrative 
measure? What is the quantum of loss or damages? What are the factors to be 
considered in the analysis of the surrounding circumstance? What is the 
proper reasonability test? And above all, what makes expectations legitimate? 
 
3.5  Tension in the formulation and application of legitimate 
expectations 
The formulation and application of legitimate expectations by investment 
treaty tribunals as highlighted earlier, is largely informed by the obligation of 
host states to treat foreign investment fairly and equitably. The crystallization 
of such expectations into a protected obligation is further linked to the public 
and administrative law idea, that private and individual entitlement must be 
protected against abuse by public authorities. In this regard, the role of 
investor’s legitimate expectations is to safeguard and protect investors from 
detrimental changes to regulatory and administrative policies of the host 
state. The extent to which investors should be protected against regulatory 
and administrative changes is yet unclear. Is the protection absolute? Could 
there be justified reasons for not protecting investor’s legitimate expectations?  
 
Host states on the other hand, are by their nature regulators administrators 
and policy makers. Their power to regulate and administer policies had for 
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long been recognised under the customary international law concept of police 
powers.338 In recognition of such sovereign attribute, the PCIJ in Oscar Chin339 
reaffirmed such principle, while rejecting the argument that good will is a right 
that could be expropriated. The Court held accordingly, that risks due to the 
general economic conditions are inescapable by enterprises and therefore 
states should not be held liable.340 Indeed, there is danger of infringing private 
right in sweeping application of sovereign or police powers in transnational 
investment relationship.  The state’s pursuant to their legitimate regulatory 
and administrative powers, may negatively impact upon investor’s legitimate 
expectations. This is more imminent, in the highest regulatory and 
administrative areas, such as public health, public moral, human rights, 
environment, taxation, or overall public interest, due to necessity or mere 
public choice. The arbitral awards discussed earlier have shown such tension 
of the interface and overlap between the competing values. The nagging 
question then, is where should the right balance be struck? 
 
Undoubtedly, deterring public authorities from performing their regulatory 
and administrative functions, short of abuse, is likely to generate a chilled - 
effect on the state’s performance of sovereign functions, including assuming 
newer commitments. It must be noted particularly, flowing from the awards 
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analysed, that where investor’s legitimate expectations are formulated 
narrowly by the tribunal, it will likely attract the narrower application of the 
principle which may in turn, undermine the treaty protections afforded to the 
foreign investors in international law. Similarly, a broader approach to the 
investor’s legitimate expectations has the potential of undermining host states 
regulatory and administrative functions in the public interest. The Saluka 
tribunal captures this dilemma in the context of expropriation in the following 
words: 
 
“…international law …has yet to draw a bright and easily distinguishable 
line between non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, on the other, 
measures that have the effect of depriving foreign investors of their 
investment…It thus inevitably left to the adjudicator to determine…”341 
 
The tribunal further added in the context of legitimate expectations: 
 
“In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s 
expectations was justified and reasonable, the host state’s legitimate right 
subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be taken 
into consideration as well…”342 
 
Therefore, balancing between investor’s legitimate expectations and state’s 
legitimate regulatory functions is an adjudicatory task to be undertaken by 
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investment treaty tribunals. In balancing between the two competing 
principles, the tribunals in S d Mayers, Gami, Methanex, Parkerings, Glamis, 
and EDF, have all shown some form of moderation towards deference to the 
host states. This is a departure from the early arbitral awards that seem to 
formulate and apply the principle broadly.  According to SD Myers tribunal, 
international law has accorded ‘high measure of deference’ to host states and 
must therefore be observed by investment treaty tribunals.343 
 
It is in this context, that the doctrine of margin of appreciation is proposed to 
play a central role in equipping the tribunals with systematic tools in 
drenching the tension between investor’s legitimate expectations and state’s 
legitimate regulatory and administrative functions. Indeed, the margin of 
appreciation has its conceptual root under public law. Therefore, unless 
investment treaty arbitration can be understood as having some relationship 
with public law, mere transplanting of margin of appreciation may result in 
exercise in futility, as the regime may lack the requisite pillars to support its 
application. In this regard, it becomes pertinent to appraise various 
contending approaches of the entire investment treaty regime. The next 
section shall begin by tracing the conceptual approaches to investment treaty 
arbitration in general, with a view to lay the proper background for analysing 
other regimes and explore methods of extracting lessons from their 
formulation and application of investor’s legitimate expectations.  
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3.6 Conceptual Approaches to Investment Treaty Arbitration 
Conceptually, one may be tempted to begin by asking the pertinent questions 
of which approach better illustrates that nature of investment treaty 
arbitration? And by extension, which, better accommodates and justifies 
investors’ legitimate expectations? In resisting the temptation of addressing 
such murky questions, a distant albeit efficacious reminder compelled us to 
pause to the reason that contending approaches in legal parlance can hardly 
succumb to formal categorisations, so also analogies. As a commentator 
opined, “any attempt to categorize adjudicative reasoning risks 
oversimplification”.344 Late Thomas Walde in his work on treaty interpretation 
appraises various contending approaches in investment treaty arbitration, 
particularly the blunt grouping of Pro-investor vs Pro-state or dictionary vs 
policy interpretive approaches. The preference for professional technical 
approach suggested by Walde is hinged on the expected role to be played by 
some sort of epistemic community of scholars and arbitrators that could 
facilitate the emergence of international common law of investment 
arbitration.345 Undoubtedly, the emergence of such collegial approach 
contemplated by Walde manifested in the regime, except with a varied 
intuitive agendas, on one hand theorising and concretising the scholarly 
dimension the regime, and on the other hand posing challenges to the regime. 
These approaches are numerous and open-ended, suffices, however to 
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mention that among the major ‘traditional’ approaches are 
Private/Commercial law approach, and Public Law approach. Other sub and 
evolving approaches include Investor rights approach, Commercial 
Arbitration approach, Public International law approach and recently, 
Comparative Public Law, Global Administrative law, and Constitutional 
Justice Approaches.346  These approaches clearly overlap in their countours 
and to some extent are repetitive. Evaluation of the totality of the approaches 
is outside the purview of this research.  
 
a. Public International Law Approach: 
The public International approach generally places emphasis on the reciprocal 
nature of relations between states.347 Accordingly, state actions and conduct 
either treaty-based or otherwise are largely interpreted and conceived by the 
adjudicators from the prism of its actors being state entities. In appraising the 
relationship between public international law and investment treaty 
arbitration, clearly, the nature and historicity of investment treaty arbitration 
undisputedly makes the regime, a product of public international law though 
with a unique feature.348 As treaty based regime, with rich history from 
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diplomatic protection to its contemporary outlook where investors can 
directly institute an action against sovereign states pursuant to an investment 
treaty seals the public international law identity of the regime beyond any 
coalescing pedantrism. In Loewen the tribunal asserting the public 
international law identity of investment treaty arbitration pursuant to NAFTA 
opined: 
“NAFTA claims have a quite different character, stemming from a corner of public 
international law in which, by treaty, the power of States under that law to take 
international measures for the correction of wrongs done to its nationals has been 
replaced by an ad hoc definition of certain kinds of wrong coupled with specialist 
means of compensation.” 
 
Approaching investment treaty arbitration from pure public international law 
perspective is likely to produce a mismatch349 due to the presence of 
additional yet vital entity otherwise referred to as ‘foreign investor’ in the 
matrix of the relationship between states concluding investment treaties. In 
other words, arbitrators will find it easier to interpret and ascertain the 
intention of the parties to a reciprocal bargain without subjecting themselves 
to the excruciating effort of discerning the action and behaviour of a non-
Party to the bargain as a stand-alone entity.  In addition, the multiplicity and 
proliferation of varied regimes within public international could bar efforts in 
advancing a holistic public international law approach in investment treaty 
arbitration.  
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b. Private law – Contractual Approach: 
The private law conception of investment treaty regime in general and 
investor’s legitimate expectations in particular is anchored on the private law 
adjudicatory process adapted by the regime. This is regardless of the apparent 
public international law identity of the regime. Private law approach, like 
public law approach, has many appellations. Amongst its appellations 
includes contractual approach, commercial arbitration approach and investor 
right approach.  The hallmark of the private law approach is the incorporation 
of private law or private international law mechanisms of dispute settlement 
to investment arbitration. Some of the private law and commercial arbitration 
elements prevalent in investment treaty arbitration include choice of law by 
the parties, conduct of arbitration, the remedies available, and enforcement of 
arbitral awards. This mix up between public and private elements in 
investment treaty arbitration breeds what some commentators termed as 
‘hybrid foundations’ of the regime.350 Substantively, the approach appears to 
place greater importance on private law principles at times at the expense of 
the public law identity of the regime. Thus, expansive interpretations 
regarding fulfillment of obligations and recurrent reliance on Pacta sunt 
Servanda and good faith obligations seem to take centre stage in analysing the 
substantive standards of treatment contained in the regime.351  
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In situating the private law approach to investor’s legitimate expectations, as 
expected, no tribunal appears to openly endorse any conceptual approach of 
its application of investor’s legitimate expectations, with the exception of few 
arbitral awards.352 However, traces of private law/contractual approach can 
be discerned from the pattern of analysis adopted by the tribunals. For 
instance, as discussed earlier, many tribunals rejected investor’s legitimate 
expectations pursuant to a legal framework set up by the host due to the 
absence of clear representation.353 Undoubtedly, the requirement of clear 
assurance need not to be extended further to denote some form of contractual 
bargain. Thus, tribunals insisting on the presence of some sort of contractual 
or quasi contractual form as a necessary element in establishing investor’s 
legitimate expectations, risks the adoption of a totally contractual approach at 
the expense of the public law identity of the relationship between foreign 
investors and host states, where individuals such as foreign investors do not 
enjoy the bonafide locus to ‘demand’ but can only act upon what the state 
voluntarily gives or promises to give. Thus, states either voluntarily 
undertakes or not. In Glamis Gold the tribunal draws analogy with a quasi 
contract as a threshold for entertaining claims alleging violation of investor’s 
legitimate expectations. Indeed, the assumpsit theory as an underlying basis 
for enforcing quasi contract obligations could hardly be equated with any 
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comparator or even rationalized in a Public, Administrative or Constitutional 
law reasoning. Although, the outcome of Glamis Gold and other similar 
tribunals  such as Methanex that rejected the formation of investor’s 
legitimate expectations pursuant to legal framework due to the absence of a 
specific assurance succeeded in substantively narrowing the scope of 
legitimate expectations, the reasoning followed by the tribunals particularly 
Glamis Gold, regarding quasi contract analogy may be read with caution. 
First, the reasoning may be at variance with the notion of investment 
planning and projection, which is at the heart of almost every rational 
investment decision making. Second, the nature of legal relationships arising 
out of administrative, constitutional or public law do not call, contemplate or 
even made it feasible to envisage explicit contractual reciprocity between 
public body and private entities.  Except in specific transactions, the 
overriding nature of such relationship is governed by publicness.354  
 
More importantly, the private law approach has its own fallacies having 
regard to the nature of claims arising out of alleged frustrations of investor’s 
expectations. The nature of the such claims most often, are far from private 
law or contractual claims.  For instance, in Thunderbird v Mexico the 
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investor challenged the revocation of its business permit through an 
administrative order as tantamount to violation of its legitimate expectations. 
In Tecmed v United Mexican States the investor challenged the revocation of 
its mining license and the refusal to renew same as amounting to a violation 
of its legitimate expectations. In Enron v Argentina the crux of the investor’s 
claim is the refusal of the Argentinian government to allow tariff adjustments 
which Enron considered as a frustrating measure and in violation of 
Argentinian Gas law, Decree and License. The nature of these cases, and 
indeed many other cases, clearly shows that the disputes are not private law 
or pure commercial disputes, rather are public and administrative law 
disputes whose nature need to be delineated. As late Brownlie remarked in 
the CME v Czech Republic: 
“It is simply unacceptable to insist that the subject-matter is exclusively 
‘commercial’ in character or that the interests in issues are, more or less, only 
those of investor. Such an approach involves setting aside a number of 
essential elements in the Treaty relation. This first element is the significance 
of the fact that the Respondent is a Sovereign State, which is responsible for 
the well-being of its people. This is not to confer a privilege on the Czech 
Republic but only to recognise its special character and responsibilities. The 
Czech Republic is not a commercial entity.”355 
 
Therefore, in recognising the special character of states as sovereign entity, the 
public law approach emerges and appears more plausible in explaining the 
nature of investment treaty arbitration, and providing a suitable approach 
towards formulation of investor’s legitimate expectations due to its 
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recognition of administrative and constitutional mandate of states to 
discharge their sovereign functions. 
 
c. Public law – Comparative Public law and Constitutional Approach: 
The public law approach is currently one of the most contending approaches 
advocated by many scholars of international investment law. The crux of the 
public law approach is the recognition of the public character of the 
substantive issues covered by investment treaty disputes and the identity of 
the states as sovereign entities. States as parties to investment treaties and 
parties before investment treaty tribunals are not the same as foreign 
investors. States are sovereign, subject to public law domestically, and subject 
to public international law under international law. Most of the factual causes 
giving rise to action regarding violations of investor’s legitimate expectations 
are instances where states engage in the exercise of their regulatory or 
administrative functions. Generally, regulatory and administrative activities 
of states as it relates to individuals include powers to tax, enforce laws, and 
administer governance as whole.  On the face of it, states presumably exercise 
such powers in the public interest and welfare. Thus, disputes arising out of 
the exercise of such regulatory and administrative functions of states need to 
be understood as public law disputes, according to public law approach.  
The support for the public law approach manifested in the corpus of 
investment treaty arbitration discourse in varied though related conceptions. 
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Among various sub-conceptions of public law, are administrative and 
constitutional dimensions. Van Hatten and Loughlin have described the 
investment treaty regime as specie of global administrative law.356 They built 
their argument on the premise that investment treaty regime as a whole is a 
means of judicially reviewing and controlling the exercise of public authority 
by the states and their organs. In justifying their thesis, they argued that the 
global administrative law feature lies in the fact that investment treaty 
tribunals established pursuant to the laws of one state could resolve 
regulatory dispute involving another state.357 Van Hatten subsequently 
confined his theory by concretizing the public law approach in his work 
‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law’.358 According to Van Hatten, 
investment treaty tribunals should recognise the public nature of investment 
disputes and other wider regulatory issues involved in the settlement of 
investment disputes including public dissent to investment projects. Walde 
while expanding the public law approach introduces comparativism into the 
public law approach in his separate opinion in Thunderbird v Mexico. 
Walde’s thesis of comparative public law approach entails both horizontal 
extractions of public law principles from various domestic legal systems and 
vertical extraction from other international and supra national regimes.  In 
justifying comparative public law as opposed to private or contractual 
approach, Walde alluded that “…contract law – presuming the existence of two 
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equal parties in a commercial contract is less relevant than comparative public law 
with respect to the judicial review of governmental conduct.”359  Kolo developing 
further on the relevance of vertical extraction of public law principles from 
other international law regimes, underscores the relevance of balancing in 
deploying margin of appreciation by investment treaty tribunals to decide 
appropriateness or otherwise of exchange restrictions.360 Indeed, the support 
for public law approach from juridical view point is reflected in the plethora 
of arbitral awards discussed above. For instance, in SD Myers v Canada361 the 
tribunal conceded to the public law nature of investment treaty arbitration 
and concurred with the public international law position in according high 
measure of deference to states. Similarly, the tribunals in Saluka,362 Tecmed,363 
Methanex, Parkerings, and recently Total364 all pointed towards recognition 
of the Public law approach and reformulation of investor’s legitimate 
expectations from the prism of Public Law. As Toto tribunal recently 
remarked; 
“The fair and equitable treatment standard of international law does not 
depend on the perception of the frustrated investor, but should use public 
international law and comparative domestic public law as a benchmark. As 
was recently confirmed in Total S.A. v. Argentina, “a comparative analysis of 
what is considered generally fair and unfair conduct by domestic public 
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authorities in respect to private investors and firms in domestic law may also 
be relevant to identify the legal standards under BITS.”365  
  
3.7 Conclusion 
An attempt has been made to present an analytical account of legitimate 
expectations in investment treaty arbitration. What emerges from the 
overview undertaken, are two major factual scenarios that could give rise to 
investor’s legitimate expectations. Both the scenarios as recognised by the 
investment treaty tribunals must satisfy the four essential ingredients of 
legitimate expectations namely, a. Representation/Conduct or framework b. 
Reliance c. Frustration and d. Damages. The awards surveyed, however, fell 
short of first, unearthing the constituents of each of the essential ingredients 
to enable subsequent tribunals to apply the principle coherently. This 
problem of ambiguity and gaps in the analysis led to the oscillation of 
narrower/broader formulation and application of the principle by the 
tribunals. Undoubtedly, the normative content of the principle is glaringly 
absent. Factors and elements that could aid in developing the normative 
content of the principle have either been absent in the analysis, or 
superficially mentioned by the tribunals devoid of any legal weight. Suffices 
to conclude, however, that the open-ended list of some of the glaring sub-
elements that features in the awards such as reasonability, unilateral 
representation, legitimacy, time factor, surrounding circumstance, prudence/due 
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diligence would require a more sophisticated approach to define and buttress 
their role in the overall analysis of legitimate expectations. 
  
It is in this context, the thesis shall recommend that the tribunals should 
outsource the formulation and application of the principle of legitimate 
expectations from the general International law. The jurisprudence of the 
PCIJ/ICJ, and early international tribunals on legitimate expectations, 
estoppel, abuse of right, and acquiescence could provide a suitable 
framework for transposing evaluative elements to enrich investment treaty 
tribunals. In addition, specialized and mature regimes such as WTO Panels 
and Appellate Bodies, European Court of Justice and European Court of 
Human Rights have all dealt with the principle of legitimate expectations. The 
jurisprudence of such specialized regimes could aid investment treaty 
tribunals in reformulating the principle and applying it in investment treaty 
regime.  Transposing and transplanting or cross fertilization among 
international adjudicative bodies is quite in tandem with the notion of ‘unity 
of international law’. In this regard, article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT provides for 
application relevant rules of international law applicable in relation to parties  
with a view to interpret international treaties and integrate other fields of 
international law relevant to the determination in dispute. 366 
 
  
                                                 
366 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html 
[accessed 29 May 2014] (n 30). 
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Chapter IV:  Legitimate Expectations - Legitimate Expectations under 
General International Law, and World Trade Organisation 
 
4.0  Introduction 
“A man may think he ought to fulfil a 
promise, but his thinking that he has an 
obligation cannot actually be the source 
of the obligation, if it was only honest 
men would be bound…”367 
(Atiyah) 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the principle of legitimate 
expectations is now well- entrenched in the jurisprudence of investment 
treaty arbitration. Most of the tribunals have gradually anchored their 
formulation and application of the principle under the broad International 
law concept of Good Faith.368  In international law, as manifestation of good 
faith, the principle of legitimate expectations has been gradually developed 
by the PCIJ, ICJ, International Arbitral Tribunals, WTO dispute settlement 
bodies, European Union Courts, and the European court of Human rights. 
This gradual development came at a time when investment treaty regime is 
struggling to coherently formulate and apply the principle in its domain. 
Reflecting on the investment arbitration arbitral awards as alluded inter alia, 
their formulation and application of legitimate expectations is inchoate and 
                                                 
367 PS Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (Clarendon Press 1981) 18. 
368 For instance in Tecmed v Mexico the tribunal held: ‘...in light of the good faith principle 
established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international 
investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account 
by the foreign investor to make the investment.’ See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. 
The United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 (n 24) 54. 
152 
 
glaringly inconsistent. The tribunals have not adumbrated the content and the 
required elements needed in substantively relying on the principle. The 
importance of such elements can hardly be overstated, given the fact that the 
tribunals would have to appraise such elements before reaching a verdict 
whether legitimate expectations exists in a given fact or not, and whether  it’s 
been violated or not. The focus of this chapter is on the jurisprudence of 
legitimate expectations under general International law as a whole and WTO 
in particular. The underlying assumption of the chapter is to the effect that the 
jurisprudence of both general international law and WTO can provide 
guidance for investment treaty tribunals to formulate and apply the principle 
of legitimate expectations coherently.  The Tribunals can learn and transpose 
certain evaluative principles used by the adjudicative and dispute settlement 
bodies of Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), International Tribunals, WTO panels and Appellate bodies. 
Thus, by engaging general international law where the principle of legitimate 
expectations is formulated and applied either directly or through its 
associated principles, a comprehensive and contextual account of the 
principle from the general international law, and WTO in particular could 
provide a basis for an integrative and systemic approach of transposing the 
needed content into investment treaty tribunals. 
 
The chapter is divided into four broad headings. Section one briefly 
introduces the chapter as a whole; section two provides an overview of 
153 
 
‘expectation-protective’ principles under the general international law, and 
further dealt with the principles in detail.  Section three provides an analytical 
account of the principle under WTO. Section four concludes with a way-
forward towards an integrative approach.  
 
4.1 Legitimate Expectations under General International Law: An 
Overview of Related Principles 
The General conception of states as corporate entities under international law 
invariably necessitates that states operate through the medium of 
representation.369 Various state officials and executive officers of states are 
considered capable of representing state and conveying state consent in the 
discharge of their official functions. Normally such conveyed consent leads to 
a mutual understanding between two or more states and eventually 
culminates into a binding agreement otherwise referred to as treaty. 
However, not all state consents are mutual, treaty based or even express. State 
representatives may function in a manner short of precise expression of 
mutual state consent, the nature of which may render state consent to be 
implied or assumed. Indeed, the problem with such functions (action or 
conduct) is how to attribute legal effect to it having contravened the 
traditional norm of attributing legal effect to state action or conduct. The 
agency through which states function and the consequent legal effect to it  
under general international law can be qualified under legitimate expectation 
                                                 
369 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 
2012) 415. 
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or its associated principles of  abuse of right, acquiescence, equity, estoppel, good 
faith, reasonableness and unilateral declarations all with a view to protect 
legitimate expectations. In this chapter, these principles shall be regarded as 
‘expectation-protective’ due to their functional similarity, overlap, and more 
importantly choice for ‘ordering factor’370. One of the relevant works that 
swayed between these principles is Dr Slouka’s work on the International 
Custom and Continental Shelf.371 According to Slouka; 
“…it is not important whether or not a term other than estoppel is used to 
describe the eventual consequences of a legal customary relationship of two or 
more states;…estoppel is an abstract embodiment of the international 
necessity and obligation of states to fulfil between themselves such 
expectations as each of them may have created in others by its actions or 
inactivity.”372 
 
D’Amato while commenting on Slouka’s work above, pointed out that Slouka 
upon discovering some connection among some of these principles, he later 
abandoned his finding on estoppel to “expectation-reliance” complex.373 
Michael Byers also alluded to the comprehensiveness of legitimate 
expectations to cover all the associated ‘expectation-related’ principles. 374 
                                                 
370 D’Amato narrated how Dr Slouka abandoned his doctoral finding from estoppel to 
‘expectation-reliance complex’. See: Anthony D’Amato, ‘Consent, Estoppel, and 
Reasonableness: Three Challenges to Universal International Law’ [2010] Faculty Working 
Papers 8 <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/102>. 
371 Zdenek Slouka, ‘International Custom and the Continental Shelf; a Study of Some Aspects 
of the Growth of Customary Rules of International Law.’ (1965). 
372 Ibid 170–171. 
373 D’Amato (n 359). 
374 According to Byers ‘Certain, more specific rules of international law, such as the rules 
concerning estoppel and unilateral declaration, may be subsumed within the broader 
principle of legitimate expectation. “Estoppel” means that when one party relies on a 
misleading assurance or statement of intent from another party, and does so to its detriment, 
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The associated principles functioned in a manner geared towards protection 
of legitimate expectations.375 The relationship between the principles is deeply 
entangled.376 While some of the principles inclined more to providing basis 
and justification for recourse to the expectation related principles, some of the 
principles contain practical elements for protecting justified expectations. For 
instance, the principles of good faith,377 equity,378 and reasonableness have 
been considered as providing basis and justification for the application of 
acquiescence, estoppel and legitimate expectations.379 According to the ICJ in 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada 
v United States of America),:  
“…the concepts of acquiescence and estoppel, irrespective of the status accorded to 
them by international law, both follow from the fundamental principles of good faith 
and equity. They are however based on different legal reasoning since acquiescence is 
                                                                                                                                            
then that assurance or statement constitutes a legal wrong which gives rise to a legal 
obligation of specific performance or compensation. “Unilateral declaration” operates in a 
similar manner, but without the requirement of detrimental reliance. Under both rules States 
expect each other to behave in certain ways as a result of their behaviour, and failures to do 
so are treated as violations of international law.’ Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of 
Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge University Press 
1999) 107. 
375 Robert Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources of International Law (With Special Reference to Good 
Faith)’ (2006) 53 Netherlands International Law Review 1, 20–24. 
376 Ian Sinclair, ‘Estoppel and Acquiescence’, Fifty Years of International Court of Justice: Essays 
in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge University Press 1996) 104. 
377 Panizzon (n 12). 
378 Christopher R Rossi, Equity and International Law: A Legal Realist Approach to the International 
Decisionmaking (Transnational Publishers 1993). 
379 Stephen M Schwebel, Justice in International Law: Selected Writings (Cambridge University 
Press 2008) 603. 
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equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party 
may interpret as consent, while estoppel is linked to the idea of preclusion.”380 
 
One of the reasons for the relevance of such principles in the context of 
investor-state relationship could be seen from states’ reliance on such 
principles in the context of state-state relationship. States have been relying on 
these non-treaty (informal law making) principles to define/clarify their 
respective rights and duties, espouse claims on behalf of their citizens and 
undertake legal obligations.  The premise under this heading is to the effect 
that much as international law can bind states on the basis of these principles 
that are descending,381 non-consensual382 or non-treaty principles ‘as 
expressing states’ will’ in the context of state-state relationship and dispute, 
then, such recognition could as well be extended by analogy to investor-state 
relationship and disputes. The basis for such an analogy from a legal 
positivistic perspective is the presence of a common denominator in both 
state-state and state-investor disputes. This common denominator is the 
existence of “legal relationship and dispute”383 between legal entities recognised 
in law. While the issue of personality of the entities is settled under 
                                                 
380 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgement, [1984] ICJ Rep 
(ICJ) 305. 
381 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) 303–387. 
382 Koskenniemi (n 370). 
383 CH Schreuer, ‘What Is a Legal Dispute?’ (2009) 6 Transnational Dispute Management 
(TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1356> 
accessed 14 January 2014. 
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international law,384 the centrality of the “entities” in this analogy may appear 
problematic given the vertical nature of the relationship between states and 
individual/corporations, in addition to the old-age dichotomy between 
subjects and objects in international law. Undoubtedly, only states have 
sovereign authority. Neither individuals nor corporations are saddled with 
sovereign functions.  
However, from the prism of ‘Formalism’385 and ‘participation’386 the story can 
be narrated differently. 387 There is an undeniable evidence of horizontality in 
terms of the interaction among the global participants at the international 
level regardless of subjects/objects dichotomy, particularly at the 
adjudicatory or dispute level. 388 In addition, the wider perspective of 
                                                 
384 Fleur Johns, International Legal Personality (Ashgate Publishing Company 2010). 
385 Hans Kelsen pioneered the formal conception approach. According to Kelsen: ‘The 
traditional opinion that subjects of international law are only states, not individuals, that 
international law is by its very nature incapable of obligating and authorizing individuals, is 
erroneous. All law is regulation of human behaviour. The only social reality to which legal 
norms can refer are the relations between human beings. Hence, a legal obligation as well as 
legal right cannot have for its contents anything but the behaviour of human individuals. If, 
then, international law should not obligate and authorize individuals, the obligations and 
rights stipulated by international law would have no contents at all and international law 
would not obligate or authorize anybody to do anything.’ Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law 
and State (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd 2009) 341–343. 
386 The Participant conception is associated with Policy-Oriented approach to Law advocated 
by the New Haven School. According to ‘Participant Approach’ ‘A renewed emphasis upon 
the individual since the end of the Second World War has facilitated the access of more 
individuals to many organized constitutive arenas. Certain international tribunals, it may be 
noted, are open, as of right, to individuals.’ Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell and W 
Michael Reisman, ‘The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision’ [1967] Faculty 
Scholarship Series 273–274 <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/675>. 
387 Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
173–208. 
388 As Higgins remarked in this context: ‘The topics of minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens, requirements as to the conduct of hostilities and human rights, are not simply 
exceptions conceded by historical chance within a system that operates as between states. 
Rather, they are simply part and parcel of the fabric of international law, representing the 
claims that are naturally made by individual participants in contradistinction to state-
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invoking “expectation protective” principles under general international law 
and in the context of state-state arbitration lies in their relevance and in some 
cases necessity, due to the nature of their role in adjudication generally. In his 
seminal work on the function of law, while commenting on the principle of 
“abuse of right” Lauterpacht justifies the recourse to such principles due to 
the evolutive nature of international society and the resultant need to respond 
judicially to such evolvement. 389 
   
The development of Investment treaty arbitration where an individual as 
foreign investor can directly institute an action against sovereign state fits 
with societal changes contemplated by Lauterpacht. This area of law has 
witnessed the demise of espousal of claims through diplomatic protection and 
the emergence of foreign investors from mere ‘onlookers’ to actors in 
international law. Recently, the ICJ in Diallo case (Guinea v Congo) 390 
                                                                                                                                            
participants.’ Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 
(Oxford University Press 1995) 50. 
389 According to Lauterpacht ‘It is easy to see why in international Society, in which there is 
no authoritative legislative machinery adapting the law to Changed Conditions, there may be 
both frequent occasion and imperative necessity for the judicial creation of new torts through 
the express or implied recognition of a principle postulating the prohibition of abuse of 
rights.’ Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 295. 
390 According to the ICJ: ‘…in contemporary international law, the protection of the rights of 
companies and the rights of their shareholders, and the settlement of the associated disputes, 
are essentially governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection of foreign 
investments, and the Washington Convention of 18 March 1965 on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which created an 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and also by contracts 
between States and foreign investors. In that context, the role of diplomatic protection some-
what faded,…’ Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Republic of Congo) Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 582 (ICJ) [para 88]. 
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confirmed the calibration of the status of foreign investors under international 
law pursuant to bilateral and multilateral investment treaties.  
In this regard, equity, reasonableness, and good faith will not be treated 
separately here, as they relate more with foundational basis of legitimate 
expectations in which all the related principles could be accommodated than 
the practical application of legitimate expectations. Thus, discussion about 
them will be intersected with other principles as providing basis to the 
principles. In what follows, the section will examine the associated principles 
of abuse of right, acquiescence, estoppel and unilateral declarations with a view to 
discern their scope of application, constituent elements, and how they could 
enrich and complement in the formulation and application of  the principle of 
legitimate expectations. 
 
4.1.1 Abuse of right (l’ abus de droit) 
The doctrine of abuse of right (abus de droit) is summarised in the legal maxim 
Neminem laedit qui suo jure utitus ie nobody harms another when he 
exercises his own rights. It has been defined as “exercising a right either in a way 
which impedes the enjoyment by other States of their own rights or for an end 
different from that for which the right was created, to the injury of another state.”391 
The doctrine is rooted in various domestic legal systems both of civil and 
                                                 
391 Alexander C. Kiss, ‘Abuse of Right’ in Rudolf Bernhardt, Rudolf L Bindschedler and 
Rudolf Dolzer, Encyclopedia of Public International Law: History of International Law Foundations 
and Principles of International Law Sources of International Law Law of Treaties (North-Holland 
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common law origins.  It later emerged at the international level through 
adjudication and further documentation in numerous treaties.  Although, the 
precise juridical recognition of the principle is unclear as to whether the 
source of application is customary international law or general principle of 
law, the principle has been unanimously endorsed in various facets of 
international law as a sanction against anti-social use of legally conferred 
rights. 392  
 
International law recognises three broad scenarios or forms of abuse of rights. 
First, where a state in the exercise of its right permitted by law hinders 
another state from enjoying its right (also permitted by law) thereby causing 
injury to the later state. Cheng described the injury element ie “malicious 
injury” as the most important element thwarted against by the theory of 
abuse of right.393 These form of abuse of right dictates weighing competing 
values as both parties have legal rights. Kiss opined that an abuse of right can 
be said to exist under this scenario where “…the injury suffered by the aggrieved 
state exceeds the benefit resulting for another state from the enjoyment of its own 
                                                 
392 Lauterpacht as one of the publicists and leading advocates of resorting to the principle in 
international adjudication captures the essence of the principle as follows: ‘The essence of the 
doctrine is that, as legal rights are conferred by the Community, the latter cannot countenance 
their anti-social use by individuals, that the exercise of a hitherto legal right becomes 
unlawful when it degenerates into an abuse of rights, and that there is such an abuse of rights 
each time the general interest of the community is injuriously affected as the result of the 
Sacrifice of an important social or individual interest to a less important, though hitherto 
legally recognised, individual right.’ Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International 
Community (n 378) 294. 
393 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(Cambridge University Press 1994) 121. 
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right.”394 In North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration (United States v 
Great Britain)395 a typical exemplification of this form of abuse of right was 
arbitrated between United States and Great Britain. By virtue of the treaty of 
1818 between Great Britain and United States, US citizens were granted 
fishing right in the territorial waters of Great Britain. Dispute arose as to 
among other things the interpretation of the nature and extent of the 
Regulatory powers of the Great Britain regarding activities in the waters visa 
via interference with the right of fishing of the US citizens. The tribunal 
having recognized the sovereign right of Great Britain to regulate held that 
exercise of such right must be in Good Faith and fairness to both local and 
American Fishermen.396   
   
Secondly, another scenario of abuse of right is where a state exercises its right 
in contradistinction to the purpose for which the right was legally allowed to 
be exercised thereby causing injury to another state. Cheng described this 
                                                 
394 Alexander C. Kiss, ‘Abuse of Right’ in Bernhardt, Bindschedler and Dolzer (n 380) 1. 
395 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Tribunal of Arbitration Constituted under a special Agreement 
signed signed at Washington, January 27th between The United states of America and Great Britain, 
The Hague PCIJ 104 (PCIJ). 
396 According to the tribunal: ‘The right of Great Britain to make regulations without the 
consent of the United States, as to the exercise of the liberty to take fish referred to in Article 1 
of the Treaty of October 20th, 1818, in the form of municipal laws, ordinances or rules of 
Great Britain, Canada or Newfoundland is inherent to the sovereignty of Great Britain. The 
exercise of that right by Great Britain is, however, limited to the said Treaty in respect of the 
said liberties therein granted to the inhabitants of the United States in that such regulations 
must be made bonafide and must not be in violation of the said Treaty. Regulations which are 
(1) appropriate or necessary for the protection and preservation of such fisheries, or (2) 
desirable or necessary on grounds of public order and morals without unnecessarily 
interfering with the fishery itself, and in both cases equitable and fair as between local and 
American fishermen, and not so framed as to the obligation to execute the Treaty in good 
faith, and are therefore reasonable and not in violation of the Treaty.’ Ibid 16. 
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scenario as “fictitious or malicious exercise of a right”.397 The scenario entails 
instances where states are deliberately evading their treaty obligations or 
using exceptional/derogatory permissions to seize away an entire right under 
the guise of functioning within the exceptional ambit of the law. For instance, 
where law permits state to adopt certain discriminatory measures in the event 
of protecting essential security of a state, any use of such right under the guise 
of protecting security interest, albeit contrary to the stated purpose by 
violating people’s right will amount to abuse of right. These kind of abuses 
are more likely to be found in the fields of human rights and international 
economic law, both trade and investment inclusive.  In Free Zones of upper 
Savoy and District of Gex398 a dispute arose between France and Switzerland 
regarding among other things tax levy in the French frontier that was agreed 
to be free from custom barrier. France in the discharge of the obligation to 
maintain its frontier had instituted police cordon and further claimed to be 
entitled to levy importation tax. Switzerland on the other hand challenged 
such levy as mere customs tax in disguise, and therefore asked the court to 
decide on what taxes may legitimately be imposed at the frontier. The Court 
while recognising the French sovereign right to establish the control cordon 
and levy importation tax other than fiscal tax remarked that “A reservation 
must be made as regards abuses of a right, since it is certain that France must not 
evade the obligation to maintain the zones by erecting a customs barrier under the 
                                                 
397 Cheng (n 382) 122. 
398 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex ( France v Switzerland) (1932) No. 46 Ser AB 96 
(PCIJ). 
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guise of a control cordon.”399 The Court further provided some of the limitations 
of the principle, that there can be no presumption of abuse of right.400  
 
The third scenario of abuse of right is where a state arbitrarily exercised its 
right thereby injuring another party. This form of abuse of right usually 
occurs in the exercise of discretionary powers and other related 
administrative functions of state by state apparatus or officials. Notable cases 
under this scenario include cases of expulsion of aliens, and other forms of 
arbitrary, and unfair exercise of legally recognised rights. Most often, the 
discriminatory and unfair dimension of this scenario affects foreigners more, 
thereby becoming victims of such administrative functions. The dictates of 
fairness and equitable dealings certainly requires certain legal safeguards in 
protecting and ensuring that foreigners either individuals or businesses have 
not been subjected to capricious and arbitrary use of legal rights or 
discretions.401 In Boffolo case402 the tribunal was confronted with the 
allegation of arbitrary expulsion of Boffolo by the Venezuelan authorities 
contrary to the laws of Venezuela. It was established before the tribunal that 
Boffolo had actually lost his Venezuelan domicile having lived earlier for two 
years outside Venezuela, in addition to being prejudicial to public order. The 
                                                 
399 Ibid 225. 
400 Ibid 12. 
401 Todd Weiler, The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination and 
Minimun Standards of Treatment in Historical Context (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 305–
320. 
402 Boffolo Case (1903) X Rep Int Arbitr Awards 528 (Italy-Venezuela Mixed Claims 
Commission) 528. 
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tribunal decided in favour of Venezuela recognising the Venezuelan general 
right of expulsion. The tribunal however remarked that: 
“A state possesses the general right of expulsion; but,…(e)xpulsion should only be 
resorted to in extreme instances, and must be accomplished in the manner least 
injurious to the person affected. …The Country exercising the power must, when 
occasion demands, State the reason of such expulsion before an international tribunal, 
and an inefficient reason for none being advanced, accepts the consequences.”403    
 
a. Elements of Abuse of Right: 
Flowing from the three scenarios above, the constituents of a successful plea 
for abuse of right need to satisfy the following elements;404 
1. Existence of the right 
2. Exercising the right 
3. Damages or Injury 
4. Causation (causation between the abused right and the injury 
suffered). 
The first element is a mandatory requirement in establishing abuse of right. It 
requires that a legal right pursuant to which state functions must exist in law. 
Usually such rights are either attributes of state sovereignty or conferred on 
states through international treaties. For instance, in Free Zones of upper 
                                                 
403 Ibid 537. 
404 Thomas Cottier, The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays (Cameron May 2007) 128–129. 
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Savoy and District of Gex405 clearly the tribunal recognised the regulatory 
powers of France as an attribute of French sovereignty.406   
The second element requires that the state must exercise the legal right. This 
element can be satisfied if it can be shown that the state expresses such right 
either in form of action or conduct.407 It must be pointed out that the exercise 
of the right in itself is prima facie legal. However, the manner, purpose and 
nature of such an exercise are the tipping points as to whether there is excess, 
arbitrariness as a prelude to qualify as an abuse. In Fur Seal Arbitral 
Tribunal,408 One of the Arbitrators Sir Charles Russell likened the element of 
the “exercise of legal right” in isolation with “Damnum” without “injuria” 
incapable of providing a cause of action. Indeed, malice and other “bad-
intent” related expressions could characterise the exercise of the right and if 
established, render the exercise as “abuse”. The determination of malice and 
similar qualifiers may in many instances require proof of intention of the 
entity exercise of the legal right. The PCIJ In German Interests Case409 
decided that abuse of right cannot be presumed, rather “…it rests with the 
party who states that there has been such misuse to prove his statement.”410  The 
justification in rejecting presumption and requiring proof of intention in 
                                                 
405 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex ( France v. Switzerland) (n 387). 
406 Ibid 12. 
407 Cottier (n 393) 129. 
408 Behring Fur Seal Arbitration (Great Britain v USA) (1893) 1 Int Arbitr 755. 
409 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland) (1925) 1926 Ser A (PCIJ). 
410 Ibid 88. 
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characterising malicious actions and inaction is clearly due to the actual 
legitimacy of such actions or inactions. 411  
The third element is damages or injury. This element has been considered by 
courts and tribunals as one of the crucial elements in establishing abuse of 
right. In German Interests case,412 It was held that two crucial elements of the 
doctrine of abuse of right are the existence of the right and, damage or injury 
resulting from the exercise of such right. By way of definition, the damage or 
injury refers to “…an intrusion of one actor’s ability to fully enjoy the benefits 
of, or to fully exercise, her own rights.”413 The consequence of such damage or 
injury would entail international wrong thereby rendering the state against 
which the action is filed wanting from the lens of international 
responsibility.414 The injury could be either material or moral as is generally 
recognised in international law.415 However, there is no general yardstick for 
determining the threshold of damage or injury, as it depends on the legal 
regime involved.416  
 
                                                 
411 According to Iluyomade: ‘…because no initial wrongful act is involved in a complaint of 
abuse of right, intention is a necessary element of the claim, distinguishing the situation of an 
unfortunate consequence of a legitimate exercise of right.’ BO Iluyomade, ‘Scope and Content 
of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in International Law’ (1975) 16 Harvard International Law 
Journal 47, 77. 
412 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland) (n 398). 
413 Cottier (n 393) 129. 
414 Iluyomade (n 400) 76. 
415 Ibid 75. 
416 Cottier (n 393) 129. 
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Lastly, the party alleging abuse of right must show causal connection between 
the injuries or damages suffered and the abusive exercise of the legal right. 
The causation element is closely connected with the element of damages. 
Generally, causation is qualified as ‘proximate’, ‘effective’ etc. 417 In Lalane 
and Ledour Case418 the causation element took the form of Custom officer’s 
refusal to permit shipment of cattle meat to Guayana by detaining  ship in a 
harbour for days which caused the ship to eventually depart without the 
cattle meat, leading to substantial damages.  Indeed, it was established before 
the tribunal earlier that the reason for the refusal was “fictitious/malicious” 
contrary to the stated sanitary motive.  
 
4.1.2 Acquiescence 
The principle of acquiescence is another corollary to legitimate expectations. 
Acquiescence is summed in the legal maxim Qui tacet consentire videtur si 
loqui debuisset ac potuisset. It entails that by silence and inaction state can 
be committed legally and be held to account. Historically, acquiescence as a 
substantive legal principle originated from common law system, before 
gradually becoming recognised in international law through adjudication. 
Acquiescence is generally viewed as an exception to the formal rule that states 
                                                 
417 According to Cheng: ‘…the principle of integral reparation in responsibility has to be 
understood in conjunction with that of proximate or effective causality….the duty to make 
reparation extends only to those damages which are legally regarded as the consequences of 
an unlawful act. These are damages which would normally flow from such an act, or which a 
reasonable man in the position of the wrongdoer at the time would have foreseen as likely to 
result, as well as all intended damages.’ Cheng (n 382) 253. 
418 Lalanne and Ledour Case (1902) x Rep Int Arbitr Awards 17 (French-Venezuela Mixed 
Claims Commission). 
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are bound only by rules they consented to positively under international 
law.419 In circumstances where positive reaction of states is required to 
demonstrate their objections, silence by states may be negatively construed 
against the states.  The purpose of the principle as argued by the 
commentators is to prevent states from playing “hot and cold”, “fast and 
loose” or approbating and reprobating against other states.420 The principle 
functions in circumstances that are less clear or vague, where no crystal and 
definite right can be manifestly relied upon.  
International courts and tribunals have applied the principle directly and 
indirectly. In one of the earlier cases in which the principle features, ie the 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Mine Area (Canada v 
US)421  The ICJ defined acquiescence as “… equivalent to tacit recognition 
manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as 
consent,…”422  
a. Functions of Acquiescence: 
The general function of acquiescence is to preclude a state that acquiesced 
from asserting or denying a particular claim on the ground that the state is 
deemed to have abandoned such a claim. Functionally the doctrine is closely 
related with consent. Publicists have controverted over the exact function of 
                                                 
419 Byers (n 18) 106. 
420 Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Interpretation and Revision of International Boundary Decisions 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 211. 
421 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgement, (n 369) [130]. 
422 Ibid. 
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acquiescence. For instance Mcgibbon was of the view that “the function of 
acquiescence may be equated with consent…”423 Mcgibbon’s view is 
underpinned by legitimacy concern of holding states to account on the basis 
of acquiescence. Therefore, once the function of acquiescence is defined as 
consent, it solves the problem of challenging the legality of invoking the 
principle, because due to the absence of international legislators, consent 
functions as a gap-filler and in a manner akin to a legislative process.424   
However Byers disagrees with the idea of describing acquiescence as consent 
particularly in the context of customary international law. 425   
 
One of the cases in which ICJ illustrates on the application and function of 
acquiescence is Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand).426 The ICJ 
was presented with the issue of boundary dispute regarding sovereignty over 
the region where temple of Preah is situated. Both Cambodia and Thailand 
are claiming sovereignty over the region including the temple. The dispute 
had its root in the treaty of 1904 between Thailand (then called Siam) and 
France being the protecting power of Cambodia. The treaty provides that 
boundaries between Cambodia and Thailand should follow watershed and be 
                                                 
423 IC MacGibbon, ‘Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, The’ (1954) 31 British Year 
Book of International Law 143, 145. 
424 Ibid. 
425 According to Michael Byers ‘the word consent is not particularly accurate description of 
the role of acquiescence in the customary process. Acquiescence often signifies ambivalence 
or even apathy to the rule in question than a conscious support for the rule on the part of the 
acquiescing state.’ Byers (n 18) 106. 
426 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) Merits, [1962] ICJ Rep p. 6. 
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delimited by a mixed Commission. During the work of the Commission maps 
were drawn on the instruction of Siemese (Thailand) authorities by some 
French Officers. In the map, the temple of Preah falls on the Cambodian side. 
Of relevance, Cambodia relied on the principle of acquiescence. According to 
Cambodia, since the production of the map in 1909 which places the temple 
on its side, Thailand by its actions and conducts had accepted the map, and 
had never raised any query or protest prior to 1958. Thailand on its part 
rejected this submission and argued among other things that, the map 
produced was never approved by the boundary commission, never accepted 
by Thailand or alternatively was accepted in error.  The Court narrowed the 
submissions on acquiescence to the following formulation; 
“…whether parties did adopt the annex 1 map, and the line indicated on it, as 
representing the outcome of the work of delimitation of the frontier in the region of 
Preah Vihear, thereby conferring on it a binding character.”427 
 
First, although it was established before the court that the mixed commission 
never approved the map, however, the maps were drawn on the instruction 
of Siemese authorities (Thailand). Secondly, It was also established that upon 
production of the map, the Siemese authorities had by their conduct accepted 
and acknowledged receipt of the maps. Because the circumstance under 
which the maps were handed over to Thailand call for protest (if any) from 
                                                 
427 Ibid 22. 
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Thailand to which none was made. 428 Thirdly, the court rejected Thailand’s 
argument that it erroneously accepted the map not knowing the map in itself 
contained error. 429 
In view of the foregoing, the court concluded that Thailand must be 
precluded from asserting claim to the temple and rejecting the map that 
places the temple on the Cambodian side. 
 
b. Elements of Acquiescence: 
There are certain essential elements that must be satisfied in any successful 
plea of acquiescence. These elements are as follows: 
1. Silence or toleration: 
Any state invoking the principle of acquiescence must show that the state 
against whom the principle is sought to be applied must have failed to assert 
its claim or was silent in respect of its claim. This element is closely tied to the 
nature of acquiescence as exhibition of reluctance or inaction. In Temple of 
Preah430 supra, the court held that Thailand must be held to have acquiesced 
                                                 
428 According to the court: ‘…it is clear that the circumstances were such as called for some 
reaction, within a reasonable period, on the part of the Siemese authorities, if they wished to 
disagree with the map or had any serious question to raise in regard to it. They did not do so, 
either then or for many years, and thereby must be held to have acquiesced. Qui tacet 
Consentire Videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset.’ Ibid 23. 
429 ‘It is an established rule of law that the plea of error cannot be allowed as an element 
vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error or could 
have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible 
error…’ibid 26. 
430 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits, (n 415). 
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their claim to sovereignty over the region in dispute due to their silence and 
acceptance of the map which showed the region as part of Cambodia. 
2. The silence must have extended over a period of time: 
One of the essential elements of acquiescence is that the inaction or silence 
forming the basis of acquiescence must last for a considerable period of time. 
No time limit has been sanctioned by courts or tribunals. In The Fisheries 
Case431 the ICJ considered a toleration of over sixty years by United Kingdom.  
In Grisbadarna Arbitration (Norway v Sweden) however, the tribunal held in 
favour of Sweden that Norway acquiesced over Sweden’s exercise of 
“…various acts in the Grisbadarna region…owing to her conviction that the regions 
were Swedish…”432 Therefore, Norway was held to have acquiesced, even 
though the lack of protest was for a short period of time. 
3. The Circumstance must have required action: 
In Temple of Preah The ICJ confirmed the relevance of circumstance as a crucial 
element in the determination of acquiescence where the court held that “…the 
circumstances were such as called for some reaction, within a reasonable period…”.433 
Indeed, not in all circumstances are states required to protest or assert a claim. 
The requirement of ‘circumstance’ is crucial, albeit the determination of such 
circumstance is far from easy. One of the likely instances where action may 
not be required in law is where the party against whom acquiescence is 
                                                 
431 Fisheries Case United Kingdom v Norway [1951] ICJ Rep 116 (ICJ). 
432 Grisbadarna Case (Norway v Sweden) [1909] Hague Court Rep 120 (PCA). 
433 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits, (n 415). 
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sought to be invoked was unaware of the subject matter in dispute, or the 
subject matter is under negotiation between the parties. In Fisheries case 
(supra), the ICJ elaborated on the knowledge and awareness United Kingdom 
had about the activities of Norway in the disputed area to an extent that the 
circumstance required a protest from United Kingdom or any other interested 
party. According to the court: “The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration by 
international community,…would in any case warrant Norway’s enforcement of her 
system against the United Kingdom.”434 
 
In Summary, acquiescence like the principle of abuse of right discussed earlier 
is relevant in situations where the rules as contained in a treaty or custom are 
ambiguous or less specific. The application of the principle in adjudication 
could therefore clarify such ambiguity or bridge the gap by providing a 
criterion for interpreting the ambiguity or resolving the claim. It can be said 
that acquiescence (and other associated principles) are playing two significant 
roles in adjudication namely, Interpretive (Evidentiary) and Substantive roles. 
In both, the function of acquiescence is to protect the expectation of the 
aggrieved state (s) whose creation was due to the inaction or silence of the 
state against whom the principle is invoked.  As highlighted in the context of 
boundary disputes, the principle is very illuminating, solidly grounded in 
general international law, and its elements could aid in reformulation of 
legitimate expectations.  
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4.1.3 Estoppel 
The principle of estoppel is summed in a maxim (Allegans contraria non 
audiendus est), ie “He is not to be heard who alleges things contradictory to 
each other”. Estoppel is analogous to acquiescence in most respect, as both 
estoppel and acquiescence interact in an overlapping manner. The origin of 
estoppel like most of other international law principles has its root in 
domestic legal systems. 435 Later, it finds its way into international sphere 
through international adjudication. The juridical basis of the principle under 
international law is not very clear. Considerable number of publicists 
considered the principle as part of ‘general principles of law’,436 while few 
have advanced the argument on the customary law origin of the principle.437 
This section does not intend to engage with the discussion of the juridical 
sources of the doctrine. It suffices to acknowledge that recourse to the 
principle has been made in numerous occasions by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, International Court of Justice and other International 
Courts and Tribunals. 
In discerning the precise meaning and scope of the principle, commentators 
linked the principle with notions of consistency, stability and coherence in the 
                                                 
435 Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law: With Special 
Reference to International Arbitration (Lawbook Exchange 2002) 204. 
436 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 358) 420. 
437 Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘The Fundamental Principles of International Law’, Recueil des 
Cours, Collected Courses, Volume 87 (2007) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 312 
<http://nijhoffonline.nl/book?id=er087_er087_191-385> accessed 27 January 2014. 
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conduct of state affairs. For instance, Macgibbon described the principle as a 
“…requirement that a state ought to be consistent in its attitude to a given factual or 
legal situation.”438 Bowett also described estoppel as a principle that “operates 
so as to preclude a party from denying before a tribunal the truth of a statement of fact 
made previously by that party to another whereby that other has acted to his 
detriment or the party making the statement has secured some benefit.”439 One of the 
thorny issues in demarcating the scope of estoppel is the oscillation in the 
conception between international law sphere and domestic law root of the 
principle.440 Uncontestably, the principle has its roots in domestic law, but its 
varied classifications under domestic law can hardly be accommodated under 
international law mutatis mutandis. For instance, under domestic legal systems 
particularly English legal systems, estoppel has been classified into various 
forms such as estoppel by representation, record, deed, res judicata, silence, 
promissory estoppel, etc. Transposing such varied classifications into 
international law may result in an exercise in futility. 441  
                                                 
438 Ic MacGibbon, ‘Estoppel in International Law’ (1958) 7 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 468, 468. 
439 DW Bowett, ‘Estoppel before International Tribunals and Its Relation to Acquiescence’ 
(1957) 33 British Year Book of International Law 176, 176. 
440  ‘…in Anglo-American municipal law estoppel is a highly complex, multifarious theory 
with numerous forms and different theoretical moorings that apply vastly in different 
circumstances…’ See: Christopher Brown, ‘Comparative and Critical Assessment of Estoppel 
in International Law, A’ (1995) 50 University of Miami Law Review 369, 371. 
441 As judge Alfaro remarked in his separate opinion of Temple of Preah case as follows: 
‘…there is a very substantial difference between the simple and clear-cut rule adopted by and 
applied in the international field and the complicated classifications, modalities, species, sub-
species and procedural features of the municipal system.’ Case Concerning the Temple of Preah 
Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) Merits, (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Alfaro) ICJ Rep 39 (ICJ). 
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While it is difficult to delineate the precise scope of estoppel due to the 
overlap with other similar principles, it can be reiterated that the principle of 
estoppel requires that ‘a state ought to maintain towards a given factual or legal 
situation an attitude consistent with that which it was known to have adopted with 
regard to the same circumstances on previous occasions’.442 
a. Functions of Estoppel: 
The main function of estoppel is to prevent a party from benefitting from its 
incoherence or inconsistency, to the detriment of another party who in good 
faith relies on the express or implied representation or conduct of the first 
party. Estoppel functions both as evidentiary and substantive principle. The 
function of estoppel as an evidentiary principle is aimed at complementing 
substantive claims thereby confirming substantive principles in a procedural 
manner. According to Judge Lauterpacht the ‘doctrine of estoppel is prima facie a 
private law doctrine forming part of the law of evidence.”443 This rather, limited 
function of estoppel is said to have constitute an obstacle into the early 
recognition of the principle in international law.444  
On the other hand, estoppel functions mostly in substantive capacity under 
international law. As a substantive stand-alone principle, it functions to 
promote stability, coherence and consistency. The substantive function of 
                                                 
442 MacGibbon (n 427) 512. 
443 Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (n 424) 203. 
444 MacGibbon (n 427) 478. 
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estoppel is confirmed in Argentine – Chile Frontier case,445 where the Court 
of arbitration held that “…there is in international law a principle, which is 
moreover a principle of substantive law and not just a technical rule of 
evidence,…this principle is designated by a number of different terms, of which 
“estoppel” and “preclusion” are the most common.”446 
 The substantive applications of estoppel under international law may have 
the effect of producing following scenarios: 
a. Barring a state from pleading its default as a justification to avoid its 
international obligations.447 
b. Estopping a state from denying what it had earlier recognised or 
admitted.448 
c. Estopping a state from avoiding obligations incidental to the exercise 
of a right it had earlier asserted.449 
d. Estopping a state from insisting on a claim it objected to earlier.450 
e. Barring a state from questioning the legality of a claim it has asserted 
or claim.451 
 
                                                 
445 Argentina - Chile Frontier Case (1966) XVI RIAA 109. 
446 Ibid 164. 
447 MacGibbon (n 427) 480. 
448 Ibid 482. 
449 Ibid 495. 
450 Ibid 496. 
451 Ibid 497. 
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In the arbitral award by the King of Spain ie Honduras v Nicaragua,452 
Nicaragua challenged the 1906 arbitral award made by the King of Spain on 
the ground of incompetency of the arbitrator. Honduras on the other hand 
argued that since Nicaragua had earlier accepted the appointment of King of 
Spain as the arbitrator, it is no longer open to Nicaragua to challenge the 
competency of the arbitrator relying on the estoppel scenario. The ICJ 
agreeing with Honduras held as follows: 
“…Nicaragua, by express declaration and by conduct, recognized the Award, as valid 
and it is no longer open to Nicaragua to go back upon that recognition and challenge 
the validity of the Award. Nicaragua’s failure to raise any question with regard to the 
validity of the Award for several years after the full terms of the Award had become 
known to it further confirms the conclusion at which the Court has arrived…”453 
 
b. Elements of Estoppel: 
From the jurisprudence of PCIJ, ICJ, and early International Arbitral 
Tribunals, a plea for estoppel must satisfy the following elements: 
i. Representation/Conduct 
An estoppel may emanate from a representation or silence of the person 
against whom the principle is invoked. Here, representations or conduct 
capable of being relied upon must be unambiguous, unconditional voluntary 
and authorised. In Serbian Loans Case the PCIJ clearly refused to uphold a 
plea for estoppel on the ground that “…there has been no clear and 
                                                 
452 Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 [1960] ICJ 
Rep 192 (ICJ). 
453 Ibid 213. 
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unequivocal representation.” The ICJ in Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroun and Nigeria454 reiterated the essential conditions for a 
successful plea of estoppel as follows: 
“An estoppel would only arise if by its acts or declarations Cameroun had 
consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary dispute 
submitted to the court by bilateral avenues alone. It would further be necessary that 
by relying on such an attitude Nigeria had changed position to its own detriment or 
had suffered some prejudice.”455 
 
In the Advisory Opinion on the European Commission of the Danube456 the 
PCIJ provided a framework for conditional representations. According to the 
Court, such conditional representations are not binding except where such 
conditions have been otherwise fulfilled.457 Same conclusion was reached in 
Eastern Greenland case (Denmark v Norway)458 where the court described the 
Ihlen declaration as binding on the ground that it was definite and 
‘unconditional’.459 
ii. Reliance 
International courts and tribunals have consistently recognized reliance as a 
cardinal element in estoppel. Reliance entails that a state relying on estoppel 
                                                 
454 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Preliminary Objections, [1998] ICJ Rep 275 (ICJ). 
455 Ibid 275. 
456 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila (Advisory 
Opinion) [1927] PCIJ XII:I, Series B No. 14 6. 
457 Ibid 35. 
458 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v Norway) Judgement (1933) Series A/B 53, 22 
(PCIJ). 
459 Ibid 72. 
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must show evidence of such reliance on a particular representation or 
conduct. This requirement is considered by many commentators as the 
cornerstone of estoppel and the bridge between estoppel and good faith 
principle.460 In other words, good faith is regarded as the root upon which 
estoppel rests.461 The element of reliance is further gauged with ‘detriment’ or 
‘prejudice’ requirement. This ad up results in the connotation of ‘detrimental 
reliance’ which simply qualifies reliance in estoppel to mean reliance that 
breeds prejudice or detriment upon disappointment. The test for determining 
‘detrimental reliance’ is said to be satisfied if it can be shown that a distinct 
act was undertaken by a party in reliance on a representation which could 
either be to the detriment of the party relying or to the benefit of the maker of 
the representation. In Temple of Preah462 Judge Fitzmaurice in his separate 
opinion captures the relevance of reliance as follows: 
“The essential condition of the operation of the rule of preclusion or estoppel, as 
strictly to be understood, is that the party invoking the rule must have “relied upon” 
the statements or conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the 
other’s advantage.”463  
 
In similar vein, the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases464 while 
rejecting an estoppel scenario plea hypothesise the view that an estoppel 
                                                 
460 Bowett (n 428) 193. 
461 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 
2012) 420. 
462 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) Merits, (Separate Opinion of 
Judge Fitzmaurice [1962] ICJ Rep 52 (ICJ). 
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scenario could emerge in the case, if it can be shown that Germany had by an 
earlier representation or conduct relied upon by Denmark or Netherlands, the 
later detrimentally changed their respective positions and suffer some 
prejudice.465 The absence of such ingredients made the plea to fail. In Serbian 
Loans Case,466 the PCIJ also rejected estoppel plea as lacking in fulfilling 
reliance element. The Court held that “There has been no change in position on 
the part of the debtor State.”467 
In addition to the aforementioned authorities, it must be pointed out that 
although there is unanimity in the recognition of ‘reliance’ as an element of 
estoppel, on the other hand there is a view that does not recognise 
‘detrimental reliance or prejudice’ as a necessary element of estoppel. The 
proponents of this view alluded to the implied absence of ‘detrimental 
reliance’ in some of the cases considered above to justify their view. As one of 
the commentators argued, “…there is no reason, in International law, to look for 
reliance by the other party; neither case law nor State Practice requires consideration 
of this kind.”468 Indeed, a reconciliatory approach appear to advocate a 
distinction between ‘estoppel’ which requires ‘detrimental reliance’ as an 
essential element, and ‘unilateral actions’ or ‘promises’ which does not 
require ‘detriment’. Whether there is truly clear-cut distinction between both 
‘estoppel’ and ‘promises’ is clearly outside the purview of this work. It is 
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incontestable however, that the terminologies deployed by counsel in their 
pleadings, or the courts and tribunals in their judgements and awards 
respectively are far from being consistent. Justice Alfaro recognising the 
judicial approach of not placing much importance to the forms but the 
substance of the principles put to rest the imaginary distinction as follows: 
“Whatever term or terms be employed to designate this principle such as it has been 
applied in the international sphere, its substance is always the same: inconsistency 
between claims or allegations put forward by a state, and its previous conduct in 
connection therewith, is not admissible (allegans contraria non au-diendus est). Its 
purpose is always the same: a state must not be permitted to benefit by its own 
inconsistency to the prejudice of another state (nemo potest mutare consilium suum 
in alterius in-juriam). A fortiori, the state must not be allowed to benefit by its 
inconsistency when it is through its own wrong or illegal act that the other party has 
been deprived of its right or prevented from exercising it. (Nullus commodum Capere 
de sua injuria propria.) Finally, the legal effect of the principle is always the same: the 
party which by its recognition, its representation, its declaration, its conduct or its 
silence has maintained an attitude manifestly contrary to the right it is claiming 
before an international tribunal is precluded from claiming that right. (venire contra 
factum proprium non valet).”469 
 
4.1.4 Unilateral Actions 
 The term unilateral actions/conduct, or statements is an umbrella to various 
manifestations of state actions. These actions include protests, notifications, 
declarations, renunciations, promises, and waiver. The diverse methods 
through which states manifest their unilateral actions are said to be the source 
of difficulty in defining unilateral actions.470 Despite the absence of a 
comprehensive definition, the principle remains one of the most important 
                                                 
469 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) Merits, (Separate Opinion of 
Vice-President Alfaro) (n 430) 40. 
470 ‘Unilateral Acts in International Law, in R. Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law’, vol Vol. 7 (North-Holland 1984) 518. 
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principles in international law.471 Brownlie has identified two prominent 
forms of unilateral actions. The First one is unilateral action or conduct in the 
formation of customary rules, whiles the second one is in form of recognition 
covered by the law of recognition. To this end, Brownlie questioned the aspect 
of ILC approach that seeks to incorporate all other forms of state actions such 
as protest, promise, and renunciation e.t.c as part of unilateral actions. 
According to Brownlie, distinguishing the forms is necessary to avoid 
obscuring legal relations.472 On the other hand, the ILC work in this area has 
provoked deeper inquiry into the area,473 and brought about some coherence 
in the fragmented manifestations of unilateral actions.474 As it is evident, 
states had for long been relying on various forms of unilateral actions, to 
express their own decisions. These actions “…take various forms, display a great 
variety of contents, and pursue different aims.”475 To that extent, states are bound 
by their unilateral actions or conduct due to the impact such actions or 
conduct has in relations among states. States that are likely to be affected by 
such unilateral actions or are simply interested in such actions ‘may take 
cognizance…and place confidence in them and are entitled to require that the 
obligation thus created be respected’.476  The freedom of states to place confidence 
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on the action or conduct of each other is what renders unilateral action an 
“expectation-protective” principle. One of the plausible explanations given in 
considering unilateral action as binding is the recognition of such actions as 
an expression of the will of the state making the action or the statement.477  
According to some commentators, unilateral actions can be regarded as a 
direct formal source of obligation against the actor state.478 
 
By way of definition, Unilateral actions are “declarations publicly made and 
manifesting the will to be bound” by states the basis upon which other states 
concerned with the action may rely on such actions and demand their 
fulfilment.  The ILC definition of unilateral actions is undoubtedly inspired by 
the decisions of ICJ.479 In Nuclear Tests case the Court while determining the 
status and scope of unilateral declarations seized the opportunity to design a 
comprehensive regime of unilateral actions under international law. 
According to the Court: 
“…declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, 
may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and 
often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration 
that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the 
declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally 
required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking 
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of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made 
within the context of international negotiations, is binding….”480 
 
It is instructive to note that the ICJ’s definition does not restrict the forms of 
unilateral actions but rather provided a guideline for their identification and 
qualification. This approach underscores the emphasis placed by the court on 
the legal basis of the principle and its constituent elements, than formal 
categorization. It is therefore not surprising that the ILC in its work also 
adopted the criteria-driven approach. Thus, it matters less, whether it is called 
unilateral ‘act’ or ‘conduct’, ‘actions’ or ‘declarations’, ‘promises’ or 
‘undertakings’, ‘waiver’ or ‘renunciation’ provided the basis of such 
declaration, action or conduct, satisfies the fundamental criteria of 
unilaterality and manifestation of will of the state concerned as part of an 
‘international legal act’. 
 
a. Elements of Unilateral Actions: 
i. Unilaterality (Form): 
Generally, form is immaterial as there is no specified form in which a 
unilateral action must conform with.481 In the Nuclear Tests case, ICJ 
unequivocally confirms the irrelevance of form in unilateral actions. 
According to the Court: 
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“…Whether a statement is made orally or in writing makes no essential difference for 
such statements made in particular circumstances may create commitments in 
international law, which does not require that they should be couched in written form. 
Thus the question of form is not decisive.”482  
 
Notwithstanding the immateriality of form, the unilateral nature is what 
distinguishes unilateral regime from bilateral and multilateral treaty regimes. 
Unlike treaty regimes where there is a reciprocal manifestation of will 
between the contracting states, in the case of unilateral actions, first, the 
manifestation of the ‘will’ emanates from one end. Though, there could be 
more than a single entity manifesting a will. Secondly, the intended addressee 
has no role in the manifestation of the will. 483  
ii. Publicity of the action: 
One of the elements of unilateral actions is publicity of the action or statement 
culminating into legally binding obligation. The publicity element was 
recognised by the ICJ in Nuclear Tests Case, and ILC in the ‘Guiding Principles 
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block, the same willingness to produce certain legal effects without any need for the 
participation of other subjects or “parties” in the form of acceptance, reciprocity, etc.’ ILC, 
‘Unilateral Acts of States, Report of the Working Group’, (1997) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.543 para 
10. 
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applicable to unilateral declarations of State capable of creating legal obligations.’484 
The ICJ in the Nuclear Tests case was confronted with the issue of public 
declaration. In the case, it was established before the ICJ that France had 
made public its intention to cease the conduct of atmospheric tests pursuant 
to various statements issued by French officials particularly the statements by 
French President and the Defence Minister. Accordingly, the Court held that 
‘…An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, 
even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding.’485  
The element of publicity is to a certain extent troubling, particularly if the 
element is to be taken literally. The trouble lies in the fact that states may 
usually anoint the recipient or the beneficiary of their statement, declaration 
or even conduct. In addition, such declarations or statements may be issued 
or occur in camera or at a secluded meetings. Thus, it’s unclear if ‘publicity’ is 
to be considered as a condition relating to validity of unilateral actions or not. 
Ian Brownlie at the deliberations of the ILC working group alluded to this 
dilemma that ‘in practice, many unilateral acts were performed by diplomats 
without publicity’.486 In Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Norway v 
Denmark),487 The PCIJ regarded a declaration made by the Norwegian 
                                                 
484 ILC, ‘Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of 
Creating Legal Obligations: ILC Report (58th Session, 2006)’, UN Doc. A/61/10 370. 
485 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgement, (n 465) [46]. 
486 ILC, ‘Unilateral Acts of States, Summary Record of the 2543rd Meeting’, (1998) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SR.2543 para 18. 
487 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v Norway) Judgement (n 447). 
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Foreign Minister to her Danish counterpart at a closed door meeting as 
unilateral declaration. 488  
Flowing from the above, it becomes clear that publicity element need to be 
qualified otherwise genuine unilateral actions by states might be excluded as 
lacking in publicity element. In addition, the Eastern Greenland case further 
confirms Brownlie’s concern and subsequent remarks, where he opined that: 
“…the criterion of publicity …was certainly relevant in terms of evidence and the 
identification of those to whom the act was addressed. It was not however, a necessary 
condition for the act to produce legal effects.”489  
 
From the foregoing, the element of publicity can be understood as a criterion 
applicable to public statements and declarations only, as in nuclear test cases. 
In non-public statements and declarations, the criterion can hardly be treated 
as pre-requisite, and can be deemed satisfied, where addressee or the 
intended beneficiary of the unilateral action is made aware of the action or the 
statement. This understanding of the ‘publicity’ element has been the 
dominant understanding among the major publicists in the area. 490  
                                                 
488 The famous declaration ie ‘Ihlen Declaration’ which the court considered binding against 
Norway was as follows ‘I told the Danish Minister to-day that the Norwegian Government 
would not make any difficulty in the settlement of this question’. The statement was issued at 
a closed door meeting between the two ministers. Ibid 17. 
489 ILC, ‘Multiple Topics, Summary Record of the 2527th Meeting’, (1998) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SR.2527 para 5. 
490 As remarked by Fiedler: ‘There is virtually complete agreement that an expression of 
intent by the declaring state alone is not sufficient, but that the declaration must be brought to 
the notice of the subject of international law concerned...This Condition follows from the 
good faith principle, as only on this basis can a situation of trust be created. It is not in fact 
necessary for the third state concerned to develop this trust.’ ‘Unilateral Acts in International 
Law, in R. Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclopedia of Public International Law’, (n 459) 521. 
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iii. Intention to be legally bound: 
Generally, international law places great emphasis on the intention of 
parties.491 Intention or manifestation of will is regarded as the cornerstone of 
unilateral actions. In the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that “…When it is 
the intention of State making the declaration that it should become bound according 
to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal 
undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct 
consistent with the declaration.”492 This position was further reiterated in 
Burkinafaso v Mali,493 where the ICJ confirms the centrality of intention 
while analysing the statement of Malian head of state regarding compliance 
with the decision of Organization of African Union. According to the court, 
citing from Nuclear test cases, “…it all depends on the intention of the State in 
question,…it is for the court to ‘form its own view of the meaning and scope intended 
by the author…”494 
As unilateral action can be expressed by way of statement, declaration, and 
conduct, the intention to be legally bound can as well be ascertained expressly 
or through the interpretation of an action, conduct, surrounding circumstance 
                                                 
491 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) Preliminary Objections, [1961] 
ICJ Rep 17 (ICJ) 31. 
492 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgement, (n 465) [43]. 
493 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkinafaso v Mali) Judgement, [1986] ICJ Rep 554 (ICJ). 
494 Ibid 39. 
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or subsequent behaviour of the state.495 In Nuclear Test cases “…not all 
unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position 
in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to 
be ascertained by interpretation of the act.”496 Two layers appear to crystallize 
regarding the intention element. First, is where the intention is obvious and 
conveyed expressly, the ascertainment of which would not require any 
further interpretation. The second is where the ascertainment of the intention 
would require judicial interpretation. In both, the determination as to the 
existence of such an intention is squarely placed on the body adjudicating the 
dispute. 497 The only distinction is, in the case of the former the ascertainment 
of the intention is direct, having flowed directly from the state action or 
conduct, while in the later, the ascertainment of the intention is to be arrived 
at indirectly through the medium of interpretation. In interpreting sovereign 
intention, the ICJ appears to adopt a cautious and narrow approach 
particularly where the intention is ambiguous. The reason for the narrow 
approach may not be far-fetched, given the implication of such intentions and 
their consequent restriction on state sovereignty. In Nuclear Tests case the ICJ 
held that ‘…when states make statements by which their freedom of action is to be 
limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.’498 In Military and Paramilitary 
                                                 
495 ‘Unilateral Acts of States’, , International Law: Achievements and Prospects (Brill) 232. 
496 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgement, (n 465) [47]. 
497 Ferna ́ndez de Casadevante Romani (n 470) 120. 
498 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgement, (n 465) [47]. 
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Activities in and against Nicaragua,499 the ICJ applied the restrictive 
approach while interpreting the communication of Nicaraguan authorities. 
The Court having examined the communication and the announcement of 
Nicaraguan authorities with a view to ascertain whether Nicaragua has 
intended to bind itself regarding its domestic policies, concluded as follows: 
“…the Court is unable to find anything in these documents, whether the resolution or 
the communication accompanied by the ‘Plan to secure peace’ from which it can be 
inferred that any legal undertaking was intended to exist.”500 
 
Similarly, in Burkinafaso v Mali the Court following its dicta in Nuclear 
Tests cases and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
case regarding restrictive interpretation of sovereign intention applied the 
restrictive approach with an additional caution. According to the Court, there 
is a duty on the Court to show greater caution while interpreting sovereign 
intention in unilateral declarations not addressed to any particular 
recipient.501 The Court further devoted a lengthy paragraph to distinguish its 
ascertainment of intention in Nuclear Tests Case with the case before it. 
According to the court, the circumstances are radically different necessitating 
different outcomes. The Court having formed its view on the meaning 
intended by Mali as proclaimed by the Malian head of state that ‘…my 
Government will comply with the decision’ concluded that ‘…there are no grounds 
                                                 
499 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America) Merits, [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
500 Ibid 261. 
501 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkinafaso v. Mali) Judgement, (n 482) [39]. 
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to interpret the declarations made by Mali’s Head of State on 11 April 1975 as a 
unilateral act with legal implications…’ 502 
It must be pointed out that the ILC guiding principles503 followed suit in 
recognising the essential nature of intention.  Article 1 of the Guiding 
principles, incorporates ‘…the will to be bound…’ as a condition, for creating 
legal obligations. Article 3 provides that in determining legal effect of 
unilateral actions, courts must take into account the content of the 
declarations, factual circumstance and the reactions to which such 
declarations gives rise to. More germane to intention is article 7, which 
provides for restrictive interpretation in the event of doubtful declarations. 504 
 
Indeed, the ILC guiding principles were inspired by the ICJ decisions. As 
such, the requirements of examining the content of a declaration, the factual 
circumstance, the reaction they gave rise to, and the clarity of the declarations have 
all been laid down by the ICJ. In Armed Activities on the Territory of 
Congo,505 the Court examined the actual content, surrounding circumstance 
                                                 
502 Ibid 40. 
503 ILC, ‘Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of 
Creating Legal Obligations: ILC Report (58th Session, 2006)’, (n 473). 
504 ‘A unilateral declaration entails obligations for the formulating State only if it is stated in 
clear and specific terms. In the case of doubt as to the scope of the obligations resulting from 
such a declaration, such obligations must be interpreted in a restrictive manner. In 
interpreting the content of such obligations, weight shall be given first and foremost to the 
text of the declaration, together with the context and the circumstances in which it was 
formulated.’ Ibid. 
505 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v 
Uganda) Judgement, [2005] ICJ Rep 168. 
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and further concludes that a unilateral statement must be made in clear and 
specific terms.506 
 
From the foregoing, the element of intention is undoubtedly crucial. As laid 
down by ICJ, a clear and precise unilateral action, statement or conduct is 
likely to convey and manifest clearly an intention to be bound.  Where the 
intention to be bound is less clear, the ICJ takes into account the content of the 
action, the circumstance and the reaction to the unilateral action in 
determining the intention of the declarant state. In addition, where there is 
doubt as to the intended obligation, the court construes such intention 
narrowly. 
 
iv. Author must be subject of International Law:  
One of the elements of unilateral actions is the author of the action must be 
competent in law. Persons acting on behalf of a state must be capable of 
binding the state. It is settled principle of international law that certain state 
officials are capable of binding state by virtue of their authority. 507  
                                                 
506 Ibid 293. 
507 In Nuclear Tests Case the ICJ while remarking on the statement made by the French 
president reiterated the position of international law as follows: ‘Of the statements by the 
French Government now before the Court, the most essential are clearly those made by the 
President of the Republic. There can be no doubt, in view of his functions, that his public 
communications or statements, oral or written, as Head of State, are in international relations 
acts of the French State. His statements, and those of members of the French Government 
acting under his authority, up to the last statement made by the Minister of Defence (of 11 
October 1974), constitute a whole. Thus, in whatever form these statements were expressed, 
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In Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo the Court was confronted 
with a statement issued by Rwandan Justice Minister before United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights. Congo argued that such statement amounts 
to unilateral statement by an authorised official and therefore binding on 
Rwanda. Rwanda on the other hand argued that the statement having not 
emanated from the President or Foreign Affairs Minister could not be 
attributed to Rwandan state. The Court while agreeing with Congo on the 
competency of Justice Minister to bind her State, reiterated its position in 
Nuclear Tests case, and elaborated further by taking into account the 
development in governance and resultant changes in state representations at 
both domestic and international fora. 508  
The position of ICJ in both Nuclear Tests case and Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo regarding the need to recognise authorised 
entities/individuals to bind states, is in line with the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts,509 the ILC Draft Guiding 
                                                                                                                                            
they must be held to constitute an engagement of the State, having regard to their intention 
and to the circumstances in which they were made.’ Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) 
Judgement, (n 465) [51]. 
508 In its judgement, the Court agreeing in part with Congo on the competency of the Justice 
Minister to bind her state held as follows: ‘…with increasing frequency in modern 
international relations other persons representing a State in specific fields may be authorized 
by that State to bind it by their statements in respect of matters falling within their purview. 
This may be true, for example, of holders of technical ministerial portfolios exercising powers 
in their field of competence in their field of competence in the area of foreign relations, and 
even of certain officials.’ Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) Judgement, (n 138) [47]. 
509 Article 7 of the Articles on State Responsibility provides as follows: ‘The Conduct of an 
organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person 
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Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States,510 and Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.511    
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that a person natural or artificial 
making a unilateral action on behalf of  a state, must be capable of binding the 
state in accordance with the  established jurisprudence of ICJ and the afore-
cited Conventions and Guidelines. Indeed, one of the dilemmas surrounding 
the competency of the person performing unilateral action is where the 
authorised person exceeded its authority, or acted unlawfully. Regarding this 
dilemma, article 7 on State Responsibility though silent on unlawful actions 
ab initio, considers ‘authorised acts in excess of authority’ as attributable to 
state. The unlawful actions will be addressed under the lawfulness of the 
object of unilateral actions. 
                                                                                                                                            
or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.’ 
‘International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, Available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html [accessed 29 May 2014]’. 
510 Articles 2 and 4 of the ILC Draft Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations 
provides as follows: Article 2: ‘Any State possesses capacity to undertake legal obligations 
through unilateral declarations.’ Article 4: ‘A unilateral declaration binds the State 
internationally only if it is made by an authority vested with the power to do so. By virtue of 
their functions, heads of State, heads of Government and ministers for foreign affairs are 
competent to formulate such declarations. Other persons representing the State in specified 
areas may be authorized to bind it, through their declarations, in areas falling within their 
competence.’ ILC, ‘Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable 
of Creating Legal Obligations: ILC Report (58th Session, 2006)’, (n 473). 
511 An analogy can be drawn from the VCLT regarding the competency of state 
representatives in treaty making. Article 7 (2) of the VCLT provides as follows: “In virtue of 
their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as 
representing their state: (a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to conclusion of a treaty; (b) Heads of 
diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting 
State and the State to which they are accredited; (c) Representatives accredited by States to an 
international conference or to an international organization or one of its organs, for the 
purpose of adopting the text of a treaty in that conference, organization or organ. “United 
Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Vol. 1155, P. 331, and Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html 
[accessed 29 May 2014]. 
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v. Legality and Appropriateness of the Object: 
Another element of unilateral action is that the object of the unilateral action 
must be appropriate and legal.  While the appropriateness of the object of 
unilateral actions refers to the realistic possibility of performing the subject 
matter of the unilateral action, the legality aspect connotes that the object 
must not be unlawful. In other words, unilateral action or declarations 
containing impossible tasks are generally invalid. Regarding the legality 
aspect, first, it is settled principle that any unilateral action in violation of jus 
cogens is void. This principle is well established in many ICJ cases, and further 
reiterated in Article 8 of the ILC Guiding principles on unilateral actions. 
Secondly, is where the unlawfulness of the object does not violate jus cogens, 
but conflicts with other international law commitments undertaken by the 
State performing the unilateral action. Here, the commitment by the state to 
fulfil the unilateral action may likely attract international responsibility of the 
state.512  As one commentator argued in this respect, ‘…there is little reason not 
to treat the situation where the fulfilment of a new undertaking is incompatible with 
an earlier one in the same manner as in the law of treaties’.513  Thirdly, is where the 
unilateral obligation is in conflict with the domestic law of the state making 
the declaration. Here, it will be difficult for such a ‘conflict’ or violation of 
domestic law to be treated as a clog to the fulfilment of unilateral undertaking 
                                                 
512 Goodman (n 466) 55. 
513 Eckart (n 462) 244. 
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under international law.514 This is because, under the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility, domestic laws cannot be relied upon to justify derogation 
from performing or complying with an international obligation.515’  In this 
respect, a commentator remarked that, “Where a (state) representative is 
competent according to this standard and represents his or her state, it should be his 
or her task and not that of addressee to ensure that the commitment undertaken is in 
conformity with its municipal provisions.”516 
On the other hand, it need to be stressed that while domestic law could not be 
relied upon to trump performance of unilateral obligation, the nature of the 
domestic law in question may however, need to be specified. Where the 
domestic law in question is of fundamental importance relating to the 
competency in authoring the unilateral action, an analogy may be drawn with 
article 46 of the VCLT where an exception to the irrelevance of domestic law 
is recognised.517  
 
                                                 
514 Reisman and Arsanjani (n 20) 339. 
515 According to article 32, ‘The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this part. ‘International 
Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, Available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html [accessed 29 May 2014]’ (n 498). 
516 Eckart (n 462) 236. 
517 According to article 46 of VCLT: 1. ‘A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of its internal law regarding competence to 
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned 
a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.’ 2. ‘A violation is manifest if it would be 
objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal 
practice and in good faith.’ United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 
May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html [accessed 29 May 2014] (n 250). 
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Flowing from the above elements of unilateral actions, it can be summarised 
that, while unilaterality and publicity could be seen as more of features (form) 
of unilateral actions than validity elements, a valid unilateral action must 
contain: (a) a manifested will (intention) devoid of defect. (b) Must be made 
by a competent subject. (c) Must be in respect of an appropriate and legal 
object. Upon fulfilment of these essential elements, a binding unilateral action 
can be said to exist. A legitimate expectation flowing from such unilateral 
action, declaration, statement, or conduct is usually accorded legal protection. 
The creator of such expectation is not allowed to revoke its assurance unless 
in specified instances recognized by law.  
 
vi. Revocation of Unilateral Actions: 
 Generally, a unilateral action once validly crystallized cannot be revoked 
arbitrarily.518 The ICJ in both nuclear tests case and Military Paramilitary 
Activities against Nicaragua case 519 unequivocally underscore the basis why 
                                                 
518 In Nuclear Tests Case the Court finds that ‘…the unilateral undertaking resulting from 
these statements cannot be interpreted as having been made in implicit reliance on an 
arbitrary power of reconsideration.’ The Court went further to add that ‘…the French 
Government has undertaken an obligation the precise nature and limits of which must be 
understood in accordance with the actual terms in which they have been publicly expressed.’ 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgement, (n 465) [53] Similarly, In Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua the ICJ reiterated its position on sanctioning 
arbitrary revocation of unilateral actions. The Court in its judgement regarding unilateral 
declarations pursuant to article 36 (2) of the ICJ statute held that ‘…the unilateral nature of 
declarations does not signify that the State making the declaration is free to amend the scope 
and the contents of its solemn commitments as it pleases.’; Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility Judgement, [1984] ICJ Rep 392 [59]. 
519 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgement, (n 507) [59]. 
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expectations created pursuant to unilateral actions shall not be reneged upon 
arbitrarily. The freedom of states to voluntarily make such solemn 
undertakings was heralded by ICJ as ‘facultative’ allowing states to 
foreseeably commit to what can be fulfilled.   In both cases the ICJ highlighted 
the sign-posts to guide the determination of arbitrary revocation. 520 In similar 
vein, The ILC Guiding Principles on Unilateral Declarations followed suit in 
sanctioning arbitrary revocation of unilateral commitments and reiterating 
the factors to be taken into account in assessing arbitrary revocation.  In this 
regard, article 10 provides: 
“A unilateral declaration that has created legal obligations for the State making the 
declaration cannot be revoked arbitrarily. In assessing whether a revocation would be 
arbitrary, consideration should be given to: 
(a) Any specific terms of the declaration relating to revocation; 
(b) The extent to which those to whom the obligations are owed have relied on 
such obligations; 
(c) The extent to which there has been a fundamental change in the 
circumstances.” 
 
Flowing from the ICJ cases and the ILC guiding principles, it can be argued 
that arbitrary revocation of unilateral action is completely sanctioned by the 
totality of the ICJ jurisprudence, leaving no room for ambiguity. However, 
both the ICJ and the ILC Guidelines have not expressly provided a conclusive 
answer to the non-arbitrary revocations. This gap or ambiguity deliberate or 
otherwise provided a window where revocation argument was resurrected in 
                                                 
520 According to the Court: ‘In making the declaration a State is equally free either to do so 
unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with conditions and 
reservations. In particular, it may limit its effect to disputes arising after a certain date; or it 
may specify how long the declaration itself shall remain in force, or what notice (if any) will 
be required to terminate it.’ Ibid. 
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the circle of the publicists. Some even argued that States are entitled to 
presumption of revocation of unilateral actions. According this school, the rule is 
‘…State can modify or revoke its unilateral act at will and at any time.’521 
Proponents of this argument relied on the supposed distinction between 
binding force of unilateral act and revocation and modification of same. On 
the other hand, some publicists are of the view that some unilateral actions 
are irrevocable.522 Proponents of this school appear to have analogised with 
part V of the VCLT dealing with termination, and suspension of treaties as a 
ceiling to their argument against revocation of unilateral actions.523 
Navigating the depth of the two extreme viewpoints is outside the purview of 
this work. However, a reconciliatory position is, the two contending views as 
extreme as they look, are not far from each other. The distinction is largely on 
what the general rule is, and what the exception is. Both approaches have 
recognised: 
a. A unilateral undertaking shall not be revoked arbitrarily. 
b. A unilateral undertaking may simultaneously contain a revocation 
notice or terms.  
c. Successful defence of fundamental change of circumstances can justify 
revocation. 
In addition, it must be admitted that there are law and policy dimensions 
regarding both positions discussed above. On one hand, there is need to 
                                                 
521 ‘Unilateral Acts of States’ (n 484) 234. 
522 Vladimir Đuro Degan, Sources of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997) 291. 
523 Eckart (n 462) 253. 
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ensure that states are not being overtly over-burdened by holding them to 
account over their pure voluntary statements and other related policy 
objectives. 524 On the other hand, fizzling out genuine expectations of 
addressees, who were led to alter their positions in good faith and against 
whose benefit undertakings were made, would undoubtedly render the entire 
unilateral undertakings regime nugatory. Indeed, it makes no sense if law 
shall allow victims of reneged promises at the mercy of the makers of the 
promises. 525  
Having acknowledged the above dilemma between broad interpretation of 
unilateral undertakings with limited revocation scope, and narrow 
interpretation of unilateral undertakings with broad revocation scope, it can 
be said that contributory to the dilemma was the absence of clear juridical 
rule guiding the interpretation by ICJ in this area. Therefore, covering this gap 
by resorting to ILC guidelines and the VCLT for guidance would 
undoubtedly bridge this gap. More importantly, the VCLT has a detailed 
prescriptive guidance regarding the revocation, modification and suspension 
                                                 
524 As one commentator remarked while critiquing the Nuclear Tests case as follows: ‘If policy 
pronouncements or expressions of intention can be construed to be irrevocable without 
detrimental reliance or any other formality beyond the possibly transitory intention of the 
declarant state, the result is hardly likely to be greater adherence of states to their 
pronouncements….it is much more likely to result in greater disregard by states of the 
asserted dictates of the law and greater reluctance by states to publish their intentions….to 
make an expressed intention irrevocable without reliance cannot encourage the sort of open 
discussion of positions and issues that leads to stability in international affairs. Nor can it lead 
to a respect for international obligations to regard them as created so easily.’ Alfred P Rubin, 
‘International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, The’ (1977) 71 American Journal of 
International Law 1, 30. 
525 As Atiyah in the opening quotation of this chapter opined: ‘A man may think he ought to 
fulfil a promise, but his thinking that he has an obligation cannot actually be the source of the 
obligation, if it was only honest men would be bound…’Atiyah (n 356) 18. 
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of treaties which could aid the courts and tribunals to analogically enrich the 
unilateral declarations regime. 
 
4.1.5 Concluding Remarks on Legitimate Expectations under General 
International Law 
From the broad international law context analysis above, the conception and 
application of legitimate expectations posits two peculiar constellations. First, 
the formulation and application of legitimate expectations under the general 
international law postulates an ‘intra’ problem of interconnectedness among 
the “expectation-protective” principles of abuse of right, acquiescence, equity, 
estoppel, good faith, reasonableness and unilateral declarations. This distinguishes 
general international law, from the specific regimes where the principle of 
legitimate expectation appears to be clearly delineated with little overlap into 
other related principles. Secondly, the scenario of the expectations under 
general international law posits an ‘inter’ regime problem between general 
international law and specialised regimes. Under general international law, 
the notion of protecting legitimate expectations is inter-state, where states 
expect each other to behave in a particular manner or refrain from behaving 
in a particular manner. In this regard, the subject matter of protection is ‘state 
expectations’ which in a way distinguishes expectations scenarios in broad 
international law from legitimate expectations under specific regimes. Under 
the specialised regimes of  human rights, European Union, and international 
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investment law, the subject matter of protection is ‘individual’s expectations’, 
not state expectations. 
 
4.2 Legitimate expectations under WTO 
 
4.2.1 Legitimate expectations under WTO: Overview 
WTO law is a jurisprudence rooted on a multilateral treaty.  One of the key 
contributions of WTO to international law is the “rule-oriented”526 dispute 
settlement approach enshrined in the WTO dispute settlement system. Under 
the dispute settlement rules, a uniform approach set out by article 11 DSU 
tasks the dispute settlement panels to make objective assessment of matters in 
conformity with relevant WTO agreements.527 Article 3.2 DSU describes the 
WTO dispute settlement system as nucleus in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral treaty and therefore mandates WTO tribunals 
to interpret and clarify WTO agreements in accordance with customary rules 
of public international law.528 In the exercise of their adjudicatory role, the 
panel and the appellate body have pursuant to customary rules of 
interpretation under the VCLT deployed the use of principles to determine 
                                                 
526 ‘Rule-oriented’ approach as opposed to ‘power-oriented’ appraoch has been described by 
Petersmann as ‘...negotiations among governments or individuals on the elaboration and 
observance of general rules of conduct which all participants voluntarily accept because the 
rules reconcile their conflicting short-term interests with their common long-term interests in 
a mutually beneficial manner.’ Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement (Martinus Nijhoff 
2012)  66–67. 
527 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401; 33 ILM 1226 (1994) (n 90). 
528 Ibid Article 3.2. 
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and clarify less clear and often ambiguous provisions of the WTO 
jurisprudence. Thus, the principle of legitimate expectations among the 
generality of the principles applied by WTO dispute settlement bodies is said 
to permeate the overall WTO jurisprudence. According to Jackson, fulfilment 
of expectations is a fundamental goal of international agreements such as 
WTO.529 The formulation and application of legitimate expectations under 
WTO emanates from the good faith obligation under international law530 and 
Principle of equity.531 Both principles though not explicitly prescribed appear 
to pervade the entire operational stages of WTO, from pre-accession to 
dispute resolution, including state’s repudiation to participate in the WTO 
system.532 Their role is to ‘inject security and predictability into the 
multilateral trading system’ as a whole as contracting parties are entitled to 
form legitimate expectations regarding their trade behaviour, maintenance of 
generalised conditions affecting future trade and overall consistency and 
predictability of the WTO law.  
 
In augmenting predictability in the WTO system, the principle of legitimate 
expectations functions interactively with the basic rules and principles of 
                                                 
529 According to Jackson “An important goal of international agreement is the fulfilment of 
expectations of the parties to the agreement. These expectations may have been aroused or 
engendered by a variety of factors, but one can empirically observe the effect of the practice 
of the institution upon the expectations of national representatives to that institution and the 
effects that these expectations have in turn upon national governments." See; John H Jackson, 
World Trade and the Law of GATT (Lexis Law Pub 1969) 19. 
530 Panizzon (n 12). 
531 Cottier (n 393) 123–147. 
532 Cottier (n 393). 
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WTO. These basic rules and principles includes533: a. The principles of non-
discrimination b. rules on market access and transparency c. rules on unfair 
trade d. rules on conflicts between trade liberalisation and other societal 
values and interests, e. rules on special and differential treatment f. dispute 
settlement procedural rules. In addition, the principle ensures equal condition 
of competition between WTO member states. In Japan-Film534 the panel 
alluded to this function that legitimate expectations protects “relative 
conditions of competition which existed between domestic and foreign 
products as a consequence of the relevant tariff concessions.”535 Other 
functions of the principle have been outlined536 to include, protection of trade 
partners from detrimental change in their competitive opportunities, 
protection of assurances under waiver, negotiation for commitments 
regarding access to projects under Government Procurement Agreements, etc. 
 
4.2.2 Formulation of Legitimate Expectations under WTO 
The nature of WTO obligations and overall objectives of WTO norms have 
attracted substantial analysis among WTO commentators.537 The analysis 
                                                 
533 Bossche (n 145) 37. 
534 Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, 1179. 
535 Ibid 10.86. 
536 Panizzon (n 12) 97. 
537 Generally on the nature of WTO obligations, see; Chios Carmody, ‘A Theory of WTO Law’ 
(2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 527; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of 
Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ 
(2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 907; Chios C Carmody, ‘WTO Obligations as 
Collective’ (Social Science Research Network 2006) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1092718 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1092718> accessed 25 August 2014. 
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deployed by the commentators’ largely538 points towards analogy with 
domestic legal systems which invariably connotes the traditional domestic 
law norms divide between contractual and constitutional regimes. The divide 
breads, two conceptual approaches, namely, contractualism and 
constitutionalism approaches. According to contractual approach, WTO law 
obligations are like contracts where two or more states may agree to take 
certain obligations among themselves, free to negotiate terms and free to vary 
and amend their contractual terms. Proponents of contractual approach 
further described WTO as mere negotiating ground for negotiating 
agreements bilaterally among WTO contracting states. An extended argument 
of contractual approach can be seen in the WTO-bilateralism position which 
opines that WTO obligations are ‘bundle of bilateral relations’ whose object is 
trade between countries in a bilateral form. 
On the other hand, Constitutional approach had appealed to many 
commentators particularly the pioneer publicists in the area.  The proponents 
of Constitutional approach compare WTO with domestic constitutions. In 
outlining the constitutional features of WTO, the proponents argued that, 
first; WTO obligations consist of a single undertaking that applies to all WTO 
member states something akin to domestic constitutions. Secondly, the WTO 
provides for an international institution with a framework for the global 
trading system and therefore creates a “higher law” binding on states. 
                                                 
538 There are commentators the analogised with overall nature of obligations under 
international law, particulalrly from the dimension responsibility. See; Tarcisio Gazzini, ‘The 
Legal Nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences of Their Violation’ (2006) 17 
European Journal of International Law 723. 
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Thirdly, the WTO provides for judicial review like a domestic constitutional 
system. The review mechanism  offers “…a framework capable of reasonably 
balancing and weighing different, equally legitimate and democratically defined basic 
values and policy goals of a polity dedicated to promote liberty and welfare in a broad 
sense.”539 Of recent, the Constitutional approach is reflected in the collectivism 
approach which identifies expectations regarding trade-related behaviour as the 
core in WTO norms. From both contractual-bilateral and constitutional-
collective approaches it can be discerned that the formulation of legitimate 
expectations in WTO is conceptually rooted and thrives in the later approach 
ie constitutional-collectivism.540The approach recognises the latitude of the 
contracting parties to generate expectations among themselves. It recognises 
the leverage of WTO tribunals to take into account and apply the principle of 
legitimate expectations in interpreting WTO agreements and settlement of 
WTO disputes.541 
 
In invoking the principle of legitimate expectations, both WTO panels and 
appellate body relied on the concept of good faith and International law 
maxim of Pacta Sunt Servanda as contained in Article 26 of the VCLT alluding 
                                                 
539 Thomas Cottier and Matthias Oesch, International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy in the 
WTO, the European Union and Switzerland: Cases, Materials and Comments (Staempfli Publishers 
2005) 534. 
540 Carmody, ‘WTO Obligations as Collective’ (n 526). 
541 Professor Andrew D Mitchell, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (Reprint edition, Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 87. 
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to the obligation of contracting parties to abide by their treaty obligations. In 
EC Sardines542, the Appellate Body remarked that: 
“…We must assume that Members of the WTO will abide by their treaty 
obligations in good faith, as required by the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda 
articulated in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention. And always in dispute 
settlement, every member of the WTO must assume the good faith of every 
other Member.”543 
 
In plethora of reports, the panels and the appellate bodies have alluded to the 
derivation of legitimate expectations pursuant to good faith principle under 
International law. In India Patents544 and EC LAN545, both panels concluded 
that good faith interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT requires 
protection of legitimate expectations. Indeed, the Appellate Body in both 
cases rejected such conclusions in the context of violation complains and 
regarded such invocations as tantamount to misapplication of VCLT. 
Instructively, in Korea-Government Procurement546 the panel traces the 
nexus between non-violations complaints and good faith principle and 
further considers non-violation complains as an extension of good faith 
requirement under international law. As the panel remarked: 
                                                 
542 EC-Sardines Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Trade Description of Sardines, 
WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, 3359. 
543 Ibid 278. 
544 India – Patents (EC) Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, Complaint by the European Communities, WT/DS79/ R, adopted 22 September 
1998, DSR 1998:VI, 2661. 
545 EC – Computer Equipment Panel Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R, adopted 22 June 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/ DS68/AB/R, DSR 
1998:V, 1891. 
546 Korea – Procurement Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 
WT/DS163/R, adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, 3541. 
209 
 
“It seems clear that good faith performance has been agreed by the WTO 
members to include Subsequent actions which might nullify or impair the 
benefits reasonably expected to accrue to other parties to the negotiations in 
question.”547 
 
Therefore, there is clear recognition of the concept of good faith as the 
foundational basis for applying the principle of legitimate expectations and 
associated principles such as abuse of right, due process, estoppel etc. under 
WTO. Indeed, Good faith is regarded in international law as a general principle 
of law that controls the exercise of rights by states. Thus, the principle of 
legitimate expectations as an appellation of Good Faith could be understood 
as practical application of good faith in an interactive setting among WTO 
contracting states. As Cottier and Schefer remarked on the role of the 
principle of legitimate expectations, “Interaction creates mutual 
expectations…the decision maker must ask whether one party held an objectively 
reasonable, or legitimate, expectation that it would receive some benefit.” In the next 
heading, the thesis shall examine the application of legitimate expectations 
under WTO.  
 
4.2.3 Scenarios of Legitimate Expectations under WTO 
                                                 
547 Ibid 7.94. 
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Generally, WTO dispute settlement provisions provides for three scenarios, 
giving rise to causes of action allowing aggrieved members to initiate the 
dispute settlement process. Article XXIII: I GATT provides in this regard: 
“If any Member should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the 
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of; 
a. The failure of another Member to carry out its obligations under this 
Agreement, or 
b. The application by another Member of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or 
c. The existence of any other situation  
The contracting party may with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the 
matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting 
party or parties which it considers to be concerned.” 
 
The above mentioned causes of action are not limited to GATT only, same 
causes of action are replicated in GATS and TRIPS. Following the provision 
under reference, and in line with the role of legitimate expectations in most 
binding agreements, the principle, is invoked in the WTO jurisprudence 
under the scenarios of violation complains, non-violation complains and in 
maintaining consistency regarding adopted Panel and Appellate Body 
Reports. 
a. Violation Complaints Scenario: 
Article XXIII:1 (a) GATT above allows WTO member states to file complaints 
against another member where the latter takes a measure in violation of its 
commitments or obligation under WTO. Such alleged violations might result 
in impairing or nullifying a benefit that ought to accrue to the aggrieved 
211 
 
party. In EC Asbestos548 the Appellate Body elaborated on the content of 
violation complain as follows: 
“Article XXIII:1 (a) sets forth a cause of action for a claim that a Member has failed to 
carry out one or more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A claim under Article 
XXIII:1(a), therefore, lies when a Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with 
a provision of the GATT 1994….”549 
 
Therefore, refusal to carry out an obligation or contravening a clear WTO 
obligation would invariably amount to violation of the legitimate expectations 
of the aggrieved party. Indeed, identifying a violation of legitimate 
expectations within violations complaints is a contested reasoning. In general, 
the WTO Appellate body had repeatedly rejected the role of legitimate 
expectations in the determination of violation complaints. In India-Patents550 
the panel having reviewed India’s mailbox application system concluded that 
the system was in violation of TRIPS and contrary to the legitimate 
expectations of other member states. On appeal before the appellate body, the 
appellate body concluded that mixing violation of WTO obligation with the 
legitimate expectations of a member state will tantamount to wrong reading 
of Article XXIII: 1 (a) & (b).  According to the Appellate Body, much as 
legitimate expectations is not reflected in the language of the treaty itself, it 
                                                 
548 EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243. 
549 Ibid 185. 
550 India – Patents (EC) Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, Complaint by the European Communities, WT/DS79/ R, adopted 22 September 
1998, DSR 1998:VI, 2661 (n 533). 
212 
 
does not belong to violation complains but, rather to non-violation 
complains.551 
 
In EC-LAN552 similar conclusion was reached regarding the role of legitimate 
expectations in violation complaints. The panel considered whether tariff 
treatment of LAN equipment could give rise to legitimate expectations 
pursuant to Article II GATT. According to the Panel, legitimate expectations 
pursuant to Article II GATT are based on an assumption that “actual tariff 
treatment accorded to a particular product at the time of negotiation will be continued 
unless such treatment is manifestly anomalous or there is information readily 
available to the exporting Member that clearly indicates the contrary.”553 Applying 
the assumption to the fact in EC-LAN, the panel was quick to recognise that 
the European Community practice of according LAN equipment tariff 
treatment as ADP machines during the Uruguay round of negotiation is 
sufficient to generate legitimate expectations of US regarding the continuity of 
such practice. The panel further rejected any attempt to place the burden of 
clarifying ambiguity or unclear manifestation of representation or conduct on 
the US being the recipient of such representation or conduct. According to the 
panel, to place such a burden of seeking clarification on the recipients would 
                                                 
551 India – Patents (US) Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, 9 [42]. 
552 EC – Computer Equipment Panel Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R, adopted 22 June 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/ DS68/AB/R, DSR 
1998:V, 1891 (n 534). 
553 Ibid 8.45. 
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“…risk an erosion of the confidence upon which it is necessary for parties to rely in 
the conduct of tariff negotiations, as onerous…”554 In its findings, the panel 
concluded that first; United States was entitled to legitimately expect that 
LAN equipment would continue to be accorded tariff treatment as ADP 
machines in the European Communities. Secondly, the legitimate 
expectations of US were frustrated by the subsequent change in the 
reclassification practice in the European Community. Thirdly, by frustrating 
the legitimate expectations of US, the European Communities have violated 
Article II: 1 GATT by failing to accord imports of LAN equipment from US 
treatment no less favourable than that provided under European 
Communities.  
 
Upon appeal to the Appellate body, following its jurisprudence in India-
Patent rejected the Panel’s findings regarding legitimate expectations. 
According to the Appellate body, the panel was wrong in concluding that the 
meaning of a tariff concession in a Member’s Schedule may be determined in 
the light of legitimate expectations of an exporting member and such 
interpretation being in accordance with Article 31 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Therefore, the panel was wrong in considering legitimate 
expectations as vital element in the interpretation of Article II: I GATT and 
member’s Schedules. 
 
                                                 
554 Ibid 8.49. 
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Notwithstanding the above cases, commentators have argued that the 
Appellate body had missed the point in both India-Patent and EC-Lan cases 
regarding the method of invoking legitimate expectations.555 As   argued,556 
the values or interests sought to be protected by nullification and impairment 
regime under WTO is akin to those values and interests falling within the 
scope of coverage of Good Faith. In other words, to strictly adhere to the exact 
treaty violation would simply yield a wrong result.  
b. Non Violation Complains Scenario 
In Non-violation scenario the focus is on measures not directly in violation of 
any provision of WTO law, but on measures that nullifies/impairs a benefit 
or impedes achievement of an objective. In other words, in non- violation 
complaints, the measure do not clearly violate the text of WTO agreement but 
undermines a benefit that should accrue to any of the contracting parties. In 
Japan- Film the panel described the purpose of non-violation complaint as 
“…to protect the balance of concessions under GATT by providing a means to redress 
government actions not otherwise regulated by GATT rules that nonetheless nullify 
or impair a Member’s legitimate expectations of benefits from tariff negotiations.”557 
 
Non violation complains are generally considered as the main domain of 
legitimate expectations under WTO. The principle of legitimate expectations 
                                                 
555 Laurent A Ruessmann, The Place of Legitimate Expectations in the General Interpretation of the 
WTO Agreements (Institute for International Law of the KU Leuven 2002) 6. 
556 Thomas Cottier and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations in the WTO’ [2007] Challenge of WTO law : collected essays 57–58. 
557 Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, 1179 (n 523) [10.50]. 
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plays a significant role in establishing non-violation due to the permeable 
nature of non-violation complains. Legitimate expectations also help in 
assessing whether a WTO consistent measure that nullifies and impairs 
benefit that ought to accrue to a contracting party is reasonably foreseeable. 
The panel in Japan-Film summarised the required applicable tests in non-
violation cases. These tests entail three elements that a complaining party 
must demonstrate in order to make out a claim under Article xxiii: I (b) as 
follows:  
a. Application of a measure by a WTO member;  
b. a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement;  
c. Nullification or impairment of the benefit as a result of the application 
of the measure. 
 
The application of legitimate expectations under WTO, either in the context of 
violation or non-violation cases, both revolves around the totality of measures 
affecting trade. Governments, most often as source of creating or removing 
barriers to trade, use laws, regulations, requirements, administrative actions 
etc. to enact and implement such measures. Therefore, where a state 
embarked upon enacting or implementing a measure, it is likely that the 
measure could nullify or impair a benefit being enjoyed by WTO member 
state. Consequences of such nullification or impairment could result in either 
violating WTO agreement or simply impairing a benefit without necessarily 
violating any WTO agreement.  
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c. Adopted Panel and Appellate Body Reports Scenario 
Although, WTO adopted Panel and Appellate Body Reports binds only the 
parties to the dispute, it is accepted however, that such reports could create 
legitimate expectations on the WTO member states. The member states can 
legitimately expect that Panel and Appellate bodies shall take into account 
their previous findings when confronted with similar cases. In Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages II558 the Appellate Body held that adopted panel reports 
‘…create legitimate expectations among WTO members, and, therefore, should be 
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute’. In US-Softwood 
Lumber V559, The Appellate Body takes into account its reasoning and 
findings in EC-Bed linen. The basis for invoking legitimate expectations 
regarding WTO dispute settlement bodies can be traced to Article 3.2 of the 
DSU. Article 3.2 provides as follows: 
“The dispute settlement system of the WTO is central element in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members 
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members 
under the Covered agreements and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.” 
 
                                                 
558 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/ DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97. 
559 US – Softwood Lumber V Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination 
on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted 31 August 2004. 
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The notion of security and predictability provided by Article 3.2 DSU has 
been described by the Appellate Body in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II560 as 
the goal sought to be achieved by the WTO system. According to the 
Appellate Body: 
“WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules are not so rigid 
or inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the endless 
ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will serve 
the multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that in mind. In that 
way, we will achieve the ‘security and predictability’ sought for the multilateral 
trading system by the Members of the WTO through the establishment of the dispute 
settlement system.”561 
 
Undoubtedly legitimate expectations pursuant to Dispute Settlement reports 
are non-justiciable and unenforceable, as they possess no cause of action 
against which an aggrieved party can file a complaint. The role of this type of 
expectations are simply to direct the policy objective of WTO towards 
predictable framework which parties can rely and coordinate their activities, 
rather than constituting a cause of action.  
 
4.2.4 Elements of Legitimate Expectations under WTO 
Legitimate expectations like in previous regimes discussed entails presence of 
assurance/conduct, reliance, revocation and damages (Injury).562 
a. Assurances/Conduct - Benefit 
                                                 
560 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/ DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97 (n 
547). 
561 Ibid 31. 
562 Cottier and Nadakavukaren Schefer (n 545) 54. 
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In the context of WTO, assurances are usually in the form of conditions of 
competition negotiated between WTO member states culminating into 
benefits accruing to the states. These benefits includes assurances as to 
improved market access, non-discrimination, price effect etc Assurances giving 
rise to legitimate expectations may be express or implied. Instances of implied 
assurances include state conduct, Policy, negotiation practice, and legal 
framework such as GATT provisions.563 Such assurances can be conveyed by 
states through their delegates during trade negotiations etc.  In German 
Import Duties on Starch and Potato Flour564, The head of German delegation 
conveyed a letter to Benelux Countries representatives containing following 
representation: 
“…The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to open 
negotiations with the Governments of the Benelux Countries on the subject of 
a new reduction of German duties on starch and starch derivatives with a 
view to applying as soon as possible under the new German custom tariff a 
duty of 15 per cent on starch derivatives.”565 
 
The panel deciding the dispute found that the letter having contained an 
assurance to negotiate the resolution of the dispute gives rise to legitimate 
expectations on the part of the recipients. Similarly in Korea-Government 
                                                 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/ DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97 (n 
523). 
563 Adrian T&#46 Chua, ‘Reasonable Expectations and Non-Violation Complaints in 
GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (1998) 32 Journal of World Trade 27, 32–36. 
564 Germany – Starch Duties GATT Panel Report, German Import Duties on Starch and Potato 
Flour, W9/178, 16 February 1955, unadopted, BISD 3S/77. 
565 Ibid. 
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Procurement566 the panel indicated that expectations could be generated in 
the context of negotiations. According to the panel “…Members should not take 
actions, even those consistent with the letter of the treaty, which might serve to 
undermine the reasonable expectations of negotiating partners.”567  In Oilseeds I568 
the panel considered a conduct of an established negotiation practice as a 
source of legitimate expectations. According to the panel: 
“…the partners of the Community in the successive renegotiations under 
Article XXIV:6 could legitimately assume, in the absence of any indications  
to the contrary, that the offer to continue a tariff commitment by the 
Community was an offer not to change the balance of concessions previously 
attained.”569 
 
Another method of creating expectations recognised by WTO law is state 
policy. In Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate570 the Panel 
considered a continuous policy as giving rise to an assurance. The Panel 
found that the removal of Sodium Nitrate fertilizer from the pool of 
subsidized fertilisers by Australia was in violation of Chile’s legitimate 
expectations that Australia’s policy of subsidy in Ammonium Sulphate and 
Sodium nitrate, a policy which was made due to local scarcity would continue 
to apply to both Fertilizers.  
                                                 
566 Korea – Procurement Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 
WT/DS163/R, adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, 3541 (n 535). 
567 Ibid 7.93. 
568 EEC – Oilseeds I  GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Payments and 
Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627, 
adopted 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86. 
569 Ibid 146. 
570 Australia – Ammonium Sulphate Working Party Report, The Australian Subsidy on 
Ammonium Sulphate, GATT/CP4/39, adopted 3 April 1950, BISD II/188. 
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The totality of the cases considered above have all pointed to various methods 
or sources of generating legitimate expectations.  Thus, not only express 
assurance can give rise to legitimate expectations. Expectations can arise from 
conduct, practice, Policies, pre-existing conditions, and provisions of WTO 
agreements. These methods of sourcing legitimate expectations need to guide 
the complaining party to specify a recognised benefit accruing to it under 
WTO. Benefit as discussed above, connotes overall conditions of competition 
under WTO or as commentator opined “…a competitive relationship between a 
foreign and domestic product established by the binding of the relevant tariff 
position.”571 
b. Reliance 
The second element needed in establishing a violation of legitimate 
expectations is reliance. Traces of reliance as an element of legitimate 
expectations, is considered in many panel and appellate body reports. In 
Norway-Restrictions572 on Imports of Certain Textile Products the panel 
considered Hong Kong’s “substantial interest” as the legitimate right to 
expect compliance with an assurance emanating from the general agreement. 
Similarly, in Oilseeds I a past negotiation practice was regarded as basis for 
                                                 
571 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The Non-Violation Procedure of Article XXIII: 2, GATT; Its 
Operational Rationale’ (1992) 26 Journal of World Trade 95, 98. 
572 According to the panel: ‘Since Hong Kong has a substantial interest in supplying eight of 
the nine product categories in question to the Norwegian Market, it had the right to expect 
the allocation of a share of the quotas in accordance with Article XIII:2(d).’ Norway – Textiles
  GATT Panel Report, Norway – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile Products, L/4959, 
adopted 18 June 1980, BISD 27S/119 [16]. 
221 
 
reliance among the negotiation parties. According to the Panel, the EEC’s 
continuation of tariff commitment signifies an offer ‘not to change the balance of 
concessions previously attained.’573 
 
However, while it is quite easy to show reliance behaviour in legitimate 
expectations claims, there are commentators who took the view that the 
element of ‘reliance’ is not a requisite for establishing violation of legitimate 
expectations.574 Their argument in rejecting reliance hinges on the instances 
where legitimate expectations can be made to appear without necessarily 
identifying the specific reliance behaviour of the complaining party. Cases of 
legitimate expectations involving non-reliance behaviour include situations 
where the source of the expectations is WTO law such as GATT provisions, or 
pre-existing competitive conditions. 
 
c. Nullification and Impairment (Revocation) 
Nullification or impairment element in WTO lexicon is like typical revocation 
element in legitimate expectations scenarios. The element requires that a party 
alleging violation of its legitimate expectations must prove that the measure 
introduced and applied by the Respondent state does provide a benefit or 
impose a burden, and above all, has adverse effect and results in frustration of 
                                                 
573 EEC – Oilseeds I  GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Payments and 
Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627, 
adopted 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86 (n 557) [146]. 
574 Chua (n 552) 47. 
222 
 
legitimate expectations. It is instructive to note that reference to ‘measure’ in 
this regard is confined to state measures involving government actions, 
conduct, or policies as opposed to private parties’.575 Therefore, the measure 
complained of must in addition to being a state measure, emanate from the 
Respondent.  In Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile Products 
the panel held that a measure inconsistent with the general agreement is 
prima facie amounting to nullification and impairment of a benefit contrary to 
legitimate expectations of the contracting parties.576  In Korea-Government 
Procurement, while alluding to the relevance of time, the panel remarked 
regarding revocation of a benefit that “…the nullification or impairment of the 
benefit as result of the measure must be contrary to the reasonable expectations of the 
complaining party at the time of the agreement.”577 As to the legitimacy of the 
expectations, the measure must not have been reasonably foreseen or 
anticipated.578 
 
Moreover, the burden of proving the nature of the adverse effect and the 
frustrative element of the challenged measure is on the complaining State. 
The determination of reasonableness of the complaining state’s expectations 
                                                 
575 Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, 1179 (n 523) [10.52]. 
576 Norway – Textiles  GATT Panel Report, Norway – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile 
Products, L/4959, adopted 18 June 1980, BISD 27S/119 (n 561) [17]. 
577 Korea – Procurement Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, 
WT/DS163/R, adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, 3541 (n 535) [7.85]. 
578 According to the panel in Japan-film: ‘If the measures were anticipated, a member could 
not have had a legitimate expectation of impaired market access to the extent of the 
impairment caused by these measures.’ Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting 
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, 1179 (n 
523) [10.80]. 
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will depend on the surrounding circumstances of the claim. In establishing 
the causal connection between the challenged measure and its adverse effect 
on the competitive positions, the panels are concerned with whether the 
challenged measure has caused the nullification and impairment, whether the 
relative conditions of competition has been upset by the introduction of the 
measure, and whether the measure is intended to nullify benefit or not,579 and 
lastly the overall impact of the measure as whole. 
 
Lastly, consequences of violation of legitimate expectations may depend on 
whether the violation fall within violation or non-violation scenario. In the 
event of violation complaint, the panel can order for restitution to the 
aggrieved party. As to non-violation scenarios, which largely attracts 
legitimate expectations plea, it is settled precedence, that the panel can only 
recommend change of behaviour, or mutual adjustment but no binding or 
authoritative order. 
 
4.2.5 Concluding remarks on Legitimate Expectations under WTO 
The jurisprudence of WTO has clearly embrace the application legitimate 
expectations. The conception and application of the principle having been 
rooted pursuant to good faith principle  also assumed a dominant position at 
least with respect to non-violation complains. The relevance of the 
                                                 
579 Ibid 10.87. 
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jurisprudence to investment treaty arbitration can hardly be overstated. Both 
trade and investment are treaty based regimes and both belong to the domain 
of economic law. References to WTO jurisprudence in investment treaty 
awards are ubiquitous and incline towards transposing well-tested 
jurisprudence of WTO to the emerging investment treaty regime. The 
reference to WTO jurisprudence by Walde in Thunderbird separate Opinion 
regarding investor’s legitimate expectations is, for the purposes of this 
research understood in that context. As he rightly put it; “A certain measure of 
recognition of this principle can be inferred from several WTO panel decisions…”580 
Thus, not only inference can be made from the jurisprudence of WTO on 
legitimate expectations, rather there are lessons to be learned by investment 
treaty tribunal in both formulation and application of the principle of 
legitimate expectations. 
 
 
  
                                                 
580 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation  v. United Mexican States (n 7) [29]. 
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Chapter V: Legitimate Expectations under European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR 
 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter the principle of legitimate expectations shall be discussed from 
both ECJ and ECtHR’s perspective. The grouping of the two separate courts 
under this chapter is for ordering and convenience factor. In addition, the 
conception and application of the principle by both courts is rooted on one 
hand, on the general principles of EU law, and on the other hand the 
recognition of right to property under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Therefore, the jurisprudence of both courts shall be examined 
separately with a view to bring to analyse how the courts have been applying 
the principle of legitimate expectations and the considerations been taken by 
the both courts in the determination or otherwise of the requisite elements 
constituting the principle. The Chapter is divided into four broad sections. 
Section briefly introduces the chapter as a whole; section two deals the 
principle of legitimate expectations under ECJ in details. Section three 
provides for an analytical account of legitimate expectations under ECtHR, 
and lastly section four concludes. 
 
5.1 Legitimate Expectations under ECJ: An overview 
The principle of legitimate expectations is part of the fundamental general 
principles recognised and applied by the European court of justice as forming 
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part of the European legal order.581 It denotes that assurances relied upon in 
good faith should be honoured.582 Generally, an individual’s (natural or 
artificial) expectations are likely to be affected by the overall administrative 
and regulatory functions of EU public institutions in three broad categories. 
These are direct decisions, indirect decisions, and lastly areas of law-making. 
Firstly, cases of direct decisions are by definition instances where the EU 
institutions directly engage in administrative decisions.583  Secondly, cases of 
indirect decisions are instances where EU decisions are being carried out by 
the national authorities of the EU member states. EU institutions in practice 
do rely on their domestic rules and institutions to implement and enforce 
certain EU laws and decisions.584 Thirdly, EU law-making function refers to 
instances where EU institutions engage in the passage of legislation or other 
                                                 
581 Case 112/80 Firma Anton Durbeck v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main- Flighafen (1981) 
ECR 1095 para 48. 
582 Case 5/75 Deuka Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH B. J. stolp v Einfuhr – und Vorratsstelle for 
Getriedeund fultermittel (1975) ECR 0759 Per A.G. Trabucchi, See also Damian Chalmers, 
Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 412. 
583 For instance, a direct decision conferring right is defined “...a measure by which a public 
authority exercises power conferred on it by law or by regulation, in the fulfilment of its public service, 
and which creates legal relations between the administration and those subject to it,..” Examples of 
direct decisions establishing right includes appointment of staff, salary grading etc. See; 
Advocate General Lagrange, Case 14/61 Koninklijke Nederlandsche hoogovens en 
Staalfabrieken NV v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (1962) ECR 
253. 
 
584 A typical example of this category is EU law on Agriculture whose implementation and 
enforcement is not by EU directly, but by the authorities of member states. Prominent 
instances of legitimate expectations under this category are: a. Recovery of EU financial 
benefits wrongly granted/paid to an individual. b. Recovery of a levy incorrectly not levied.  
c. Repayment of wrongly levied amounts. Cases of legitimate expectations under this 
category are quite minimal compared to direct actions by EU authorities. Schwarze (n 91) 
970–979. 
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forms of law-making which has bearing on the overall individuals and 
entities within the EU legal order. 585  
 
The Regulatory and administrative functions of EU institutions in the 
categories above, relate with individuals in form of conferral of right/benefit 
on individuals, imposition of burden, or mere declaratory function. In 
positive terms, such regulatory and administrative decisions could confer 
rights or benefits on individuals. In negative terms, such administrative 
decisions could impose restrictions/burdens on individuals. While in a 
neutral sense such decisions could be simply law-making. Generally, All EU 
measures, for the purpose of generating legitimate expectations are not 
hortatory; rather, they embody external legal effect.  
In the determination of legitimate expectations pursuant to the categories 
above, it can be discerned that certain functions could be lawful ab initio, 
while some could not be lawful at their inception.586 On one hand, a lawful 
EU regulatory and administrative function could prima facie give raise to a 
successful plea for legitimate expectations. On the other hand, an unlawful 
EU regulatory and administrative function from the outset could hardly 
ground a successful plea of legitimate expectations.  
                                                 
585 The crux in EU law-making scenario is the issue of retrospectivity in legislation. The 
Courts have developed a detailed jurisprudence regarding the legality or otherwise of 
retrospective legislation as it affect legitimate expectations of private entities. Ibid. 
586 Craig provides a broad categorization from lawful/unlawful dimension. See Paul Craig, 
EU Administrative Law (2nd edn, OUP Oxford 2012) 556–566. 
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The trigger for the violation of legitimate expectations in the three categories 
above is where the EU public institutions directly or indirectly 
revoke/withdraw the initial decision, or change the operative law.587 
Revocation could take place, factually in all the three categorized decisions. 
An individual, natural or artificial aggrieved by such revocations could seek 
judicial review through two gateways. First, pursuant to Article 263 
(TFEU),588 this provides that an individual who has direct dealing with EU 
regulatory bodies can institute an action for violation of legitimate 
expectations directly against such institutions. Secondly, pursuant to Article 
267 (TFEU), this provides that an action for violation of legitimate 
expectations could be maintained against national administrative authorities 
implementing EU regulations before national courts of member states. 
Subsequently, issues could be formulated before the national courts and be 
referred to the Court of justice for interpretation. 
 
Undoubtedly, the relevance of introducing various categories where issues of 
legitimate expectations have been litigated is to put in place proper 
foundation of discerning various approaches adopted by the European court 
of justice with due respect to the peculiarities of the categories. It need to be 
stated however, that one of the flaws  to the approach is the absence of a 
generic criteria that could describe pattern of analysis used and observed by 
                                                 
587 Stefan M. Stefanson, Legitimate Expectations in EC/EEA Law in Mario Monti, Nikolaus 
Von Und Zu Liechtenstein and Bo Versterdorf (eds), Economic Law and Justice in Times of 
Globalisation: Festschrift for Carl Baudenbacher (Bilingual, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2007) 636. 
588 Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) 
229 
 
the European court of justice in its formulation and application of legitimate 
expectations in each category. More particularly, for the purpose of a study of 
this nature that seeks to distil relevant adjudicative standards used by the 
Court. It can be discerned from the categories highlighted, that analysis of 
legitimate expectations would obviously entail diverse scenarios. Craig589 
aptly categorized the scenarios into four, namely: 
- Where a public authority makes a decision and subsequently revokes 
it. 
- Where a public authority makes a decision and subsequently makes a 
decision inconsistent with the representation. 
- Where a public body replaces an existing policy with a different one. 
- Where a public body departs from its policy in a particular case. 
 
In what follows from the introduction, the chapter will first, briefly, revisit the 
foundational basis of legitimate expectations as conceptualised under EU law. 
Secondly, the chapter will examine the criteria for ascertaining legitimate 
expectations under ECJ. Thirdly, the chapter will identify the key elements of 
legitimate expectations. Section four, will deal with the legitimacy dimension, 
while section five concludes on the relevance of the ECJ approach to the non 
EU regime, particularly investment treaty arbitration. 
    
                                                 
589 Craig (n 575) 553. 
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5.1.1 Basis for protecting Legitimate Expectations under ECJ 
In understanding the underlying basis behind ECJ’s approach of protecting 
legitimate expectations, various reasons had been advanced by the court and 
scholars. One of the most prominent reasons offered is “legal certainty”. 
Indeed, the ECJ’s formulation of the principle is intertwined with the 
principle of legal certainty. Legal certainty encapsulates the notion of 
predictability planning and coherence as very much in tuned with law.590 The 
impetus of the principle entails that law should be clear, unambiguous and 
predictable to the extent individuals can project and plan their lives in 
accordance with the law. Both legal certainty and legitimate expectations 
aimed at ensuring that the European Union Law is generally accessible and 
foreseeable.591 However, as the cases will illustrate, not all scenarios of 
legitimate expectations could be totally rationalised from the lens of legal 
certainty, particularly in view of the recognised powers of public 
administrators to alter their positions when circumstances dictate.592  Another 
explanation offered is “Rule of Law”. The ECJ in several occasions remarked 
that, both legitimate expectations and legal certainty constitute superior rules 
of law.593 Schwarze also argued that both legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations are derived from the notion that “Community is based on the 
rule of law”.594  Fairness and equity were also considered as a rationale for the 
                                                 
590 Alina Kaczorowska, European Union Law (2nd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2010) 232. 
591 Gordon (n 166) 228. 
592 See: Per Sedley J. in R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries  and Food, ex p Hamble 
(Offshore) Ltd (1995) 2 All ER 714,at 724 
593 See: Case 112/80 Firma Anton Durbeck v Hauptzollant Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen 
(1981) ECR 1095 para 48 
594 Schwarze (n 91) 867. 
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protection of legitimate expectations. According to this view, the principle of 
legitimate expectations has equitable function enabling the court to ensure 
fairness in public administration. Other reasons offered include “Reliance”, 
and “trust”.595  
Indeed, none of the aforementioned reasons has precisely captured the width 
and breadth of the principle as applied by the court in all conceivable 
scenarios.596  While legal certainty and the rule of law could offer explanation 
why retroactive legislations should be sanctioned by the courts, hardly could 
same explanation be plausible in justifying the protection of legitimate 
expectations where trust and detrimental reliance as embodied in a given fact 
is more visible in the eyes of the courts. In the next heading, the chapter will 
examine methods used by the ECJ in ascertaining legitimate expectations. 
 
5.1.2 Method of Ascertaining Legitimate Expectations under ECJ 
The European court of justice relies on various criteria to ascertain the 
principle of legitimate expectations.  Regrettably, those criteria are not 
entirely uniform.597 Two-tier approaches598 stood out in the analysis of the 
                                                 
595 For a general overview of the rationales See; Craig (n 575) 554–556. 
596 Paul Reynolds, ‘Legitimate Expectations and the Protection of Trust in Public Officials’ 
(Social Science Research Network 2010) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1689518 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1689518> accessed 3 February 2013. 
597 According to Schwarze, “...it is hardly possible – at least not on the basis of the case law of the 
Court of Justice in its present state of development- to compile a universally binding and definitive list 
of relevant circumstances.” See: Schwarze (n 91) 950. 
598 While the two tier approach could be analysed as (a) reasonability and (b) legitimacy 
dimension of legitimate expectations, Paul Craig’s analysis rather analyses legitimate 
expectations as (a) legitimacy and (b) balancing. According to Craig, “The ECJ will…normally 
consider the legitimacy of the expectation separately from whether there are valid policy reasons for 
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formulation and application of legitimate expectations by the court. The first 
approach is to determine the existence of the expectations otherwise referred 
to as reasonable expectations, while the second approach is to determine the 
legitimacy of the expectations.  
 
a. Reasonability of Expectations: 
In ascertaining reasonableness of an alleged legitimate expectation, the court 
is simply concerned with the existence of the expectations first, from both 
litigant’s subjective perspective and non-litigant’s objective perspective. This 
is to ensure by that the identified expectation satisfies the necessary elements 
of reasonable expectations. This process is both fact-dominated and criteria-
driven. The litmus test adopted by the court is “whether an informed prudent 
and discriminating person would have had such expectations.” The Court 
further deploys both objective and subjective analysis to ascertain whether 
indeed, an alleged expectation is reasonable enough to deserve legal 
protection. As the Court remarked in this context: 
“If a prudent and discriminating economic operator could have foreseen the 
adoption of a community decision likely to affect his interest, he cannot plead that 
principle if the decision is adopted.” 599  
 
Applicants alleging violation of legitimate expectations must satisfy this 
objective foreseeability test. In Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European 
                                                                                                                                            
departing from that expectation.” See: Pp Craig, ‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations in 
Domestic and Community Law’ (1996) 55 The Cambridge Law Journal 289, 306.   
599 Case C-426/10 Bell & Rose BV, v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM) (2011) E.C.R. 00000 para 56  
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Union, Spain challenges the regulation of European Union providing tariff 
quota for imports of canned tuna and subsequent reduction in the quota rate. 
According to Spain the reduction in the quota rate violates among other 
things the legitimate expectations of investors who prior to the community 
regulation, invested heavily in the affected countries. The Court while 
rejecting the Spanish argument concludes that the investors and traders 
should have foresaw the adoption of the decision. The court further 
remarked: 
“…the traders concerned could not have harboured any expectation based on 
the maintenance of the rate of customs duty which applied to imports of 
canned tuna originating in Thailand and Philippines during the consultations 
and mediation between those countries and the community. It was, on the 
contrary, foreseeable that those procedures could lead to a reduction in that 
rate.” 600 
 
Similarly, in Erwin Behn Verpackungsbedarf GmbH v Hauptzollamt 
itzehoe the applicant paid customs duty for import in accordance with a 
manual of German Ministry of finance which erroneously contained a wrong 
figure for imports below the legally authorised charges. When asked to pay 
the difference, the applicant challenged the decision on the ground of 
violation of legitimate expectations having been misled earlier by the German 
authorities. The ECJ while dismissing the Applicants plea for violation of 
legitimate expectations concluded that the burden was on the applicant to be 
prudent. The Court remarked as follows: 
 
                                                 
600 C-342/03 Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union (2005) ECR 1-01975 para 48 
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“…a trader whose business essentially comprises import and export 
transactions and who has accumulated some experience in that area 
must…acquaint himself with the community law applicable to the 
transactions which he undertakes.” 601 
 
It can be discerned from these cases that the prudent economic operator’s test 
is strict. The practice of the court places a larger burden on the applicant to be 
discharged; otherwise, it will be resolved in favour of the Union institutions.  
The degree of diligence expected on the Applicants covers wide range of 
issues surrounding the legal and regulatory framework of European Union. 
Especially in highly regulated areas, where applicants are expected to 
acquaint themselves with European Union laws as authentically documented, 
including negotiations prior to changes in laws and policies of the Union. 
Paul Craig summarizes the depth of this approach as follows: 
“The demands placed on the trader to be prudent, discriminating and well-
informed have led to failure of many claims for legitimate expectations, more 
especially in the areas where common policies operate, such as agriculture, 
fisheries, and transport. The rules in these areas are frequently changed to 
cope with factors that affect these markets. It is therefore especially difficult to 
sustain a claim for legitimate expectations, since the Union courts will expect 
the prudent trader to factor the possibility of such change into market 
calculations.” 602  
 
b. Legitimacy of expectations: 
On the legitimacy of expectations, the court is concerned with the legitimacy 
of the expectations that already satisfied the reasonableness criteria. The first 
                                                 
601 Case 80/89 Erwin Behn Verpackungsbedarf GmbH v Hauptzollamt itzehoe (1990) ECR 1-
02659 para 14 
602 Craig (n 575) 570. 
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concern here is whether there are valid justifications for departing from the 
expectations. Subsequently, the court would examine whether there is public 
interest concern counter to the fulfilment of reasonable expectations. The test 
adopted by the court is whether the public interest concern militating against 
fulfilment of reasonable expectations is legitimately overriding.603 This stage 
entails evaluation and balancing between reasonable expectations on one 
hand and public interest on the other hand. In view of the recognition of the 
legitimate powers of EU and national authorities in the initial balancing and 
evaluation between reasonable expectations and public interest, the court is 
mostly guided by ‘margin of respect’ to public bodies, the size of which 
depends on the subject matter in a given case.604 Where there is no compelling 
public interest concern; the court would usually treat the established 
expectations as legitimate and accord it protection. In Kingdom of Spain v 
Council, supra The court, after applying ‘prudent trader test’ concluded with 
the approach of balancing with a wide margin of respect to public bodies. 
According to the court: 
“…since the Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in the 
choice of the means needed to achieve the common commercial policy, traders 
cannot claim to have a legitimate that an existing situation will be 
maintained.” 605 
 
It is clear from both reasonableness and legitimacy dimensions of legitimate 
expectations that the dichotomy between the two (if any) is marginal. This is 
                                                 
603 Gordon (n 166) 237. 
604 Sharpston (n 19) 4. 
605 C-342/03 Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union (supra) para 49 
236 
 
because; both “prudent economic operator” and “balancing” tests overlaps in 
the practical application in a given case. It suffices however, to assert at this 
stage, that both are constitutive whole in ascertaining legitimate expectations. 
Indeed, while the “prudence” test focuses more on the reasonable ingredients 
to be ascribed to an alleged expectation, the balancing test inclines more 
towards legitimacy of the overall protection to be accorded to the alleged 
expectation.606 In the next two headings, the chapter will examine the 
elements of legitimate expectations from both reasonability and legitimacy 
dimensions respectively.  
 
5.1.3  Elements of Reasonable Expectations under ECJ 
From the generality of cases in the ECJ, an Applicant alleging violation of 
legitimate expectations must satisfy the requirements of 
Representation/conduct, Reliance, and Revocation/withdrawal.  
 
a. Representation/Conduct: 
The case law of ECJ specifies that an individual alleging violation of 
legitimate expectations must show that the authorities must have given some 
assurance in form of representation or conduct capable of endangering 
reasonable expectations.607 Generally, there is no strict form of assurance 
                                                 
606 Gordon (n 166) 236. 
607 See: Joined Cases C-37/02, C-38/02 Di Lenardo and Di lexto (2004) ECR 10000, para 70,   
237 
 
under the ECJ.608 Assurances could be triggered through various forms such 
as letters, fax, reports, agreements,  administrative statements, decisions etc.609 
However, such assurances/conduct/representations  must at the minimum 
reach a level of ‘creating a pardonable confusion in the mind of a person acting in 
good faith and with all the diligence required of a normally informed businessman’.610 
This can be established pursuant to an oral or written 
assurance/representation or consistent conduct by the public body 
concerned.611 In addition, it must satisfy some criteria developed by the ECJ 
case law. First, the assurance must be ‘precise and specific’. As illustrated in 
Bell & Rose BV, v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM) the court succinctly summarised this rule 
as follows; 
“…the right to rely on that principle extends to any person with regard to whom an 
institution of the European Union has given rise to justified hopes. However, a person 
may not plead infringement of the principle unless he has been given precise 
assurances by the administration”. 612 
 
In Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij,613 an implied 
representation was tested before the ECJ. The background to the case was, the 
European Market was in excess of milk production. In the effort to restrain 
                                                 
608 Craig (n 575) 567. 
609 Schønberg (n 9) 120. 
610 See: Case C-44/00 Societe de distribution mecanique et d’automobiles  v Commission 
(2000) ECR 1-11231 para 50. 
611 While oral statements could amount to precise and specific assurance, in practice they 
carry less weight, and often difficult to prove. See: Schønberg (n 9) 121. 
612 Bell & Rose BV, v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and 
Designs) (OHIM) (2011) E.C.R. 00000 para 56 
613 Case 120/86, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij (1988) E.C.R. 2321 
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surplus of milk products in the market, the Commission introduced 
regulation 1078/77. Under the regulation, farmers and milk producers are 
encouraged to cease production and suspend marketing in return for a 
premium during the suspension period. In addition, during the suspension 
period, a new regulation ie no. 857/84 further requires proof of milk 
production before issuance of reference quantity to enable milk production 
without incurring additional levy. Mr Mulder pursuant to regulation 1087/77 
suspended milk/dairy production and delivery for 5 years. In return, he 
benefitted from the premium scheme during the period of suspension. 
However, after the expiry of the ‘suspension undertaking’ and upon Mulder’s 
resumption of milk production, he applied for allocation of reference 
quantity. He was denied on the ground of his inability to prove his milk 
production of the previous year as required by law. He appealed against the 
refusal decision, and argued that it was impossible for him to prove any milk 
production because he had suspended his milk production during the 
previous 5years in compliance with regulation 1078/77. Therefore, the new 
regulation of 857/84 was in violation of his legitimate expectations that he 
should be able to resume his business upon the expiry of the suspension 
undertaking. The Court agrees ‘in part’ with Mr Mulder’s submission and 
held as follows: 
“There is nothing in the provisions of Regulation no 1078/77 or in its 
preamble to show, that the non-marketing undertaking entered into under that 
Regulation might, upon its expiry, entail a bar to resumption of the activity in 
question. Such an effect therefore frustrates those producers’ legitimate 
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expectation that the effects of the system to which they had rendered 
themselves subject would be limited.” 614 
 
The court, however, maintained that it will be wrong for a producer such as 
Mr Mulder to legitimately expect that the conditions would remain static, and 
be able to resume production under the previously applied conditions. It can 
be observed here, that the basis of Mr Mulder’s legitimate expectations was an 
implied representation pursuant to Regulation no 1078/77. Although the 
regulation encourages producers such as Mr Mulder to suspend production, 
it did not expressly mention that those who suspend production will 
automatically be entitled to resume production. 
Secondly mere silence is incapable of qualifying as specific representation, 
conduct, or an acceptable assurance to endanger legitimate expectations. In 
the case of Chomel v Commission615 the Applicant Mr Chomel was 
employed by the Commission of European communities as administrator. 
While accepting the offer of employment, he pointed out to the commission 
that he considered himself as an employee entitled to ‘expatriation allowance’ 
and further requested a written confirmation to that effect. The Commission 
did not provide any written confirmation or rejection of Mr Chomel’s request. 
Having discovered from his salary statement that the commission had not 
paid the allowance, he submitted a complaint against the refusal decision. The 
Commission rejected the complaint.  He further instituted an action before the 
court alleging violation of legitimate expectations. Indeed, Mr Chomel’s 
                                                 
614 Case 120/86, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij (supra) p 6 
615 Jean-louis Chomel v Commission of the European Communities (1990) ECR 11- 00131 
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argument was, the silence of the Commission pursuant to his written request 
constitutes an assurance and therefore endangers his legitimate expectations. 
The Court held in favour of the Commission. According to the Court, the 
silence by the Commission however regrettable, could neither amount to 
implied confirmation nor specific assurance by the commission.616  
 
Thirdly, a conduct capable of endangering legitimate expectations must be 
consistent.  In Helmut Holtbecker v Commission617 the Applicant Mr 
Hotbecker (an employee of the European commission) challenged the 
Commission’s refusal to refund medical expenses incurred by his spouse. 
According to the commission, the refusal was pursuant to community staff 
regulation rules which require employee spouses to register with a different 
insurance scheme first before resorting to the commission’s scheme. 
While alleging violation of legitimate expectations, the Applicant argued that 
since the Commission had previously reimbursed his spouse’s medical 
expenses, the conduct led him to legitimately believe that his spouse was 
covered by the scheme. The court while rejecting Applicant’s argument had 
this to say: 
“…an official may not plead a breach of the principle of legitimate expectations 
unless the administration has given him precise assurances. In the present 
case the mere fact that in the past a number of medical expenses of a relatively 
modest amount were reimbursed without reservation cannot be regarded as 
                                                 
616 Jean-louis Chomel v Commission of the European Communities (supra) para 27 
617 Case T- 20/91 Helmut Holtbecker v Commission of the European Communities (1992) 
ECR  11-2600  
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having been sufficient to lead the applicant to be certain that his wife was 
actually covered by the joint sickness insurance scheme or as constituting a 
fault on the part of the administration.” 618 
 
Flowing from the above cases, the requirement of representation or specific 
assurance is the most important requirement Applicants need to satisfy. In 
many instances, cases are thrown out by the court due to the failure of the 
claimants to satisfy this requirement.619 The requirement has also shown; that 
applicants cannot merely rely on general policy statement by an EU 
institution as initiating factor of legitimate expectations.620   
  
b. Reliance: 
An Applicant must show reliance on a particular representation or conduct. 
The test for determining this criterion is subjective.  Reliance in the ECJ 
jurisprudence signifies a change in position by an applicant resulting to a 
state of inducement pursuant to a representation or conduct by the EU 
institutions.621 The premise of this criterion is to distinguish mere existence of 
representation or conduct giving rise to legitimate expectations and the 
response of the claimant alleging violation of expectations by reposing trust in 
                                                 
618 Case T- 20/91 Helmut Holtbecker v Commission of the European Communities (supra) 
para 53 
619 As commentator remarked in this respect, “The crucial issue from the perspective of the 
applicant is …to show that the representation…was sufficiently precise and specific to give 
rise to a legitimate expectation that it would be adhered to. It is this hurdle that applicants 
have found difficult to surmount, since the Community courts will not readily find that this 
criterion has been met.” See: Craig (n 575) 568. 
620 See: Case 111/86 Delauche v Commission (1987) ECR 5345 
621 Paul Lasok, Timothy Millett and Anneli Howard, Judicial Control in the EU: Procedures and 
Principles (OUP Oxford 2004) 362. 
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the representation or the conduct of the public authority. Indeed, a change of 
position could unilaterally occur devoid of any trigger emanating from EU 
institutions in form of representation or conduct. In such situations, no 
reasonable expectations can be generated due to the absence of a clear trigger 
that could accommodate any reliance. Similarly, a shift in position could as 
well occur prior to a specific representation or conduct. Here, any 
disappointment could hardly be linked to the incidental representation or 
conduct due to the lack of causal connection between the objectively assessed 
representation or conduct on one hand, and the subjective reliance by the 
claimant on the other hand. Even in post representation/conduct behaviour, a 
change in position or ‘alleged reliance’ post specific representation or conduct 
but not subjectively meant to respond to the representation or conduct in 
issue, could hardly succeed in grounding a successful plea of reasonable 
expectations. For instance, in Agazzi Leonard v Commission622 the Applicant 
who claimed to be a victim of administrative reorganization challenged the 
decision barring her from changing her employment status as an 
infringement of her legitimate expectations. The Court discovered however, 
that the applicant could not have held any reasonable hopes at that time, 
because the administrative reorganization which she complained of was put 
in place prior to her qualification necessary to benefit from the old 
administrative system.  According to the court, while the Applicant might 
                                                 
622 Case 181/87 Marie–Elizabeth Agazzi Leonard v Commission of the European 
Communities (1998) ECR para 35 
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have her reasons why she considered herself a victim of such administrative 
reorganisation, undoubtedly no legitimate expectations could be founded. 
 
c. Revocation or Departure from a Decision: 
Revocation or departure from an assurance or framework is the trigger to the 
legitimate expectations disputes. This is because where there is no revocation 
of a representation or conduct giving raise to expectations; the Applicant is 
unlikely to have a legitimate grievance before the EU Courts. Revocation of an 
assurance or change of regulation or policy is embedded in the EU 
framework. This explains why the principle of legitimate expectations is so 
central to the EU jurisprudence, to protect private entities from unjustified 
revocations by EU public institutions. Therefore, any determination of 
revocation or change will encompass the determination of the legality of the 
action, and the powers of the public entity(s) thereto.  
 
Generally, EU authorities can revoke their assurances or change their legal 
and policy frameworks. Such revocations and changes could affect private 
entities in various ways. For instance, the revocation could be in form of 
withdrawal of an earlier conferred benefits, or removal of an imposed burden, 
or simply in form of law-making/declaratory decisions. First, the subject 
matter of revocation or departure from an assurance or policy involves 
analysis of the nature or type of the decision culminating into that assurance 
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itself. Pertinent questions need to be dissected. For instance, is the decision 
conferring benefit/right or imposing burden? Is the decision lawful or 
unlawful? Secondly, where revocation is permitted in principle, the next step 
is to decide whether it should be allowed prospectively or retrospectively. 
The ECJ jurisprudence in this area (namely benefit vs burden, legal vs illegal, 
prospective vs retrospective revocation) is not very clear.  
 
In Dineke Algera & Ors v Common Assembly of the European Coal and 
Steel Community623 the Applicant Miss Algera was a temporary staff of the 
Common Assembly. Subsequently, her temporary appointment was changed 
to permanent one to take effect in future date. The Common Assembly later, 
sought to revoke Applicant’s permanent appointment. While deciding the 
case in favour of the Applicant, the ECJ emphasizes the nature and effect of 
the decision as follows: 
“…an administrative decision conferring individual rights on the person 
concerned cannot in principle be withdrawn, if it is lawful decision; in that 
case, since the individual right is vested, the need to safeguard confidence in 
the stability of the situation thus created prevails over the interests of an 
administration desirous of reversing its decision. This is true in particular of 
the appointment of an official.”                                                                                               
 
It can be discerned from Algera, that the general rule regarding specific 
lawful decisions conferring right or benefit is (in principle) irrevocability. 
Where however, the decision was unlawful, Algera, in another breath 
                                                 
623 Joined Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 Dineke Algera & Ors v Common Assembly of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (1957) ECR 39  
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contemplated such scenario. According to the ECJ, the “absence of an 
objective legal basis” in a decision justifies its revocation due to the effect of 
the illegality on the right of the individual.624 Indeed, ECJ in Algera did not go 
further to elaborate whether the revocation of an illegal decision should be 
prospective or retrospective. On the face of it however, prospective 
revocations are less problematic. ECJ had been consistent on its position that, 
in principle, prospective revocation of illegal or wrongful decisions is possible 
and can be justified.625 In Anton Herpels v Commission626, The Applicant, a 
staff of the Commission who resides in Brussels and worked in Luxembourg 
was being paid separation allowance in accordance with EU public service 
regulations.  Later, his status changed when he was transferred to Brussels 
but continued to receive separation allowance in error from the part of the 
Commission. When the Commission discovered the error, and revoked the 
separation allowance entitlement prospectively he challenged the decision 
alleging frustration of legitimate expectations. The Court while dismissing the 
claim decided that an unlawful payments or grants cannot confer an 
irrevocable vested right. The Court further added with regard to the nature of 
the revocation as follows:627  
“Although the retroactive withdrawal of a wrongful or erroneous Decision is 
generally subject to very strict conditions, on the other hand the revocation of 
such a Decision as regards the future is always possible.”   
                                                 
624 Joined Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 Dineke Algera & Ors v Common Assembly of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (Supra) p 55 
 
625 Case 15/60 Simon v High Authority (1961) ECR 115, p123 
626 Case 54/77 Anton Herpels v Commission (1978) ECR 0585 
627 Case 54/77 Anton Herpels v Commission (supra) para 38 
246 
 
 
Flowing from Herpels above, one can safely conclude that in principle 
retroactive revocations are not allowed except under strict conditions. 
SNUPAT is the locus classicus of retroactive revocation of unlawful decisions.  
In SNUPAT v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community,628 SNUPAT applied to the High Authority for derogation from 
paying levy under scrap metal equalisation fund. The application was refused 
having failed to qualify for the exemption under the scrap metal scheme. 
SNUPAT then, protested against the High authority for awarding similar 
derogation previously to Hoogoven, a competitor to SNUPAT, and further 
urged the court to retroactively revoke the derogation granted to its 
competitor. Indeed, the court found in favour of SNUPAT that the derogation 
granted to Hoogoven was illegal and must be revoked. As to whether it 
should be revoked retroactively, the court reiterated the position of law in the 
member states that allows retroactive withdrawal of administrative decisions 
on the basis of false or incomplete information. However, that 
notwithstanding, according to the court, the nature of such determination 
requires the interplay between two competing legal principles of legal 
certainty and legality. According to the court, the High Authority is best 
suited to carry this appraisal and balancing first, before resorting to the court. 
The court while referring the matter for revocation to the High Authority held 
as follows:  
                                                 
628 Case 42/59 S.N.U.P.A.T. v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Company (1961) 
00053  
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“The court cannot put itself in the place of the High Authority and must 
consequently confine itself to referring the matter back to the High Authority 
so that it may make that appraisal in accordance with Article 34 of the 
treaty.”629 
 
Despite the overlap in the classifications of various decisions i.e. (lawful vs. 
unlawful, burden, benefit and declaratory, retroactive vs. prospective), 
generally, permissible revocation of decisions leading to possible violation of 
legitimate expectations can be illustrated within the confines of the following 
grounds:630 
First is where laws authorising certain decisions contain provisions for the 
withdrawal and revocation of such decisions. In such situations, revocation or 
withdrawal of decisions pursuant to such provisions could hardly violate any 
justified expectations.  Examples of this form of explicit statute-based 
revocations and withdrawals are contained in EU staff regulations, and EU 
competition law. In Sorema v High Authority of the ECSC631 the court was 
confronted with a revocation pursuant to article 65 (2) of ECSC treaty. The 
provision empowers the high authority to allow some form of competition 
restrictive agreements subject to certain stipulated conditions and further to 
revoke such agreements where changes occurred rendering the agreements 
below the stipulated conditions.  The court found in favour of the high 
                                                 
629 Case 42/59 S.N.U.P.A.T. v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Company 
(supra) p. 88 
630 Schwarze considered these grounds as special grounds for revocation while Craig 
considered most of them as exceptions to protection of legitimate expectations. See: Schwarze 
(n 91) 1011. 
631 Case 36/64 Sorema v High Authority of the ECSC (1965) ECR 00329  para 4 
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authority that the conditions for granting the decision ceased to exist and 
therefore the revocation was justified. 
 Secondly, is where the decision, is subject to revocation at the inception 
expressly. For instance where EU authorities expressly subject a particular 
administrative decision to an “express right to revoke or withdraw” thereby 
reserving the right to alter it in future. In the event of exercising such right, it 
will be deemed in principle, not in violation of any expectations. This is 
because, the reservation is assumed to have limited or blocked the possibility 
of generating any legitimate expectations. Most EU temporary decisions are 
covered under this scenario. Indeed, victims of this form of revocation, most 
often, do challenge (unsuccessfully) the authorities’ power to revoke such 
decisions notwithstanding its express mention in the initial decision. 
Thirdly, EU institutions do revoke their decisions when such decisions are 
founded on false information. The EU authorities have inherent power to 
revoke their administrative decisions if they discovered that such decisions 
came to fruition pursuant to incomplete or fraudulent information. In 
SNUPTA THE ECJ decided that EU authorities can revoke their 
administrative decisions retroactively where such decisions are reached 
illegal ab initio or are based on false or incomplete information. In the 
language of the court: 
249 
 
“…retroactive withdrawal is generally accepted in cases in which the 
administrative decision in question has been adopted on the basis of false or 
incomplete information provided by those concerned.”632 
 
The fourth instance is where there are changes in legal situation. Changes in 
legal situation could emanate from EU commission/Parliament or through 
judicial pronouncement by the ECJ. In the case of parliamentary-led changes, it 
is trite that EU authorities could amend repeal or alter their laws and policies. 
Such exercise is undoubtedly likely to affect an existing benefit conferred on 
individuals otherwise amounting to expectations. The problem here lies in the 
retroactivity of the change introduced by the legislative instrument. While the 
jurisprudence clearly recognises the power of the EU authorities to change 
their laws either conferring right or imposing burden on individuals or economic 
operators, there is a slight distinction between the two. Where the change 
simply affects removal of an existing burden for instance levy etc, the court 
appear to accept such changes as not violating legitimate expectations. 
However, where the changes appear to deprive a conferred benefit on an 
individual/economic operator, such as allowances or remunerations, the 
court appear to evaluate the new legislation against public interest vis-à-vis 
the private rights acquired pursuant to the old legislation and whether such 
right was taken into account before the withdrawal or revocation decision. In 
Grogan v Commission633 The applicant challenged the decision of the 
commission to reduce his pension from 30,145 Btrs to 13,080 pursuant to a 
                                                 
632 Case 42/59 S.N.U.P.A.T. v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Company 
(supra) p. 87 
633 Case 127/80 Vincent Grogan v Commission of the European Communities (1982) ECR 869 
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new regulation. According to the Applicant, since he was retired from service 
in 1975 (ie prior to the new rule) his pension is governed by the regulation in 
force at that time, and not the commission’s subsequent decision of 1979 and 
the new rule. The court rejected the applicant’s argument against the 
introduction of the new system. However, on the failure to take into account 
applicant’s legitimate expectations, the court decided in favour of the 
Applicant. According to the court: 
“…after failing to act for a period extending over a number of years, the 
Council could not, without failing to protect pensioners legitimate 
expectations, lay down a transitional period for the progressive reduction of 
the amounts paid which lasted only ten months. A period of at least twice that 
length should have been envisaged for that process.”634 
 
To clarify further the dynamics of retroactive changes pursuant to 
legislations, the jurisprudence of ECJ distinguishes between actual and 
apparent retroactivity.635 Actual retroactivity refers to a situation where the 
new rule is sought to apply over a concluded matter or transaction. A change 
regarding concluded matter which confers benefit is in principle prohibited as 
it will infringe the notion of legal certainty. Indeed, the exception to this is 
where the new promulgated legislation sought to remove a burden on an 
individual. Apparent retroactivity on the other hand, refers to a situation 
where the new rule sought to be applied is in respect of an on-going matter or 
                                                 
634 Case 127/80 Vincent Grogan v Commission of the European Communities (supra) para 34 
635 Alexander H Turk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2010) 131–133. 
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event.636 In this scenario, hardly could a legitimate expectations plea 
succeed.637 
 
With regard to changes pursuant to judicial pronouncement, ie by EU courts, it 
is trite that any action or decision declared void by the ECJ ceases to have any 
legal recognition as it will be “deemed non-existent”.638  Indeed, the effect of 
void declaration entails that such an action or decision becomes illegal 
retroactively. Instances where revocation due to changes in legal situation 
(pursuant to judicial pronouncement) could arise are successful annulment 
proceedings or where a purported decision by legislator is challenged by an 
aggrieved party, or where the validity or otherwise of a particular EU rule is 
sought to be clarified. In this context, the legal effect of ECJ pronouncements 
regarding the validity of such contested decision or rule might lead to 
changes to legal situation. Such changes are bound to be implemented by EU 
institutions as a matter of law and compliance with such court orders. In 
practice, the judicial led- changes triggering revocations could in many cases, 
have retrospective effect while many at times, particularly in decisions 
conferring benefit be devoid of retrospectivity.  
 
                                                 
636 According to Craig, apparent retroactivity arises where the legal act takes effect for the 
future, but has an impact on the past events. See: Craig (n 575) 553. 
637 For a detailed discussion on actual and apparent retroactivity, See: Schwarze (n 91) 1120–
1122. 
638 Case 22/70 Commission of the European Communities  v Council of the European 
Communities (1971) ECR 0263 para 59 
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The fifth instance is where there is change in circumstance. Indeed many 
regulatory and administrative decisions are products of circumstance. It 
follows therefore, where the circumstance that led to the emergence of a 
decision or underpins its validity changes, the possibility of revocation, 
replacement or suspension of such decision cannot be excluded. Many at 
times, revocation due to change in circumstance are dictated by the law in 
force. Therefore failure by EU authorities not to revoke the decision in 
question might amount to violation of an operative law in force. More 
importantly, it is settled principle in EU Law that administrative actions must 
also comply with relevant laws.639  
 
Lastly, revocation/withdrawal is undoubtedly the ‘core’ element in 
establishing violation of expectations. Surprisingly however, unlike assurance 
and reliance elements, the task of establishing revocation and withdrawal 
appear less tedious compared to the previous elements discussed. An 
individual or economic operator needs to simply show that EU public 
institutions changed or altered their decisions. Most often, the EU public 
institutions hardly challenge the factual assertions as they function mostly 
through the EU written instruments, except they normally offer purported 
justifications for their subsequent actions or conducts pursuant to the 
principles examined inter alia. Therefore, the task in revocation analysis is 
mostly on the Courts and the Advocate general to determine the legitimacy 
                                                 
639 Schwarze (n 91) 1023. 
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and justification of the revocation in dispute on one hand, and further decide 
whether EU institutions had struck a proper balance between public and 
private interest involved. The following graphs attempts to capture the 
interactions between regulatory and administrative decisions in their diverse 
classifications. 
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5.1.4 Legitimacy of Legitimate expectations (Balancing) under ECJ 
The process of determining the legitimacy of an alleged expectation is not 
completely detached from the analysis of identifying the reasonability 
elements of legitimate expectations. This is because the practice of the court 
does not clearly demarcate between these two stages. The preoccupation of 
the court from the legitimacy dimension is whether the alleged (and 
established) reasonable expectation is fit and worthy of protection. As some 
commentators argued in this context, this is not simple because an expectation 
might be sound particularly in the eyes of its beholder, but lack legitimacy 
due to legal or public interest considerations neutralizing it.640 Generally, the 
ECJ case law stipulates that a claim for violation of legitimate expectations 
that satisfies the required elements of ‘assurance’, ‘reliance’, and ‘revocation’ 
is likely to be protected except where it is affected by the following factors: 
a. Accompanied by transitional measures/warning: 
b. Devoid of clear obligation with public authorities 
c. Absence of adverse effect 
d. Foreseeable 
e. Tainted by Claimant’s wrong doing 
f. Contrary to the general framework of EU Rules 
g. Contrary to public interest. 
 
a. Transitional Measures/Warning: 
                                                 
640 Wade and Forsyth (n 231) 449. 
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In Hellmut Stimming KG v Commission of the European Commission641 
the Applicant entered into a contract for the delivery of marinated beef under 
the EEC Regulations on the common organization of the market in beef and 
common customs. The same month of the contract a new council regulation 
was adopted. The new regulation imposed a much higher levy on the 
Applicant’s subject matter of the contract. The Applicant therefore, urged the 
court to either compel the commission not to levy the importation according 
to the new regulation, or in the alternative order the commission to pay 
compensation for the damages caused. The court refused the application, 
because the commission had put in place a transitional measure. According to 
the court: 
“Thus, by publishing on page 15 of official journal 1 352 OF 22 December 
1976 both the warning to traders concerned and the announcement that the 
previous arrangements would continue to apply in favour of all those who 
before a certain date had expressed their intention to make use of them for 
certain current transactions, the commission had already adopted transitional 
measures…” 
 
Therefore, a claim for violation of legitimate expectations is bound to be 
protected where public authorities altered applicant’s reasonable expectations 
without adopting a transitional measure, where such is relevant. However, in 
a situation where such transitional measure is likely to conflict with public 
interest, it will become imperative upon EU authorities to balance between 
adopting the transitional measure on one hand, and sacrificing it to protect 
                                                 
641 Case 90/77 Hellmut Stimming KG v Commission of the European Communities (1978) 
ECR  0995 para 6  
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public interest on the other hand. In Ditta Angelo Tomadini Snc v 
Ammministrazione delle finanze dello stalo642 the Court subjects the 
requirement of transitional measures to public interest.  According to the 
court:  
“…the principle of respect for legitimate expectations prohibits those institutions 
from amending those rules without laying down transitional measures unless the 
adoption of such a measure is contrary to an overriding public interest.” 
 
b. Clear bargain with public authorities: 
The jurisprudence of ECJ has shown that an applicant alleging violation of 
legitimate expectations must show that the public authorities had entered into 
some form of bargain resulting into an obligation with them. In many cases, 
the court had refused to uphold violation of legitimate expectations where the 
Applicants failed to satisfy this requirement, even though they were 
undoubtedly affected by such decisions. In Tomadini  supra, the Italian Court 
(pretura di Trento) referred the matter to ECJ for interpretation regarding 
validity of EU regulation introducing monetary compensatory amounts on 
durum wheat and derived products, which was challenged by the affected 
applicant before the Italian Court. The ECJ held concerning the need for the 
Applicant to prove some the presence of obligation as follows: 
“On the other hand, the field of application of this principle cannot be extended to the 
point of generally preventing new rules from applying to the future effects of 
situations which arose under the earlier rules in the absence of obligations entered 
into with the public authorities. This is particularly true in a field such as the 
common organization of markets, the purpose of which necessarily involves constant 
                                                 
642 Case 84/78 Ditta Angelo Tomadini Snc v Ammministrazione delle finanze dello stalo 
(1979) ECR 1801 para 20 
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adjustment to the variations of the economic situation in the various agricultural 
sectors.”643 
 
The court concluded that the content of such and similar regulations are 
meant specifically for certain economic operators; as such respect for 
legitimate expectations could not be extended to all other contracts in 
progress.   
 
Similarly, the ground for clear bargain underscores the underlying basis of 
legitimate expectations under EU jurisprudence by making the content of 
expectations to be shared and not unilateral or mere claimants subjective 
believe. The sense of commitment must flow from the action or conduct of EU 
public institutions.  In Societe de distribution mecanique et d’automobiles  v 
Commission The ECJ while rejecting a purported violation of legitimate 
expectations held that legitimate expectations does not apply to mere “public 
statements of a general nature by a member of the Commission or repeated contacts 
between the person concerned and the Commission”.644 
c. Adverse effect: 
The effect of revocation or withdrawal of a decision pursuant to which a 
legitimate expectations claim is hinged on the Applicant, is quite significant in 
the determination of legitimacy of the purported violation of the expectations. 
                                                 
643 Case 84/78 Ditta Angelo Tomadini Snc v Ammministrazione delle finanze dello stalo 
(supra) para 21 
644 Case C-44/00 Societe de distribution mecanique et d’automobiles  v Commission (2000) 
ECR para 50 
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Legitimate expectations will not be upheld where the purported violation 
could not result into a significant change or effect on the Applicant.  In 
Societe CAM SA v Commission645 where the Applicant sought an annulment 
of an EU regulation concerning measures to be taken due to raise in threshold 
prices for cereals and rice in respect of those licenses where the import levy or 
export refund is fixed in advance. The regulation prohibits adjustment of 
those fixed import levies and export refunds regarding part of the increase in 
the threshold price. The Claimant argued this violates its legitimate 
expectations having halted the presumed continuity of the old regulation. The 
Court concluded that the new regulation could not have adversely affected 
the Applicants expectations. Similalrly in Westzuker GmbH v Einfuhr-und 
Vorratsstelle fur Zuker646 The case involves amendment to an existing 
regulation. The old rule in the common organization of the market in sugar 
provides for the grant of export refund to cover white sugar price disparity 
between world market and community market, and also adjustment to the 
amounts fixed for refund. Later, new regulation came up which made the 
provision for adjustment to the refund amount mere optional. Upon the 
challenge by the Applicant, the court held that the new regulation that made 
the adjustment optional did not intrinsically change the positions of the 
persons concerned, and therefore not repugnant to any expectations or 
confidence. 
 
                                                 
645 Case 100/74 Societe CAM SA v Commission (1975) ECR 1393  
646 Case 1/73 Westzuker GmbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Zuker (1973) ECR 0723 
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d. Foreseeability: 
The ECJ had consistently refused to uphold alleged violations of legitimate 
expectations because the revocation or withdrawal of the decision 
culminating into the violation is foreseeable. As mentioned earlier, the 
relevant foreseeable test adopted by ECJ is “the prudent economic operator 
test”. The context in which legitimate expectations features, is also crucial 
from the case law. While an expectation may appear legitimate in the context 
of EU/staff relationship, it may not possibly pass the threshold of 
foreseeability test in the context of economic management in the EU market. 
The threshold for foreseeability test in economic sector is quite high. In CSL 
Behring GmbH v European Commission and European Medicines 
Agency647, The Applicant challenged the decision of the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) for refusing to designate its medicinal product as “orphan 
medicinal product”. EMA’s decision was predicated upon the fact that the 
Applicant had already obtained marketing authorisation for the product and 
therefore the Application for the designation was invalid pursuant to 
Regulation No 141/2000. The Applicant instituted an action challenging both 
the refusal decision and the Regulation relied upon by EMA, on the ground of 
(among other things) violation of legitimate expectations and equality. The 
Court rejected the Applicants arguments and held: 
“…even if a competing undertaking were to obtain market exclusivity for an 
orphan medicinal product recognised in the member states  throughout the 
European Union, such a limitation, based on considerations connected with 
                                                 
647 T- 264/07 CSL Behring GmbH v European Commission and European Medicines Agency 
(2010) ECR 00000 
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public health, could not infringe the principle of legitimate expectations. The 
court considers that a prudent and discriminating trader must be in a position 
to foresee that, in a field such as that of the research and development of 
effective treatments for patients suffering from rare diseases, The European 
Union legislature may be called upon to encourage research, inter alia, by way 
of the award of market exclusivity to a pharmaceutical undertaking which has 
developed the treatment with the most significant benefit.”648 
 
Indeed, CSL underscores the breadth of “foreseeability” having alluded to its 
connection with public interest. In Van den Berg en jurgens Bv and Van Dijk 
Food Products v Commission649 the Applicants instituted an action against 
“Christmas butter” scheme which provides for disposal of butter at a reduced 
price. The scheme was a temporary intervention measure by the commission 
introduced due to the large quantities of butter in the market. The scheme 
was criticized and its efficiency was questioned even by the commission. 
However, upon the expiry of the scheme, after a brief interval, the 
commission organised similar scheme. The Applicant challenged the second 
scheme alleging violation of legitimate expectations. According to the 
Applicant, the commission having publicly and on several occasions criticized 
the first scheme could not have reasonably reverted to the same scheme.  The 
court rejected the Applicants arguments because they failed to show any 
undertaking from the commission never to have recourse to the scheme. The 
Court further held that “the possibility could not be excluded that a further 
                                                 
648 T- 264/07 CSL Behring GmbH v European Commission and European Medicines Agency 
(supra) para 98 
649 Case 265/85 Van den Berg en jurgens Bv and Van Dijk Food Products v Commission 
(1987) ECR 1155 
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Christmas butter scheme would be operated and a prudent and discriminating trader 
ought to have taken that possibility into account.”650  
e. Claimants wrong doing: 
Claimant’s wrong doing is a vitiating factor in establishing violation of 
legitimate expectations. This ground includes cases where the Applicant 
engages in an illegality, fraud, or other wrongful actions or conducts capable 
of depriving expectations legitimacy. In Weidacher v Bundesminister fur 
Land- und Forstwirtschaft651, The Applicant alleged violation of legitimate 
expectations when the Commission adopted a transitional measure due to 
enlargement as a result of entry of new member states to EU. The Measure 
introduced tax on surplus stocks. According to the Commission, the measure 
was meant to neutralise the economic advantage of the holders of surplus 
stocks with their competitors within the market and further avert 
undermining proper functioning of the market. The Applicant aggrieved by 
the decision alleged violation of legitimate expectations. The Court held that 
the Applicant could not have been entitled to legitimate expectations of 
market distortion and speculative profit as the community institutions did 
not; by act, or omission, create that impression.  Similarly in Sideradria SpA v 
Commission,652 The Applicant who had manifestly exceeded its production 
quota was fined by the Commission. In an action challenging the fine, the 
Applicant argued that the failure of the Commission to warn it that it had 
                                                 
650Case 265/85 Van den Berg en jurgens Bv and Van Dijk Food Products v Commission 
(supra) para 45  
651 Case C-179/00 Weidacher v Bundesminister fur Land- und Forstwirtschaft (2002) ECR 1-
00501 
652 Case 67/84 Sideradria SpA v Commission (1985) ECR 3983  
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exceeded its delivery quota was in violation of legitimate expectations. The 
Court rejected the Applicants argument and held; 
“…it is wrongly based on the principle of legitimate expectations. That 
principle may not be relied upon by an undertaking which has committed a 
manifest infringement of the rules in force.”653 
 
f. General Framework of EU Rules: 
General framework of EU Rules is another ground which could deprive an 
applicant, protection of expectations under the ECJ jurisprudence. This 
ground simply refers to the overall nature of EU rules and procedures in their 
respective areas of coverage within the EU legal order. The ground further 
signifies the relevance of policy objectives of diverse sectors covered by EU 
legal system. In Hellenic Republic v Commission654 The Court reiterate its 
stance on looking at the nature of EU Rules before deciding whether an 
expectation should be protected or not. The case involves compliance with 
state aid grant procedure and whether legitimate expectations could be 
entertained in the absence of formal decision to that effect. The court held 
that: 
“…In view of the mandatory nature of the supervision of state aid by the 
Commission under Article 88 EC, undertakings to which aid has been granted 
may not, in principle, entertain a legitimate expectation that the aid is lawful 
unless it has been granted in compliance with the procedure laid down in that 
article…”655 
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Similar conclusion was reached in Regione Autonoma Della Sardegna v 
Commission.656  The applicant argued that due to the positive 
correspondence between Italian authorities and the Commission and 
subsequently the long silence by the commission, they are entitled to 
legitimately expect that their project was compatible with the common 
market. The court however, looked at the nature of the procedure laid down 
for granting compatibility status as follows; 
“…where the formal investigation procedure has been initiated in accordance 
with the first paragraph of Article 88 (2) E C, it must subsequently have been 
closed by means of a positive decision in accordance with  Article 7 (1)  and 
(3) of Regulation No 659/1999. Therefore it is only once such a decision has 
been adopted by the Commission and the period of bringing an action against 
that decision has expired, that a legitimate expectation, as to the lawfulness of 
the aid concerned can be pleaded…”657 
 
Indeed, the general framework, ground depicts the importance of context of 
the area where the expectations are sought to be protected. Thus, the need to 
distinguish between less and highly regulated areas is imperative. The 
framework in general administrative dealing is not susceptible to changes 
compared with economic management and administration, such as 
agriculture, Steel, Competition, Aid, External trade etc. 
 
g. Public Interest: 
Public interest underlies all the factors discussed. The ECJ jurisprudence, 
unless where there is none, subjects all the legitimacy factors to public interest 
                                                 
656 Case T-171/02 Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission (2005) ECR 11-2123  
657 Case T-171/02 Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission (supra) para 65 
266 
 
test. In principle, overriding public interest trumps legitimate expectations. 
As trabucchi put it,658 “when the public interest so requires there can be no doubt 
that the interests of individuals, even if they form a group of some size, must take 
second place.”  What this signifies in the ECJ jurisprudence is that expectations 
that could otherwise be considered legitimate and worthy of protection must 
pave way to a genuine public interest.  In essence, public interests operate as 
an inherent exception to the protection of legitimate expectations in the ECJ 
jurisprudence. The scenarios under which public interest features are cases 
where there is prima facie violation of legitimate expectations but for the 
justification pursuant to the public interest ground. In practical terms, EU 
institutions have a burden of disclosing the public interest concerned 
responsible for making them to alter their decision, policies, or behaviour. 
Where they failed to disclose, legitimate expectations will trumps. In Firma 
Anton Durbeck v Hauptzollant Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen659 The 
applicant (apple importer) had entered into apple importation contract, when 
the Commission decided to suspend all apple importations from outside EU 
market with a view to safeguard the objectives of the common Agricultural 
policy. The Applicant aggrieved by the decision alleged violation of 
legitimate expectations particularly due to the failure of the commission to 
provide for transitional measures before the implementation of the 
                                                 
658 Opinion of Advocate General in Case 74/74 Comptoir National Technique  Agricole 
(CNTA) SA v Commission of the European Communities (1975) ECR 0533 
659 Case 112/80 Firma Anton Durbeck v Hauptzollant Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen (1981) 
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suspension decision. The court rejected the Applicant’s argument. According 
to the court: 
“…in view of the needs which the temporary suspension of imports met, 
transitional measures which exempted contracts already entered into from the 
suspension of imports would have robbed the protective measure of all 
practical effect…”660 
 
The scope of public interest undoubtedly covers vast areas of regulation and 
administration, such as health, environment, and the overall economy 
broadly defined. For instance, in CSL Behring GmbH v European 
Commission and European Medicines Agency,661 The court stresses the 
relevance of public health nature of the regulation and further prioritizes it 
over legitimate expectations and equality. Similarly, in Dieckmann & Hansen 
GmbH v Commission662 The case involves a public decision aimed at 
protecting consumers and public health. The Applicant entered into a contract 
to import 9,500 kg of fresh cavier from Kazakhstan on 5th March 1999. On 26th 
March 1999, the commission banned importations of cavier from Kazakhstan 
on consumer protection and public health ground. The Applicant found it 
impossible to perform the supply contract. Aggrieved by the decision of the 
Commission, the Applicant alleged violation of legitimate expectations. The 
Court decided in favour of the Commission as follows: 
                                                 
660 Case 112/80 Firma Anton Durbeck v Hauptzollant Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen (supra) 
para 5 
661 T-264/07 CSL Behring GmbH v European Commission and European Medicines Agency 
(supra)  
662 T-155/99 Dieckmann & Hansen GmbH v Commission (2001) 11-03143 
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“…the ban on the importation of cavier from Kazakhstan was justified on 
grounds of the protection of the health of consumers and therefore by an 
overriding public interest within the meaning of the case law.” (para 80) 
 
The ECJ engagement with public interest is through the medium of balancing 
exercise. Indeed, the initial balancing exercise must have been carried out by 
the relevant public institution, which essentially limits the courts engagement 
to mere review of the initial balance struck by the public institutions involved. 
As a commentator opined in this context, “the purpose of the review exercised by 
the European court is not to substitute its view of the desired public interest for that 
of the administrator, but to determine whether the disappointment of an expectation 
was indispensable for the attainment of that objective.”663  
 
The label of such balancing has attracted academic scrutiny. While the court is 
not very explicit with a particular label on how it engages with public interest 
analysis, academic commentaries have swayed between “proportionality”664 
and “significant imbalance”.665 Undoubtedly, although the label could be 
unclear but the scope of the balancing exercise is very much clear. The Court 
had consistently maintained that in matters of economic management the 
public institutions enjoy wide margin of discretion. In Offene 
Hnadelsgesellschaft Firma Warner Faust v Commission666 where the 
                                                 
663 Thomas (n 6) 63. 
664 Thomas (n 6). See also Craig, EU Administrative Law, 584–585. 
665 Schønberg (n 9) 150. 
Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law. 
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commission decided to ban importation of shrimp from Taiwan while 
allowing importation from China for much longer period. According to the 
Commission, the decision was taken to achieve two legitimate objectives of 
stabilizing the market and implementing external trade policy. The Applicant 
a shrimp importer from Taiwan alleged violation of the legitimate 
expectations of ‘maintenance of trade relation with Taiwan’. The Court 
decided in favour of the Commission. According to the Court: 
“…Since Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in the choice of 
the means needed to achieve their policies,  traders are unable to claim that 
they have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable 
of being altered by Decisions taken by those institutions within the limits of 
their discretionary power will be maintained.”667 
 
5.1.5 Concluding remarks on Legitimate Expectations under ECJ 
The section examined the formulation and application of legitimate 
expectations under the European Court of Justice. What flows from the 
examination is, the principle of legitimate expectations is well entrenched in 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Undoubtedly, few, if any, 
international and supranational legal regimes have such well-developed and 
extensive jurisprudence on the principle of legitimate expectations. The 
European Court of Justice seems to have accumulated such wealth of 
expertise from the developed jurisprudence of its member states. This 
explains the standard framework for analysis being used by the court and the 
                                                                                                                                            
666 Case 52/81 Offene Hnadelsgesellschaft Firma Warner Faust v Commission (1982) ECR 
3745  
667 Case 52/81 Offene Hnadelsgesellschaft Firma Warner Faust v Commission (supra) para 27 
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rigor with which the entire jurisprudence on legitimate expectations can be 
identified with. 
 
Indeed, there are lessons to be learned from the ECJ jurisprudence to 
emerging international and supra-national regimes, particularly in the 
delicate areas of tension and overlap between protection of legitimate 
expectations and accommodation of public interest.  Investment treaty 
arbitration in particular, is in dare need of such opportunity, owing to the 
growing criticisms of arbitral awards as being emasculative to legitimate 
public interest concerns of host states. Therefore, the methodology adopted 
by the ECJ in ascertaining legitimate expectations, and the balancing 
framework between protection of legitimate expectations and accommodation 
of public interest could provide a useful guidance for investment treaty 
tribunals. 
 
5.2 Legitimate Expectations under European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) 
5.2.1 Legitimate expectations under ECtHR: An Overview: 
The Principle of legitimate expectations is a well-entrenched principle 
forming part of the jurisprudence of right to property under the European 
Court of Human Rights. As a key element within the constitutive whole of the 
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right to property, it has been ubiquitously relied upon in establishing 
possession as an element of the Convention’s property right. In analyzing the 
Court’s approach regarding the determination of individual’s legitimate 
expectations, this section shall trace first the formulation of the principle by 
the court, the methods adopted by the court in the application of the 
principle, and lastly conclude by enumerating the factors relevant to the 
determination of legitimate expectations in investment treaty context. 
 
5.2.2 Formulation of Legitimate Expectations under ECtHR 
The principle of legitimate expectations is formulated by the court pursuant 
to the right to property under the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Article 1 protocol 1 (A1P1) of the ECHR provides as follows: 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and subject to the conditions provided for by law 
and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in anyway impair the rights of a state to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.” 
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The text of A1p1 above provides for ‘possession’ as part of property covered 
by the Convention. The concept of possession above is said to be wide, as it 
covers broad range of properties such as movable and immovable, tangible 
and intangible including legitimate expectations. In addition, some 
commentators regard A1p1 above as ‘qualified’668 or ‘weak priority’669 rights. 
The article provides for protection against arbitrary interference with 
possession by states. In the same vein, it recognizes the right of states to 
control the use of property in accordance with law. Taking into account this 
textual formulation, the court’s approach in interpreting the text also seem to 
recognize this non-absoluteness of the right to property. In Sporrong and 
Lonnroth case670 the court outlined the famous “three rules “emanating from 
A1p1. According to the court: 
“…Article (1P1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a 
general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is 
set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers 
deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in 
the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the 
states are entitled, amongst other things to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem 
necessary for the purpose, it is contained in the second paragraph.” 
                                                 
668
 A. Grgic and Others, The Right to Property under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Its Protocols, Human Rights Handbooks No.4 (Council of Europe Publishing, 2007) 5. 
669
 Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 203–276. 
670
 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR [61]. 
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In discerning the formulation of the court in the above mentioned case, it is 
instructive to note that although the court has identified three rules to guide 
its interpretation of the right to property provision, it is also mindful of the 
order in which its analysis should start. In the opinion of the court, it must 
determine first, whether rules two and three have been complied with before 
determining rule one. This approach of the court shows that the formulation 
of the right to property pursuant A1P1 is a qualified right. In addition, the 
three rules or rather the entire provision of A1P1 is interconnected. As the 
court admits, the rules are not distinctly independent. 
 
Moreover, as pointed out, the court’s approach to applying  legitimate 
expectations is premised upon the concept of possession pursuant to the right 
to property. Possession refers to Applicant’s existing possession and not right 
to acquire possessions.  In Broniowski the court reaffirmed its conception of  
possession under A1P1 as follows: 
“The concept of ‘possession in the first part of Article 1 Protocol No. 1 has 
autonomous meaning which is not limited to the ownership of material goods and is 
independent from the formal classification in domestic law. In the same way as 
material goods, certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be 
regarded as ‘property rights’, and thus as ‘possessions’ for the purposes of this 
provision. In each case the issue that needs to be examined is whether the 
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circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a 
substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”671 
 
Indeed, the conception of legitimate exepectations  pursuant to right to 
property makes the court’s application of the principle unique. Unlike ECJ 
where individuals rely on state measures to induce reliance on the measure, 
in ECtHR the entire principle is viewed from the prism of rights. Thus, the 
pre-occupation of the court is not on the elements of the principle, as there is 
little role of elements, rather on the inherent exceptions and the circumstances 
under which  such exceptions could be justified.  The method adopted by the 
court in evaluating such exceptions is referred to as fair balance, or just 
balance.   As it can be observed, sources of legitimate expectations includes 
judicial decisions, administrative and parliamentary decisions, legal 
provisions, registers and zoning plans, actions and conduct of authorities and 
agreements and contracts between parties.672 
 
5.2.3 Application of Legitimate Expectations 
As discussed above, central to the application of legitimate expectations by 
ECtHR is the notion of ‘possession’ and ‘assets’. In Maltzan and Others v 
                                                 
671
 CASE OF BRONIOWSKI v POLAND (Application no 31443/96) [129]. 
672
 Maya Sigron, Legitimate Expectations Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Intersentia Ltd 2014) 101–160. 
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Germany the ECtHR alluded to the connection between legitimate 
expectations, possessions and right to property. According to the court: 
“An applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the 
impugned decisions related to his “possessions” within the meaning of this provision. 
“Possessions” can be either existing possessions or assets, including claims, in respect 
of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate expectation” 
of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast, the hope of 
recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively 
cannot be considered a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfillment of the 
condition.”673  
 
In Koporky v Slovakia674  The Applicant lodged a complaint asking to regain 
possession of coins collections belonging to his father. The applicant could not 
succeed in the case, having failed to trace the location of the coins as required 
by law.  Indeed, the crux in the legitimate expectations cases is more on the 
measures interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the expectations. On 
assessing the measures. The court has developed multiple layers of tests with 
a view to  strike a fair balance between fulfilment of the expectations or 
otherwise.675 First, the court would enquire whether an interference with 
peaceful enjoyment is lawfull. The second test is whether the interference is in 
                                                 
673
 Applications nos 71916/01, 71917/01 and 10260/02 Maltzan and Others v Germany [74 (c)]. 
674
 CASE OF KOPECKÝ v SLOVAKIA (Application No 44912/98). 
675
 A Mowbray, ‘A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 289. 
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pursuit of legitimate aim. In deciding what constitute legitmate aim in the 
public interest, states enjoy wide margin of of respect. The third factor being 
considered by the court is whether fair balance has been struck at the initial 
revocation decision. Fair balance in this regard entails that the interest of the 
individual affected must be evaluated with the interest of the general public. 
Such exercise is necessary to ensure that disproportionate measures are not 
imposed on individuals. Indeed, a step further in the fair balancing test would 
introduce the doctrine of margin of appreciation. As discussed in chapter II, 
the doctrine, through its functional elements of deference and proportionality 
would enable the court to decide the matter accordingly. In the determination 
of legitimate expectations pursuant to A1p1 the court accords high measure of 
deference to public bodies and institutions. 
Lastly, compensation though part of the initial fair balancing exercise, need to 
be paid to an individual  victim of an infringement or deprivation of peaceful 
enjoyment of  property. The basis for for recognizing compensation at the 
initial stage of fair balancing exercise is due to the fact that the human rights 
regime recognises that there are overriding public interest demands that must 
be fulfilled, and legitimate expectations not matter how in size must Pave way 
to their realisation. 
 
5.2.4 Concluding remarks on Legitimate Expecatations under ECtHR 
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The jurisprudence of ECtHR on legitimate expecatations is undoubtedly one 
of the most sophisticated and pioneer regimes where legitimate expecatations 
is being considered. The practice of the court regarding fair balance and 
consequent application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation are the main 
lessons to be transposed to investment treaty arbitrations. Unlike the ECJ 
jurisprudence where elements of legitimate expectations are the main 
preoccupation of the court, the ECtHR’s approach focusses more on the 
balancing part  of legitimate expectations. In this regard, a whole chapter is 
dedicated to the doctrine of margin of appreciation, and forming part of the 
analytical framework of this research. 
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Chapter VI:  Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration – II: 
Synthesising the Formulation, Application and Justification 
 
6.0  Introduction 
It is settled practice now that investor’s legitimate expectation is a key 
principle in gap-filling the fair and equitable treatment standard.676 Facts 
giving rise to expropriation are also included in the gap-filling function of the 
principle due to the semblance between the scenarios of both fair and 
equitable treatment and expropriation.  For long, arbitral tribunals and 
commentators have realised that obligations of both fair and equitable 
treatment and expropriation ‘do not necessarily differ in quality but just in 
intensity.’677 In Metalclad, the tribunal considered violation of ‘reasonably-to-
be-expected economic benefit’ an important factor in the determination of an 
indirect expropriation. The blurry dichotomy among not just expropriation 
and fair and equitable treatment, but the entire investment treaty standards 
                                                 
676 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic   Partial Award (Watts, Fortier, 
Behrens) (n 15) [302]. 
677 Katia Yannaca-Small, Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the 
Key Issues (Oxford University Press 2010) 399. 
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had for long been alluded to by major publicists in the regime.678 As one 
tribunal in an obiter commented on the rise and ubiquitous reference to fair 
and equitable treatment as opposed other standards, it remarked that it was 
due to ‘the fact that other standards traditionally provided by international law 
might not in the circumstances of each case be entirely appropriate.’ 679 To that 
extent, the thesis argued that the critical role once played by the treaty 
standards and to some extent contractual guarantee clauses such as 
stabilisation clause have now been overtaken by the renaissance of the 
principle of investor’s legitimate expectations. One of the critical problems 
posed by the application of investor’s legitimate expectations and overall 
investment treaty standards is the interface between investor’s protection and 
states’ regulatory and administrative autonomy.  The problem is indeed, 
warping and an old-arching having featured in most of arbitral awards 
discussed in this thesis. Undoubtedly, the nebulous nature of investor’s 
legitimate expectations further knits the states dual functions of 
administration and regulation. Both regulatory and administrative functions 
of states have become interwoven and subject to arbitral scrutiny due to on 
one hand the inherent close connection between administration and 
regulation, and the pervasive nature of the principle of legitimate 
                                                 
678 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Introduction: Interrelationship of Standards’ in August Reinisch (ed), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). 
679 In PSEG, the tribunal held that: ‘The standard of fair and equitable treatment has acquired 
prominence in investment arbitration as a consequence of the fact that other standards 
traditionally provided by international law might not in the circumstances of each case be 
entirely appropriate. This is particularly the case when the facts of the dispute do not clearly 
support the claim for direct expropriation, but when there are notwithstanding events that 
need to be assessed under a different standard to provide redress in the event that the rights 
of the investor have been breached.’ See; PSEG Global Inc. &Anor v Republic of Turkey ICSID 
Case No.ARB/02/5 (n 25) [238]. 
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expectations on the other hand. Therefore, in framing the discourse a little 
distant from the traditional standards of treatment as usually contained in 
most bilateral investment treaties, is to beg the question of constituent of this 
pervading principle and determining the consequent interface of the principle 
with the regulatory and administrative functions of states. As enquired 
earlier, what are the criteria for determining investor’s legitimate 
expectations? And what are the factors to be considered in the determination 
of host state’s legitimate regulatory and administrative functions? 
Drawing lessons from PCIJ, ICJ, WTO, ECJ, ECtHR and to some  extent 
African and Inter-American Human rights jurisprudence, this chapter seeks 
to appraise and synthesise the lessons learnt in the formulation and 
application of investor’s legitimate expectations. Complementary to the 
public law nature of investment treaty regime, the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation as an analytical tool is deployed to provide further guidance in 
the reformulation and calibration of the application of investor’s legitimate 
expectations in investment treaty context. The overall aim of the chapter is to 
respond to the question of how can investment treaty tribunals formulate and 
apply the principle of legitimate expectations taking into account state’s regulatory 
and administrative functions. 
The chapter is divided into five broad sections. Section I introduces the 
chapter by outlining the issues to be covered.  Section two provides for 
formulation of investor’s legitimate expectations using relevant conceptual 
approaches and analogies. Section three syntheses the lessons learnt from the 
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jurisprudence of various regimes discussed in the thesis. Section four 
provides for justification of applying legitimate expectations from the prism 
of margin of appreciation, and section five concludes with possible challenges 
and recommendations. 
 
6.1 Formulation of Legitimate expectations in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: The Milieu to Analogies 
The idea of formulation in legal parlance is one of the ambiguous and 
contested legal paradoxes particularly when sought to be isolated from 
practical application of law. The idea as to whether law as a discipline, has 
distinctively recognised ‘formulation’ as a legal exercise to be engaged by 
legal scholars, practitioners and jurists in clinical isolation from application of 
law is opaque. Without delving into the paradox of formulation and 
application of law, and  for the purpose of this thesis, the notion of 
formulation is aimed at analysing the method of conception of a legal 
principle adopted by judicial bodies or legal regime. The significance of 
formulation cannot be over emphasized. As indicated in the introductory 
chapter, the juridical function of arbitrators is what provokes the relevance of 
approaches and analogies in the application of law. As Elihu Lauterpacht 
remarked, ‘…international tribunals, by the very nature of the judicial function, are 
not confined to a purely mechanical application of the law.’680 In the context of such 
                                                 
680 Lauterpacht, ‘The Absence of an International Legislature and the Compulsory Jurisdiction 
of International Tribunals’ (n 74) 210. 
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judicial function, and with a view to interpret treaties particularly ambiguous 
standards like fair and equitable treatment, law-making process is being 
engaged.  More importantly, adjudication of legal principles such as 
legitimate expectations as opposed to strict legal rules is exponentially 
amenable to the inherent powers of international tribunals to formulate and 
apply the principle within their juridical leverage and compelling 
circumstance. The basis for such exercise lies in the ambiguous nature of the 
treaty standards and the inevitable gap arising due to the evolutive nature of 
the treaty standards particularly, fair and equitable treatment standard.   In 
fact, as Douglas rightly pointed out in this context, the principle of legitimate 
expectations could be regarded as a product of such judicial function, as 
arbitrators, are likely to prefer legitimate expectations while interpreting fair 
and equitable treatment than to be guided by less juridical approaches like 
policy objectives of the treaties.681 Therefore, in setting the analytical account 
for reformulation of investor’s legitimate expectations this section shall deal 
with analogical formulation of investor’s legitimate expectations. 
 
6.1.1  Analogies in the Formulation of Investor’s legitimate expectations 
The nature of obligations assumed by states under investment treaties has 
generated scholarly debate particularly regarding their source of obligation.682 
                                                 
681 Douglas (n 242) 84. 
682 For an overview on the analogies, see; Paparinskis (n 335); ‘EJIL: Talk! – The Nature of 
Investor’s Rights under Investment Treaties: A Comment on Paparinskis’ “Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and the (New) Law of State Responsibility”’ <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
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In search for the juridical basis, Judge Stephen Schwebel683 and Professor 
Andreas Lowenfield684 alluded to the customary law stance due to the 
concomitance of the bilateral investment treaties and the way they impacted 
on the traditional conception of treatment of aliens under international law. 
According to Schwebel: 
“Customary international law governing the treatment of foreign investment has 
been reshaped to embody the principles of law found in more than two thousand 
concordant bilateral investment treaties. With the conclusion of such a cascade of 
parallel treaties, the international community has vaulted over the traditional divide 
between capital-exporting and capital-importing states and fashioned an essentially 
unified law of foreign investment.”685  
 
The absence of the consistent state practice in the content of the treaties, in 
addition to the lack of opinio juris is undoubtedly a shortcoming to the 
customary law thesis. Analysing the output of the divergent views 
surrounding the juridical basis of bilateral investment treaties shows that the 
regime is still soul searching its basis and nature under international law. 
Rather than painstaking analysis of the nature of the investment treaties, the 
analogy school understandably seem to offer plausible Comparism with a 
view to discern the basis and nature of these treaties. The analogy approach 
generally compares the nature of the content of investment treaties with 
closer or analogous legal regimes. A notable clock in the analogy path is 
                                                                                                                                            
nature-of-investors-rights-under-investment-treaties-a-comment-on-paparinskis-investment-
treaty-arbitration-and-the-new-law-of-state-responsibility/> accessed 21 February 2014. 
683 Stephen M Schwebel, ‘Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary 
International Law, The’ (2004) 98 American Society of International Law Proceedings 27, 27–
30. 
684 Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘Investment Agreements and International Law’ (2003) 42 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 123, 123–130. 
685 Schwebel, Justice in International Law (n 368) 146. 
284 
 
identifying the suitable regime for the analogy. As indicated in the 
introductory chapter, Human Rights regime provides a suitable base and 
enjoys an overwhelming support by many publicists in international 
economic law. Without being repetitive, its suitability lies in the fact that in 
both regimes, individuals can invoke the rights enshrined in their respective 
treaties. The human rights analogy in investment arbitration is linked to the 
conception of investment treaties generally as providing direct rights as 
opposed to derivative rights.686  Apart from human rights analogy, a 
complementary, yet, a contending candidate within right analogy is the third 
party beneficiary theory.  i.e stipulations pour autrui. The suitability of the 
theory is predicated upon the conception of bilateral investment treaties as 
treaties conferring rights on third parties, something analogous with treaties 
conferring rights on third party states.  
a. Legitimate expectations from Human Rights Analogy 
The human right approach to investment treaty arbitration analogises the 
nature of rights conferred upon foreign investors by bilateral and multilateral 
                                                 
686 The argument regarding the nature of investor’s rights pursuant to investment treaties led 
to the emergence of two theoretical schools namely derivative and direct models. Derivative 
model as an extension of ‘diplomatic protection system’ connotes that foreign investors do 
not have a right of their own in investment disputes, but are merely stepping into the shoes of 
their home states to enforce the right of their home states. In Loewen Group v United States 
of America the tribunal expressed derivative theory as follows: ‘There is no warrant for 
transferring rules derived from private law into a field of international law where claimants 
are permitted for convenience to enforce what are in origin the rights of Party states.’ Loewen 
v. United States of America ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (n 271) [para 233] Direct theory on the 
other hand is premised upon the recognition that states can confer rights on individuals and 
private entities pursuant to investment treaties. Therefore, investors can be recognised as 
having individual rights by virtue of their direct relationship with host states, and can 
therefore institute a claim for the enforcement or seeking remedy regarding their rights. See:; 
Germany v United States (La Grand) ICJ, (n 87) [para 77] See also; SGS Societe Generale de 
Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines ICSID Cases No ARB026 [154]. 
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investment treaties as akin to human rights. In other words, bilateral 
investment treaties like human rights contain certain guarantees for the 
benefit of individual parties who are literally neither parties nor signatories to 
the treaties.  One of the early traces of reference to human rights by 
investment treaty tribunals is Mondev tribunal’s analysis regarding 
immunities of public authorities. The tribunal justifies analogy with the 
decisions of the ECtHR regarding “Right to Court” as providing “guidance by 
analogy as to the possible scope of NAFTA’s guarantee of ‘treatment in accordance 
with international law including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security’.”687  
In Corn Products International v Mexico the tribunal unequivocally rejects 
derivative theory and held that investment treaties do confer substantive rights 
on foreign investor’s depending on the intention of the treaty contracting 
states, which is to be discerned from the treaty text. According to the tribunal: 
“In the case of Chapter XI of the NAFTA, the Tribunal considers that the intention of 
the parties was to confer substantive rights directly upon investors. That follows from 
the language used and is confirmed by the fact that Chapter XI confers procedural 
rights upon them. The notion that Chapter XI conferred upon investor’s a right, in 
their own name and for their own benefit, to institute proceedings to enforce rights 
which were not theirs but were solely the property of the State of their nationality is 
counterintuitive.” 
 
Fundamentally, in formulating investor’s legitimate expectations pursuant to 
human rights lens, it is priori to recognise the similarity between the 
substantive investment rights conferred by investment treaties and the rights 
                                                 
687 Mondev v. United States of America Case No. ARB(AB)/99/2 (n 269) [144]. 
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of individuals under human rights treaties. Indeed, one of the justifications of 
using the human rights approach in the determination of legitimate 
expectations and balancing between protection of same and a justified 
interference is right and duty parallels. Horizontally,688 while the foreign 
investor’s right to fair and equitable treatment, including its legitimate 
expectations need to be fulfilled, the investors also must be accountable.689 
Thus, an adjudicative body, such as investment treaty tribunals need to apply 
balancing principles in deciding disputes between right beneficiaries and 
duty holders since the nature of the relationship between the litigants is 
inherently overlapping from the perspective of right-duty parallels. Secondly, 
the nature of the obligations is similar in both human rights and investment in 
that states are responsible for the respect and protection of the rights, and the 
sovereign powers of the state cannot prima facie be used to impair realisation 
of the substantive rights.690  Thirdly, as substantive rights under human rights 
are not absolute,691 so are investor’s rights under investment treaties. The non-
absoluteness of the rights presupposes the need for reconciling fulfillment of 
the rights with public interest demands. 
 
                                                 
688 The horizontal human rights approach seeks to establish duties private actors owe to the 
society. See; John H Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102 American Journal of 
International Law 1, 1–47. 
689 Francioni (n 3) 739. 
690 Rehman (n 64) 4. 
691 Dr Richard Burchill, Dr Scott Davidson and Dr Alex Conte, Defining Civil and Political 
Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Ashgate Publishing, 
Ltd 2013) 39; In the context of investment, see; Montt (n 50). 
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Moreover, from the discussion on the jurisprudence of ECJ and ECtHR, the 
overall recognition of legitimate expectations as possession under right to 
property by the ECtHR solidifies the case for analogy in formulating 
investor’s legitimate expectations from the prism of human right. As 
discussed above, the ECtHR pursuant to Article 1 protocol 1 of the ECHR has 
formulated possession to include legitimate expectations of an individual. 
Therefore, an investment treaty tribunal can transpose the reasoning of 
conceiving generality of benefits/rights given to the foreign investor as 
contained in investment treaties as falling within the umbrella of benefits a 
foreign can legitimately expect. 
 
b. Legitimate Expectations as ‘stipulations pour autrui’ 
In advancing the thesis that international investment treaties in themselves 
and in their own right contain a joint manifestation of the will of the 
contracting states the basis upon which investor’s legitimate expectations 
could be generated, the analogy here, viewed investor’s legitimate 
expectations as analogous to stipulations by states where foreign investors are 
likened with third party beneficiaries of a conferred right. There are two 
scenario layers to this analogy. First, the content of investment treaty 
standards as contained in the treaties could galvanise investor’s legitimate 
expectations. Therefore, mere fact that states are signatories to investment 
treaties could trigger reliance on the part of foreign investors violation of 
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which could be sanctioned and compensated.692 Secondly, non-treaty actions 
or conducts of states otherwise referred as “unilateral manifestation of will” 
could also galvanise investor’s legitimate expectations as is the case with 
many claims alleging violation of investor’s legitimate expectations. 
 
In drawing analogy from the discussion on general international law, it may 
be recalled that unilateral manifestation of will by a state is an essential 
element of unilateral actions. The unilaterality test is said to be satisfied when 
one, two or more states jointly or collectively manifest their will to be bound 
by their actions or conduct. According to ILC working group report of 1997: 
“…this characteristic, which is to be seen both in the structure and in the object and 
content of the acts, leaves ‘plurilateral’ international legal acts, such as treaties, 
outside the scope of study. But it does not exclude so called ‘collective’ or ‘joint’ acts, 
inasmuch as they are performed by a plurality of states which do not intend to 
regulate their mutual relations by this means, but to express, simultaneously or in 
parallel fashion, as a unitary block the same willingness to produce certain legal 
effects without any need for the participation of other subjects or ‘parties’ in the form 
of acceptance, reciprocity, etc.” 
 
Flowing from the report, it can be discerned that BIT contracting states can 
mutually express their will to be bound by conferring on investors the 
guarantees contained in the bilateral investment treaties. Such expression 
could be understood analogically from the ‘unilateral actions regime’ as a 
joint or collective act of states making a declaration or giving an assurance to 
                                                 
692 In this regard, its not the signing or entry into the treaty by states that grounds the 
obligation to respect investor’s expectation, rather, the ability of the investor to relate its 
expectations with specific provisions of a given treaty. See; Total S.A. v Argentina Republic (n 
341) [117]. 
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foreign investors.  Indeed, as argued in the preceding chapters, the principle 
of legitimate expectations encapsulates variety of ‘expectation-protective’ 
principles which includes elements of abuse of right, acquiescence, estoppel, and 
unilateral actions. In addition, the justification for analogy between state treaty 
actions and non-treaty actions was for long recognised. In the work of 
international law commission on unilateral actions of states, same issue was 
mentioned when a participant remarked that: 
‘Since the consent to be bound by a treaty and the consent to unilateral act were both 
expressions of will of a state, it seemed logical that the same reasons for invalidity 
should apply to both types of statements.’693  
 
Therefore, the assumption can be said to be fairly settled that international 
investment treaties, as containing states’ will to be bound by the content of the 
treaties provides an assurance to foreign investors capable of triggering 
investor’s legitimate expectations regarding performance of the entire treaty 
obligations. The proof of this contention lies with the fact that states could 
create expectations when their intention to be bound legally is manifested 
multilaterally, bilaterally or unilaterally. While multilateral and bilateral 
manifestation of will most often belongs to the pure treaty regime, the 
unilateral manifestation of state will could as well be analogised with the 
treaty regime.  
 
                                                 
693
 Remark by the Representative of Poland. See ‘UN Doc A/C.6/54/SR.25’ (1999). 
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Furthermore, Article 36 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties 
provides as follows: 
“ A right arises for a third state from provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty 
intended the provision to accord that right either to the third state, or to a group of 
states…” 
 
Indeed, Article 36 (1), in addition to the above provided further that the third 
states need to assent to the right conferred upon it, though such assent could 
be presumed. It must be pointed out, that the issue of “assent”, “consent” by 
the beneficiary state and presumption of same somehow present a hitch in the 
analogy path given the fact that while states can give consent in public 
international law, individuals do not enjoy the same status. However, as 
argued while remarking on the status of foreign investor in chapter four, the 
theories of formalism and participation appear to debunk the traditional docile 
status of individuals including foreign investors. In addition, it is well settled 
principle in investment treaty arbitration that investor’s invocation of 
investment treaty provisions regarding dispute settlement signifies foreign 
investor’s consent and acceptance to an offer made by states that are parties to 
an investment treaty.694 Therefore, where an investor successfully invokes BIT 
treaty provisions, such invocation can be analogised with the requirement of 
‘assent’ under article 36 (1)VCLT, thereby signifying reliance as required in the 
implorations of legitimate expectations. 
 
                                                 
694
 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 244) 238–253. 
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Indeed, the formulation of investor’s legitimate expectations as stipulations 
pour autrui, doesn’t come as a surprise to a regime whose nature has proved to 
be problematic, bearing various ascriptions as ‘arbitration without privity’, 
‘three-dimensional’, ‘beast’, ‘hybrid’ etc.  In Wintershall AG v Argentina the 
tribunal in express terms likened foreign investor with ‘third state’ covered by 
Articles 34, 35, 1and 36 of the VCLT. According to the tribunal: 
“It is a general principle of the law of treaties that a third beneficiary of a right under 
it must comply with the conditions for the exercise of the right provided for in the 
treaty or established in conformity with the treaty. On the analogy of Article 36 (2 ) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (the “Vienna Convention”), 
the ‘secondary right-holder under a bilateral treaty (the investor) who is conferred 
certain rights, being in no different position from “the third state” (mentioned in 
Article 36)-must comply with the conditions stipulated for the exercise of the rights 
provided for in the treaty concerned, which in the instant case is the “basic” 
treaty.”695   
 
Conversely, the principle of investors’ legitimate expectations can be 
conceptually formulated from public law approach without relinquishing the 
public international law identity of the investment treaty arbitration. Pursuant 
to public law approach, human rights analogy can further illuminate the 
juridical formulation from property right based analogy. As Naon remarked in 
EnCana: 
“…the legal entitlement in such legitimate expectations presents itself in the form of 
ownership or “propiedad” rights directly protected by the Treaty and is not premised 
on the national law of the host State once the investment, that comprises the right to 
obtain returns on the investment, has been made in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the host state.”696 
                                                 
695 ‘Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, Award’ (n 341) 114. 
696 Partial Dissenting Opinion of Horacio A Grigera Naon in En Cana Corporation v Republic of 
Ecuador [2005] Uncitral (LCIA) Case No. UN 3481 [20]. 
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In the next heading, the thesis shall dwell upon the lessons learnt from the 
analytical survey of various legal regimes considered in the preceding 
chapters, and how such lessons could aid investment treaty tribunals towards 
a cohesive and coherent application of investor’s legitimate expectations.    
 
6.2.1   Lessons Learnt from General International Law 
a. Formulation of legitimate expectations 
The thesis found that the jurisprudence of PCIJ, ICJ and early tribunals 
analysed in chapter four posits that the principles of abuse of right, 
acquiescence, estoppel and unilateral declarations are all aimed at protecting 
legitimate expectations in the interaction among states.697 The principles are 
rooted and formulated pursuant to the fundamental principles of equity and 
good faith.698  Regardless of various ways good faith as an international law 
concept manifested itself, the principle of legitimate expectations embodies its 
manifestations and provides for its practical application.   
 
Situating legitimate expectations under the international law principle of 
good faith, is a lesson that investment treaty tribunals should entrench in the 
concretization and development of investor’s legitimate expectations. 
Admittedly, the investment treaty tribunal has captured the essence of this 
lesson when they refer to the good faith obligation as a basis for invoking 
                                                 
697 See Chapter IV (4.1) 
698 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgement, (n 369) 305. 
293 
 
investor’s legitimate expectations while interpreting fair and equitable 
treatment. In Tecmed, the tribunal succintly refer to legitimate expectations in 
the light of good faith principle established by International law.699 In Thunderbird 
separate Opinion of late Walde, reference is made to good faith as forming 
part of the doctrinal structure of investor’s legitimate expectations.700 In El 
paso the tribunal further re-echoed the good faith basis of investor’s 
legitimate expectations. According to the tribunal; “There is an overwhelming 
trend to consider the touchstone of fair and equitable treatment to be found in the 
legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Parties, which derive from the obligation 
of good faith.”701 Therefore, juridical formulation investor’s legitimate 
expectation pursuant to good faith is a lesson that appears to be recognised by 
the tribunals and should be refined and entrenched702 into investment treaty 
corpus juris. 
 
b. Application of legitimate expectations 
 
Reflecting on the essential elements of legitimate expectations under 
investment treaty arbitration, the lessons to be drawn from the jurisprudence 
of PCIJ/ICJ and other relevant international tribunals discussed under 
chapter IV suggest that, the element of  Assurance/Conduct/Framework is 
                                                 
699 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2 (n 24) [54]. 
700 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation  v. United Mexican States (n 7) [25]. 
701 El Paso Energy International Company v The Argetine Republic [2011] ICSID Case NoARB0315 
[348]. 
702 On the refined approach to good faith in the context of investment treaty arbitration, see; 
AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘The Concept of Good Faith in International Investment Disputes - the 
Arbitrator’s Dilemma’ (2012) 2012 Amicus Curiae 16. 
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recognised in both PCIJ and ICJ among all the ‘expectation protective’ 
principles. In the case of abuse of right, representation or conduct is in the 
form of existence of the right and exercise of the right.703 In the case of 
Acquiescence, the element of assurance or conduct is reflected in the element 
of silence or toleration.704 In both estoppel and unilateral actions, the content 
of assurance/conduct element is effectively the same element as in legitimate 
expectations mutatis mutandis.705 The unanimous recognition of this element 
invariably connotes that there should be lessons to reflect on by investment 
treaty tribunals. First, the tribunals could learn regarding the content of an 
assurance/conduct or legal framework. Some of the key qualifiers ascribed to 
assurance/conduct include clarity,706 unambiguity,707 unconditionality and 
voluntariness of  representation in legitimate expectations.708 In addition, the 
intention element within the fulcrum of state representation or conduct could 
at times becomes problematic. While it is quite easy for adjudicators and 
arbitrators to look at the preponderance of evidence and surrounding 
circumstance to decide whether states manifests their intention to be bound 
by a particular representation or conduct, most often, in the absence of clear 
and unequivocal representation, states could question whether they intend to 
                                                 
703 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex ( France v. Switzerland) (n 387). 
704 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits, (n 415). 
705 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Preliminary Objections, (n 443); Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) 
Judgement, (n 465). 
706 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Preliminary Objections, (n 443) 275. 
707 According to the court; ‘There has been no clear and unequivocal representation by the 
bondholders upon which the debtor state was entitled to rely and has relied.’ Case Concerning 
the Payment of Various Serbian Loans issued in France, Judgement of 12 July 1929, (n 455) 39. 
708 See Chapter 1V  
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be bound by certain representations or behaviour. The legal adage is, not all 
state actions imply an obligation.709 In this regard, there is lesson to be learnt 
from the jurisprudence of ICJ regarding unilateral actions analysed in Chapter 
IV. According to the ICJ in Nuclear Tests Case, ‘…intention confers on the 
declaration the character of a legal undertaking,…”710 In Burkinafaso v Mali The 
court reiterated its position by remarking that ‘it all depends on the intention of 
the State in question,’.711 The nagging question flowing from the lesson above 
is, how can investment treaty tribunals ascertain the intention of states in a 
given representation or conduct? One of the arbitral awards discussed in 
Chapter III is Thunderbird, where the Claimant alleged that it reasonably 
relied on a written official assurances from Mexican officials. Mexico on the 
other hand denies that its communication raises any expectation to warrant 
reasonable reliance. The tribunal found that whatever standard it applies be it 
narrowest or broadest, it could not pathom the claimant’s argument that they 
‘Oficio’ generated claimant’s legitimate expectations. 712 In the award, the 
tribunal appear to assume that an intended though ambigious assurance was 
given by Mexico against the background of an inaccurate and incomplete 
information from the Claimant. Interestingly, there was no dispute as to the 
existence of the official written communication addressed to the Claimant. 
Rather, the dispute was whether the content of such communications 
constitutes an intended assurance capable of being relied upon. Neither the 
                                                 
709 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgement, (n 465) [47]. 
710 Ibid 43. 
711 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkinafaso v. Mali) Judgement, (n 482) 39. 
712 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States Mexico (n 28) [145–
148]. 
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tribunal nor the separate opinion of late Walde was ready to determine the 
dispute from this angle despite the fact that, that was the defence put forward 
by the Respondent. According to the Respondent; “…The Oficio was an 
advisory opinion, not an approval or permit, based on the information provided by 
EDM in the Solicitud,…”713 The determination of whether the Oficio was meant 
to be mere advisory and not an approval or permit triggers the role of 
intention in the determination of state representation or conduct as an element 
in the analysis of investor’s legitimate expectations. Drawing our lesson from 
ICJ and ILC guiding principles applicable to unilateral declarations, the 
tribunal could have been guided by the lessons learnt, particularly, by taking 
into account the content of the Oficio, factual circumstance and the reactions 
which the Oficio gives rise to.714 Should the tribunal remain doubtful as to the 
intention of Mexico, a restrictive interpretation would have been in tandem 
with the ICJ jurisprudence in this area.715 
 
Withregard to legal framework as a source of investor’s legitimate 
expectations, undoubtedly, the jurisprudence of general international can 
strengthen and reinforce part of investment treaty jurisprudence that 
recognised legal framework set up by host state as a source of investor’s 
legitimate expectations  and analogous to specific assurance or conduct. As 
                                                 
713 Ibid 141. 
714 ILC, ‘Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of 
Creating Legal Obligations: ILC Report (58th Session, 2006)’, (n 473) 7; Case Concerning Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) Judgement, (n 
494) [293]. 
715 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgement, (n 465) [47]; Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) Merits, (n 
488) [261]; Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkinafaso v. Mali) Judgement, (n 482) 40. 
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discussed in chapter III, there is no unanimity in investment treaty 
jurisprudence regarding recognition of legal and administrative framework as 
a source of legitimate expectations. The current state of the jurisprudence 
though, recognised legal and administrative framework as source for creating 
legitimate expectations, its use as source of generating legitimate expectations 
has been relegated and cyclically circumscribed with additional requirements 
of decisiveness of surrounding circumstance.716 This ought not to be taking 
into account that the whole principle of acquiescence and to a certain degree 
estoppel as developed by ICJ simply applies to state’s passive behaviour.  
 
Another lesson learnt is regarding the recurrence of  conduct and the duration 
required for a conduct to last before regarding such conduct as capable of 
rising investor’s legitimate expectations. In this regard, the jurisprudence of 
ICJ requires a conduct or silence to last for a considerable period, or in the 
case of short period, to occur recurrently717 before binding a state against its 
will.718 This can be quite useful for investment treaty tribunals adjudicating 
legitimate expectations pursuant to state conduct, particularly where the 
Respondent is denying either the subjective  element of the conduct or the 
inducement/galvanising force aspect of the conduct. In typical scenario of 
                                                 
716 According to Parkerings; ‘...in the situation where the host state made no assurance or 
representation, the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the agreement are decisive 
to determine if the expectations of the investor are legitimate.’ Parkerings-Companiet AS v 
Republic of Lithuania ICSID Case No.ARB/05/8 (n 23) [216]; See also Glamis Gold where the 
tribunal held that ‘...a violation of Article 1105 based on the unseettling of reasonable, 
investment-backed expectation requires, as a threshold circumstance, at least a quasi-
contractual relationship between the State and the investor, whereby the State has purposely 
and specifically induced the investment.’ Glamis Gold v USA (n 22) [766]. 
717 Grisbadarna Case (Norway v Sweden) (n 421) 6. 
718 Ibid 139. 
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this, the state would be denying its conduct as short of creating any legitimate 
expectations. In Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal citing Metalclad and 
Thunderbird mentioned the relevance of “repeated” nature of an assurance in 
creating legitimate expectations.719 Indeed, this lesson can be complemented 
by the on-going practice of the tribunals regarding measuring the continuum 
of an assurance or conduct in terms of its level of clarity and specification. It is 
now an endorsed practice that the less specific an assurance or conduct is, the 
less likely that it would translate into legitimate expectations.720 
 
6.2.2 Lessons Learnt from WTO 
a. Formulation of Legitimate Expectations 
The research found that WTO law as jurisprudence rooted on a multilateral 
treaty provides for the contracting states to form legitimate expectations 
regarding their trade behaviour, maintenance of generalised conditions 
affecting future trade and overall consistency of the WTO law. These forms of 
expectations have been clearly covered while discussing the three scenarios of 
WTO legitimate expectations. The formulation of legitimate expectations 
under WTO further reveals the role of foundational juridical concepts of good 
faith and equity. Rooted in the spirit of good faith and equity, the rationale for 
legitimate expectations is to provide security and predictability of 
commitments in the multilateral regime. Following the analysis of contractual-
bilateral and constitutional-collective approaches it can be discerned that the 
                                                 
719 Marvin Feldman v Mexico [148]. 
720 Parkerings-Companiet AS v Republic of Lithuania ICSID Case No.ARB/05/8 (n 23) [121]. 
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conception of legitimate expectations in WTO is largely developed in the 
constitutional-collectivism approach. 
 
b. Application of Legitimate Expectations 
The research found that the application of legitimate expectations under WTO 
is reflected in cases of violations complains, non-violation complaints, and the 
status of adopted panel and Appellate body reports. In the case of violation 
complains although panels were willing to recognize the application of 
legitimate expectations, the appellate body was unequivocally clear in 
rejecting the application of legitimate expectations. According to appellate 
body, the principle of legitimate expectations has no role in the determination 
of violation complains, having not been mentioned explicitly in the treaty. 
Non- violation cases appear to be the dominant cause of action of legitimate 
expectations. Both the panels and the Appellate body in their reports have 
recognised and applied the principle of legitimate expectations in non-
violation complaints. Indeed, the adopted panel and Appellate Body reports 
do not provide for a substantive cause of action, such reports are however, 
relevant in generating legitimate expectations and regarded as the central 
element in providing security and predictability in the overall WTO 
jurisprudence. 
 
Moreover, like in investment treaty arbitration, the elements needed to 
establish legitimate expectations include conditions of competition, reliance, 
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and Nullification/impairment. Conditions of competitions have typified the 
element of assurance or conduct as a constituent of legitimate expectations in 
investment treaty arbitration, while nullification and impairment is 
synonymous with the revocation element of typical legitimate expectations 
claims under investment treaty regime. 
 
First, one of the lessons worthy of reflecting in WTO jurisprudence, is the 
approach of the panel in identifying the benefit / condition of competition 
which is the core of all legitimate expectations pleas. In EC-LAN discussed in 
chapter four, the panel resolved the of presumptive ambiguity regarding the 
existence or otherwise of benefit in favor of the party relying on the benefit. 
According to the panel it will undermine the whole essence of expectations to 
place the burden of clarifying understanding of representation or conduct on 
the recipient state.721 
 
The jurisprudence of WTO in this regard could be transposed to investment 
treaty arbitration with a view to fill the gap of interpreting ambiguous 
representations/conducts. Issues surrounding interpretation of ambiguous 
assurances or conduct present a lacuna in the investment treaty 
jurisprudence. As discussed in Chapter three Part of the reasons for separate 
opinion of Walde in Thunderbird was who should bear the burden of 
                                                 
721 EC – Computer Equipment Panel Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R, adopted 22 June 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/ DS68/AB/R, DSR 
1998:V, 1891 (n 534) [8.49]. 
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clarifying ambiguous representations in legitimate expectations. In the main 
award, the majority never considered this aspect as an issue worthy of 
specific verdict. According to the majority, in an asymmetric relationship, one 
would expect the moving party i.e. Thunderbird to supply adequate 
information, though the tribunal navigated the argument by denying 
ambiguity in Mexico’s response to the clarification sought by the foreign 
investor.722 Late Walde took it up as cornerstone to his dissent to the Chair 
and the Co-arbitrator. According to Walde: 
“At issue in dispute-and the main area where I disagree with my colleagues – is 
whether the conduct of the Government, i.e. SEGOB, the federal gambling directorate, 
has individually or in its aggregate, created a legitimate expectation for Thunderbird 
that it could carry out legally its business of computer-driven slot machines involving 
some measure of skill and human intervention. In this context, the government’s duty 
to avoid ambiguity towards foreign investors, to send clear messages and to pro-
actively correct any misperception manifestly created, to take into account the 
investor’s need for predictability of government conduct and key attitudes is engaged, 
also its obligation to take its prior assurances into account when “closing” the 
facilities.”723 
 
Indeed, the finding of this thesis regarding the WTO position on the burden 
of clarifying of ambiguous assurances, concedes to two caveats. First 
compelling cases of non-disclosure by the foreign investor (where such is 
required given the asymmetric relationship between the investor and the host 
                                                 
722 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States Mexico (n 28) [159] The 
tribunal added at paragraph 164; ‘It cannot be disputed that Thunderbird knew when it chose 
to invest in gaming activities in Mexico that gambling was an illegal activity under Mexican 
law. By Thunderbird’s own admission, it also knew that operators of similar machines 
(Guardia) had encountered legal resistance from SEGOB. Hence, Thunderbird must be 
deemed to have been aware of the potential risk of disclosure of its own gaming facilities and 
it should have exercised particular caution in pursuing its business venture in Mexico. At the 
time EDM requested an official opinion fromSEGOB on the legality of its machines, EDM 
must also be deemed to have been aware that its machines involved some degree of luck, and 
that dollar bill acceptors coupled with winning tickets redeemable for cash could be 
reasonably viewed as elements of betting. Yet EDM chose not to disclose those critical aspects 
in the Solicitud.’ . 
723 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation  v. United Mexican States (n 7) [21]. 
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state) are unlikely to be affected by this finding. Secondly, contrasting this 
position with the PCIJ position in Serbian Loans Case is likely to produce an 
incongruous position in the overall international law adjudication. It may be 
recalled, as discussed in chapter four while dealing with the general 
international law position on Estoppel, the PCIJ rejected a plea for estoppel on 
the ground that “there has been no clear and unequivocal representation”.724 
 
Secondly, as part of the lessons learnt and worthy of transposing to 
investment treaty arbitration, is the practice of WTO dispute settlement 
bodies regarding identification of a state measure of revocation of 
expectations. The approach of the WTO is being driven not by “state 
responsibility-centric paradigm” but a realistic recognition of plurality of players 
in the market. Both Panel and Appellate body appear unequivocally clear that 
for a member state to be responsible for violation of legitimate expectations, 
the nullification or impairment measure must be in form of governmental 
action, conduct or policy emanating from the state and not that of private 
parties.725 The only exception, indeed, is where a private party revocation 
measure has a governmental flavour.726 The bottom line here is, the 
jurisprudence of WTO is strikingly concerned with emblematic adjudication 
                                                 
724 According to PCIJ; ‘There has been no clear and unequivocal representation by the 
bondholders upon which the debtor State was entitled to rely and has relied. There has been 
no change in position on the part of the debtor State.’ Case Concerning the Payment of Various 
Serbian Loans issued in France, Judgement of 12 July 1929, (n 455) 39. 
725 Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, 1179 (n 523). 
726 Ibid 10.54. 
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issues relating to burden of proof727, and causation and thereby careful in 
ensuring that there is causality between responsibility and frustrative 
measure.728  
 
The determination of revocation measure in investment treaty arbitration, as 
crucial as it is, is in most cases absent or devoid of deserving scrutiny. Most 
often, the tribunals are concerned with how legitimate expectations are 
created. Once satisfied that legitimate expectations have been created, they 
seem to care less to scrutinise evidentiary and with similar dexterity as in the 
analysis of identification of expectations, how such expectations can be 
breached. Thus, the issue of burden of proof and causation is being 
summarily treated and in most cases viewed from the state responsibility 
angle than the traditional  factual ascertainment of fact. A cursory search729 of 
all the arbitral awards reveals no result regarding  burden of proof or 
causation in respect of legitimate expectations analysis except in few 
                                                 
727 Regarding burden of proof, ‘…we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of 
judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a 
claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international 
tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently 
accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the 
respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally accepted canon 
of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof 
rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a 
particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption 
that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will unless it 
adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.’ Ibid 10.29. 
728 In Japan-Film, the panel remarked in this regard; ‘We consider it important to approach 
the issue of whether the “measures” in dispute are private or attributable to the Government 
of Japan with particular care, especially in light of the strong disagreement between the 
parties as to the nature of certain of these “measures”. We are also sensitive to the possibility 
that at times it may not be possible to distinguish with great precision a bright-line test of a 
measure.’ Ibid 10.60. 
729729 A simple electronic search of over thirty arbitral awards dealing with investor’s 
legitimate expectations using search terms such as “burden of proof”, “causation”, reveals 
less than six matches. 
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instances. An exception to this arbitral lacunae is thunderbird separate 
Opinion, where late Walde unearthed this salient aspect of arbitral practice 
and put it in non-provocative condour as follows:  
“The element of breach in the case of legitimate expectations under Article 1105 of the 
NAFTA does not consist in the act of creating them, but in the disappointment of 
such expectations i.e. when a government changes course after the investor made its 
investment. We need therefore to examine not only how the expectations were created, 
but also how they were breached.”730  
 
 
Thirdly, a lesson worth reiterating though with caution is the WTO Appellate 
Body’s denunciation of “subjective expectations.” Although, this thesis 
departs from the Appellate body position of rejecting legitimate expectations 
in violation complaints in toto, the Appellate body’s analysis regarding 
“Subjective expectations” reveals a salient lesson for Investment treaty 
tribunals. The Appellate body recognizes the subtle nature of legitimate 
expectations claims, where unintended expectations could find their way 
through the rubric of the protections accorded by law. Quite expectedly, the 
practice of investment treaty tribunals is now inclined towards thwarting 
against such subjective expectations.731  According to Toto tribunal; 
“…legimate expectations are more than the investor’s subjective expectations. Their 
recognition is the result of a balancing operation of the different interests at stake, 
taking into account all circumstances, including the political and socioeconomic 
conditions prevailing in the host state.”732  
 
6.2.3 Lessons Learnt from ECJ 
a. Formulation 
                                                 
730 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation  v. United Mexican States (n 7) [102]. 
731 According to Glamis Gold Tribunal; ‘a state may be tied to the objective expectations that it 
creates in order to induce investment.’ Glamis Gold v USA (n 22) [627]. 
732 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A v Republic of Lebanon (n 354) [165]. 
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Conceptually, the principle of legitimate expectations is formulated by the 
ECJ by pursuant to legal concepts of rule of law and legal certainty.733 While 
the later entails coherence, stability and planning, the former is concerned 
more with equality of litigants before the court. Apart from legal certainty 
and rule of law, the concepts of fairness, equity, trust, and reliance theory 
have all been mentioned as conceptual underpinnings to the principle of 
legitimate expectations.  
 
Juridically, the principle has been formulated and described by ECJ in Case 
112/80 Firma Anton as ‘superior rules of law’ and forming part of the 
fundamental principles of the community law. More importantly, the court 
had repeatedly maintained that the principle of legitimate expectations is part 
of general principles of law of the European community order. In addition, it 
conceptually remarked that assurances relied upon in good faith should be 
honoured. Thus, the formulation of legitimate expectations by the ECJ is 
pursuant to the firmly rooted concepts of general principles of EU law, Rule 
of law, Legal certainty, Trust, Confidence, and equity and fairness. 
 
Reflecting on the formulation of legitimate expectations by investment treaty 
tribunals, particularly, the early tribunals that grappled with the principle, 
they seem hesitant to justify the application through firmly rooted principles. 
Rather, they relied on interpretive techniques. The reason is not far-fetched, 
and can be explained due to the ad-hoc nature of the tribunals, bilateral 
                                                 
733 See chapter five supra 
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nature of the treaties, and the fact that the tribunals appear to confine their 
task to mere application of the treaties guided by customary rules of treaty 
interpretation as contained in Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. It is 
in this context, that reference by the tribunals to good faith obligation in 
formulating legitimate expectations is understood.734 Thus, in addition to 
formulating the principle of legitimate expecatations pursuant to good faith 
obligations, a lesson to be transposed is to complement the good faith 
formulation and explore other relevant jurisprudencial concepts to aid in 
accommodating varied conceivable scenarios of legitimate expectations.  
 
c. Application of Legitimate Expectations 
 
The application of legitimate expectations by ECJ is one of the most 
illuminating discoveries of this research. The research found that ECJ has two 
distinct tests in its analysis of legitimate expectations. First, the court applies 
“prudent economic operator” tests to ascertain the reasonability of an alleged 
expectations. Secondly, the court applies “balancing test” to determine 
whether there are valid policy reasons in departing from protecting legitimate 
expectations by public bodies.735   
 
                                                 
734 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2 (n 24) [154]; International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States 
Mexico (n 28) [147]; The SPP tribunal refers to ‘established principles of international law’ See; 
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3 [82–83]. 
735 See Chapter four sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively. 
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Regarding the elements of legitimate expectations, like investment treaty 
requirements, legitimate expectations must consist of Representation/Conduct, 
Reliance, Revocation resulting in damages. Part of the lessons learnt includes; 
first, evaluation of the content of representation element. The jurisprudence of 
ECJ has set a minimum test regarding ascertainment  of representation or 
conduct capable of creating legitimate expectations.  In  Societe de 
distribution mecanique  et d’ automobiles v Commission, the court held 
that assurances, conduct or representations must at the minimum reach the 
level of “creating a pardonable confusion in the mind of a person acting in good faith 
and with all the diligence required of a normally informed businessman.”736 In 
addition, silence is incapable of giving rise to expectations in circumstrances 
where clear and specific response is required,737 and where an applicant is 
relying on a conduct as basis for reliance, the claimant has a burden to show 
that the conduct is consistent.738 
 
Reflecting on the requirements of representation/conduct under investment 
treaty arbitration, the tribunals do not dwell much in considering whether a 
representation or assurance rises to the level of inducing reliance. Unlike ECJ 
where most of the legitimate expectations cases thrown out by the court are 
due to the failure of the claimants to satisfy the ‘minimum pardonable confusion 
test’. As discussed discussed in chapter five, the test is regarded is the most 
                                                 
736 Case C-44/00 Societe de distribution mecanique  et d’ automobiles v Commission ECR 1-11231 
[50]. 
737 Jean - louis Chomel v Commission  of the European Communities [1990] ECR 11-00131 [27]. 
738 Case T- 20/91 Helmut Holtbecker v Commission of the European Communities [1992] ECR 11-
2600 [53]. 
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herculean hurdle claimants have found difficult to surmount.739 The test could if 
transposed into investment treaty arbitration immensely aid the tribunals in 
clarifying the ambiguity surrounding the comstituent elemant of an assurance 
or representation capable of galvanising investor’s legitimate expectations. 
For instance, in the case Thunderbird, the test could have saved the tribunal 
and the entire regime the peril of separate opinion over what could have been 
easily tested with magnifying parameters such as the one used by ECJ. It must 
be admitted though, that the current position of Investment treaty arbitration 
regarding determination of representation/assurance or conduct is 
prosperous. In one of the articulated awards regarding the content of the 
assurances, the position remains thus; 
“…On the one hand, the form and specific content of the undertaking of stability 
invoked are crucial. No less relevant is the clarity with which the authorities have 
expressed their intention to bind themselves for the future. Similarly, the more 
specific the declaration to the address(s), the more credible the claim that such an 
addressee (the foreign investor concerned) was entitled to rely on it for the future in a 
context of reciprocal trust and good faith. Hence, this accounts for the emphasis in 
many awards on the government having given ‘assurances’, made ‘promises’, 
undertaken ‘commitments’, offered specific conditions, to a foreign investor, to the 
point of having solicited or induced that investor to make a given investment.” 
 
Secondly, another important lesson from the practice of ECJ is the legal 
regime regarding revocation or measures capable of frustrating legitimate 
expectations. The courts jurisprudence in this area as discussed in chapter five 
navigates around revocation measures that are either lawful or unlawful, 
measures that either confers benefit or imposes burden, or measures that are 
                                                 
739 Craig (n 575) 568. 
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either prospective or retrospective.740 The jurisprudence of ECJ in this regard 
is quite elaborate and prescriptive. In summary, five scenarios are worth 
recapping as an exception to the liability rule. First, where laws authorising 
decisions contains provisions for revocation of such decisions, a revocation 
pursuant to such laws could hardly violate any legitimate expectations.741 
Secondly, where EU authorities expressly retain right to revoke or withdraw a 
decisions.742 Thirdly, where decisions are discovered to have been based on 
false information. Fourthly, where there are changes in legal position. Fifthly, 
where there is change in circumstance. Revocations outside the 
aforementioned instances are prima facie likely to be in violation of legitimate 
expectations.  
 
Whether investment treaty regime could attain such level of detailed clarity 
and sophistication given the bilateral nature of the treaties, the ad-hoc nature 
of the tribunals, amidst the divergent domestic legal traditions of investment 
treaty countries is near impossible to project. However, lessons could be 
drawn, and jurisprudence can be developed over time. Investment treaty 
tribunals can, part of the lessons learnt from the ECJ, transpose the 
classification of measures being applied by the ECJ and apply same in 
arbitrating claims relating to legitimate expectations. In this regard, the 
position of few arbitral awards that begin to distinguish and qualify the 
                                                 
740 See Chapter five section 5.5.3 supra 
741 Case No 36/64 Sorema v High Authority of the ECSC [1965] ECR 00329 [4]. 
742 For instance,  in cases of temporary decisions. See Chapter V section 5.5.3 
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nature of  complained measures can be regarded as an exercise in the right 
direction. In Mobil v. Canada the tribunal while distinguishing pure 
regulatory measure from wilful frustrative measures held that mere change of 
regulation could not amount to violation of investor’s legitimate expectations. 
According to the tribunal; 
“…Article 1105 may protect an investor from changes that give rise to an unstable 
legal and business environment, but ony if those changes may be characterized as 
arbitrary or grossly unfair or discriminatory, or otherwise inconsistent with the 
customary international law standards. In a complex international and domestic 
environment, there is nothing in Article 1105 to prevent a public authority from 
changing the regulatory environment to take account of new policies and needs, even 
if some of those changes may have far-reaching consequences and effects, and even if 
they impose significant additional burdens on an investor. Article 1105 is not, and 
was never intended to amount to, a guarantee against regulatory change, or to reflect 
a requirement that an investor is entitled to expect no material changes to the 
regulatory framework within which an investment is made. Governments change, 
policies changes and rules change. These are facts of life with wich investors and all 
legal and natural persons have to live with.”743 
 
The last lesson to be drawn from the jurisprudence of the ECJ, are the factors 
ECJ is considering in refusing to uphold the applicant’s legitimate 
expectations. As discussed in chapter five, a plea for legitimate expectations 
that satisfies all the essential elements of ‘assurance’, ‘reliance’, and 
‘revocation resulting in damage’ would ordinarily be protected by the court, 
except where the expectation is affected by any of the following factors, 
namely, transitional measures/warning, Clear bargain with public 
                                                 
743 Mobil Investments Canada Inc & Murphy Oil Corp v Canada [153]; Similar conclusion was 
reached  in Continental Casualty v. Argentina where the tribunal held; ‘general legislative 
statements engender reduced expectations, especially with competentmajor international 
investors in a context where the political risk is high. Their enactment is by nature subject to 
subsequent modification,and possibly to withdrawal and cancellation, within the limits of 
respect of fundamental human rights and ius cogens;’ See; Continental Casualty v Argentina 
Case NoARB/03/9 (ICSID) [261 (i) ]. 
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authorities, adverse effect, foreseeability, Applicant’s wrong doing, General 
framework of EU rules, and lastly public interest. While detailed discussion 
on these factors had taken place in chapter V, The totality of the factors 
signifies the preoccupation of the court with determining legitimacy of 
expectations and consequent balancing with public interest concerns. The 
practice of the court regarding the balancing exercise, is to accord wide 
margin of respect to the public institutions. In justifying its position, the court 
had repeatedly maintained; 
“…community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in the choice of means needed 
to achieve their policies, traders are unable to claim that they have a legitimate 
expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by Decisions 
taken by those institutions within the limits of their discretionay power will be 
maintained.” 
 
This lesson represents one of the core issues pertaining to the research 
question posed by this thesis. Ie the issue of balancing. Admittedly, however, 
the recent practice of investment treaty tribunals, have recognized some of the 
above mentioned vitiating factors militating against the fulfillment of 
legitimate expectations. First, looking at the issue of clear bargain with public 
authorities, the investment treaty tribunals have repeatedly maintained that 
exercise of sovereign authority is a sine quo non to finding of violation of 
legitimate expectations.744 In Glamis Gold, the tribunal unequivocally 
stresses the element of bargain with public authority.745 In fact, the totality of 
                                                 
744 Duke v. Ecuador Case No. ARB/04/19 (n 73) [358]. 
745 According to the tribunal; ‘...a violation of Article 1105 based on the unsettling of 
reasonable, investment-backed expectation requires, as a threshold circumstance, at least a 
quasi-contractual relationship between the State and the investor, whereby the State has 
purposely and specifically induced the investment.’ Glamis Gold v USA (n 22) [677]. 
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tribunals that rejected formation of investor’s legitimate expectations 
pursuant to legal and administrative framework are (even if not glaringly) are 
invariably supportive of ‘clear bargain factor’.746 Secondly, the issue of adverse 
effect is similar to ‘damages as a result of revocation’.747 Thirdly, foreseeability 
factor is reflected under various elements in the analysis of legitimate 
expectations by investment treaty tribunals. The tribunal in Parkerings for 
instance refers to ‘due-diligence’ and ‘anticipation’.748 Fourthly, Claimant’s 
wrong doing  is one of the most visible factors addressed by investment treaty 
tribunals, not just in the context of legitimate expectations,749 but in the entire 
treaty standards. Fifthly, General Framework of EU Rules is also reflected in 
the practice of investment treaty tribunals in ensuring that only legitimate 
expectations not in violation of the host state law are protected.750 Lastly,  
public interest factor as discussed in  chapter V, is the most important factor to 
being considered by ECJ. The jurisprudence of ECJ as aptly described in 
Chapter five shows that, the determination of public interest is the rolling 
point from mere analysis of legitimate expectations to balancing of competing 
interests. The key lessons regarding court’s engagement with public interest 
in this regard, is the overriding nature of a genuine disclosed public 
                                                 
746 Continental Casualty v Argentina Case No.ARB/03/9 (n 26) [260]; PSEG Global Inc. &Anor v 
Republic of Turkey ICSID Case No.ARB/02/5 (n 25) [241–242]; Sempra Energy International v 
Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (n 288) [298]. 
747 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States Mexico (n 28) [147]. 
748 Parkerings-Companiet AS v Republic of Lithuania ICSID Case No.ARB/05/8 (n 23) 329–332. 
749 According to Walde; ‘There is ample jurisprudence that a legitimate expectation protected 
by Art. 1105 of the NAFTA can not be created if deception, fraud or other illicit means were 
used to obtain the ogvernmental assurance or other rights obtained from the government in 
this way.’ International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation  v. United Mexican States (n 7) [112]. 
750 Marvin Feldman v Mexico (n 702) [149]; MCI Power Group v Ecuador Case No. ARB(AF)/03/06 
(n 294) [303]. 
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interest,751while at the balancing stage, the minimalist review approach to 
public decisions adopted by the court, with a view to determine ‘whether the 
disappointment of an expectation was indispensable for the attainment of that 
objective.’752 
 
Undoubtedly, public interest considerations is one of the thorny issues raised 
in the introductory part of this thesis. The practice of ECJ regarding the 
recognition of public interest concerns in the determination of legitimate 
expectations is a lesson that can be transposed into investment treaty 
arbitration. Indeed, quite expectedly, the recent practice of investment treaty 
tribunals inclines towards allowing public interest issues in the determination 
of investor’s legitimate expectations. As pointed out in chapter three for 
instance, the tribunal in Parkerings has this to say in this regard; 
“It is each State’s undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative 
power. A state has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its own discretion. 
Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause or 
otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the 
regulatory framework existing at the time an investor made its investrment. As a 
matter of fact, any businessman or investor knows that laws will evolve over time. 
What is prohibited however is for a State to act unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably 
in the exercise of its legislative power.”753 
 
6.2.4 Lessons Learnt from ECtHR 
a. Formulation of legitimate expectations 
                                                 
751 Opinion of Advocate General in Case 74/74 Comptoir National Technique  Agricole (CNTA) SA v 
Commission of the European Communities (1975) ECR 0533. 
752752 See Chapter 5 at 5.5 (f)  
753 Parkerings-Companiet AS v Republic of Lithuania ICSID Case No.ARB/05/8 (n 23) [332]. 
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As discussed in chapter five, the jurisprudence of ECtHR is one of the most 
advanced regarding protection of legitimate expectations. The court, being a 
human rights court, tasked with adjudicating human rights disputes, views or 
rather formulates  legitimate expectations from the prism of right to property. 
One of the lessons learnt from the jurisprudence of ECtHR regarding 
legitimate expectations is the conception of legitimate expectations as right 
property. This lesson is thoroughly amplified in the analogy section of this 
chapter where investor’s legitimate expectations is presented as right-based 
principle and therefore deserves no repetition. In elaborating further 
however, the lesson that investment treaty tribunals could further drive from 
the conception of legitimate expectations as property right, is the structure of 
the right as contained in A1P1. The three basic structures as outlined in 
Chapter V regarding legitimate expectations under ECtHR are; a. Provision 
for peaceful enjoyment of possessions b. deprivation of possession c. Control 
of Use in accordance with general interest. The simultaneous formulation of 
legitimate expectations along with its visible limitations or exceptions under 
the three rules above, is a lesson for investment treaty tribunals. 
Notwithstanding the textual nature of AIP1, the tribunals can transpose this 
lesson interpretively by acknowledging the inherent limitations attached to 
investor’s legitimate expectations. Indeed, this lesson is inadvertently 
acknowledged by some tribunals, but need to be consciously concretised in 
the entire regime. In Total v Argentina the tribunal held that “…it is clear that 
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the principle of legitimate expectations is not absolute and does not amount to a 
requirement for the host state to freeze its legal system for the investor’s benefit;…”754  
 
a. Application of Legitimate Expectations 
As an embodiment of right, legitimate expectations under ECtHR is required 
to be concreate.  As discussed earlier, it is settled principle that A1P1 applies 
only to existing possessions. Therefore, mere hope, or belief of possessing 
property in future would not give aise to legitimate expectations. One of the 
key lessons from the ECtHR is founding the principle of legitimate 
expectations pursuant to right to property. In this regard, the tribunals  can 
transpose the three structures contained in AIP1 as it would help in assuaging 
the tension between protection of investor’s legitimate expectations and 
State’s legitimate regulatory and administrative functions. 
The most important lessons however, for the purpose of this thesis is the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation which formed the analytical framework of 
this thesis. Having discussed the doctrine extensively in chapter two, little can 
be said about it in this regard. It need to be reiterated however, that the 
application of the doctrine in the context of public interest exceptions is the 
most relevant for the purposes of determining investor’s legitimate 
expectations. A salient lesson in this regard, is the wide margin legitimate 
expectations attracts in the jurisprudence of ECtHR. Although investment 
treaty tribunals appear to recognise the need to allocate margin of 
                                                 
754 Total S.A. v Argentina Republic (n 341) [120]. 
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appreciation to states, such practice need to be concretised clearly and 
transposed fully from the mature jurisprudence of ECtHR. 
 
The totality of the lessons learnt from all the regimes considered can be 
transposed into an investment treaty regime. In transposing such lessons, the 
thesis deploys Saluka benchmark regarding condition precedent for the 
protection of legitimate expectations in response to the question raised by the 
thesis. As Saluka tribunal put it; “(investor’s) expectations, in order for them to be 
protected, must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the 
circumstances.”755 In unveiling the reasonableness, legitimacy, and circumstances 
levels of investor’s expectations, a three-tier formula of ascertainment, 
determination and balancing (ADB) can be said to emerge in the 
jurisprudence. The formula, apart from being an extract from the lessons 
learnt in chapters IV and V, is also a product of resistance to the peril of 
lumping in arbitral analysis by investment treaty tribunals.  As alluded to in 
Chapter I while dealing with the core problems to this research, ambiguity 
and inconsistency had taken diabolical tune through analytical lumping by 
the investment tribunals. One may wonder, what the tribunals mean, when 
they say for instance, they could not find violation of legitimate expectations. 
Is it that the expectation isn’t reasonable? not legitimate? Or simply there is 
public interest demand that trumps the legitimate expectations of an 
individual or group of individuals?. To this end, the ADB three-tier approach 
                                                 
755 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic   Partial Award (Watts, Fortier, 
Behrens) (n 15) [304]. 
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distilled from Saluka and lessons learnt, and further articulated in this thesis 
becomes imperative as a gap-filler and coherence builder in the analysis of 
investor’s legitimate expectations. 
 
6.3 Application of Legitimate Expectations: The Three Tier Approach 
This section builds upon the answer to the research question above, and seeks 
to test the answer in the light of analytical account of investor’s legitimate 
expectations presented in Chapter three and the lessons learnt analysed in 
this chapter.  As discussed in the preceding chapters, the principle of 
legitimate expectations requires that a foreign investor alleging violation of 
legitimate expectations must present a situation where a state conduct or 
representation creates reasonable and legitimate expectations on the part of 
the investor to rely on the said representation, to the extent that should the 
state fail to honour such representation the foreign investor would suffer 
damage.756 The key elements identified from the investment treaty awards 
reviewed in chapter three are; Representation/Conduct, Reliance, and 
Revocation resulting in damages.  These elements, have now been tested, 
having been applied in the jurisprudence of ICJ, WTO, ECJ and ECtHR. 
Therefore, drawing from the jurisprudence of the aforementioned courts 
particularly ECJ and ECtHR, this section distils three-tier approach as 
juridical guide for investment treaty tribunals in the application of investor’s 
legitimate expectations. The three tier approaches towards application of 
investor’s legitimate expectations are part of the lessons learnt from the 
                                                 
756 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States Mexico (n 28) [147]. 
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aforementioned mature regimes. In unveiling the three-tier approach, 
investment treaty tribunals should determine and assess investors legitimate 
expectations by cumulatively determining first, the reasonability of investor’s 
expectations, secondly, the Legitimacy of investor’s expectations and lastly, 
balancing the reasonable/legitimate expectations with regulatory and 
administrative functions of states. The order of at which the three tiers are 
recommended is for analytical coherence, except where a tribunal is 
confronted a prima facie unlawful expectation.757 In that regard, the doctrine 
of judicial economy may dictate against following the recommended order.  
 
a. Ascertainment of Reasonableness of investor’s expectations 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the ascertainment of reasonableness 
of an alleged legitimate expectation entails that a purported expectation be 
analysed by subjecting claimant’s subjective belief to an objective juridical 
assessment to enable arbitrators ascertain whether Claimant’s subjective belief 
can withstand the test of objectivity. The procedure for carrying out this task 
is fact-driven, and most often contextual.758  
                                                 
757 This is in line with the lesson learnt form the practice of ICJ. In Oil Platform, the ICJ was 
confronted with the determination of ‘use of force’ which is prima facie illegal under 
customary international law and contrary to the UN Charter. The court started its analysis in 
a reverse order, at the end of which it decided not to proceed and examine the defense of US 
regarding margin of respect. See; Oil platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of 
America), Judgement, (n 87) [paras 43–44 and 73] See also Chapter II Section 2.3 (a). 
758 While remarking on the contours of the term reasonability in the determination of 
legitimate expectations, Peterson remarks with reference to practice US courts that: ‘When the 
Court discusses this factor, it usually is considering whether the claimant reasonably relied to 
her economic detriment on an expectation that the government would not act as it did-that is, 
that it would not deprive her of the property at issue. Sometimes, however, the Court focuses 
not on the claimant’s reliance, but rather on whether the challenged law permits the Claimant 
to make some reasonable use of her tangible resource.’ Andrea L Peterson, ‘Takings Clause: 
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In distilling reasonability from the lessons learnt in the preceding chapters, 
the jurisprudence of PCIJ and ICJ regarding expectation protective principles 
clearly sets the tune for transposing well tested elements enabling 
adjudicators to determine reasonability. In Temple of Preah759, the ICJ though 
did not refer to reasonability test directly but underscores the relevance of 
‘circumstance’ and ‘reasonable period’ in the determination of acquiescence 
and by extension the entire ‘expectation-protective’ principles. Similarly, the 
ILC guiding principles regarding unilateral declarations provides that in 
determining the legal effect of unilateral declarations, courts must take into 
account the content of the declaration, the factual circumstance pursuant to 
which the declaration is made and the reactions to which the declaration 
gives rise to.760 In ascertaining reasonableness of legitimate expectations, the 
jurisprudence WTO alluded to the relevance of objective expectations as 
opposed to parties’ subjective belief. In ascertaining the objectivity of 
expectations, the jurisprudence of both Panels and Appellate body is 
unanimous that “circumstance” under which such expectation is held is vital 
and must be taken into account.  Drawing lessons from the European courts, 
namely ECJ and ECtHR, provides for the litmus test in assessing reasonability 
                                                                                                                                            
In Search of Underlying Principles--Part I--A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 
The’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 0, 1320. 
759 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits, (n 415). 
760 ILC, ‘Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of 
Creating Legal Obligations: ILC Report (58th Session, 2006)’, (n 473) Article 7. 
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of an expectation. Both courts do inquire, whether an informed, prudent and 
discriminating person would have had such expectations.761  
 
Distilling further from the lessons learnt, and in recapitulating the framework 
for ascertaining reasonability of investor’s legitimate expectations, the totality 
of arbitral awards discussed earlier provided for the requirement of 
reasonableness in the determination of investor’s legitimate expectations.762 In 
Duke v. Ecuador the tribunal developed a detailed framework of defining 
some of the constituent elements of reasonableness of investor’s legitimate 
expectations. According to the tribunal:763  
“The assessment of reasonableness or legitimacy must take into account all 
circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the 
political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the host state. 
In addition such expectations must arise from the conditions that the state offered the 
investor and the latter must have relied upon them when deciding to invest.” 
 
Similarly, the tribunal in Saluka clearly held that mere claimant’s subjective 
motivations and considerations could not ground plea for legitimate 
expectations. A similar conclusion was reached in EDF v Romania, where the 
tribunal held that; 
“Legitimate expectations cannot be solely the subjective expectations of the investor. 
They must be examined as the expectations at the time the investment is made, as they 
                                                 
761 Case C-426/10 Bell & Rose BV, v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks 
and Designs) (OHIM) ECR 00000 [56]. 
762 Bayindir Insaat Turizm ve sanayi AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29 [192]. 
763 Duke v. Ecuador Case No. ARB/04/19 (n 73) [340]. 
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may be deduced from all the circumstances of the case, due regard being paid to the 
host State’s power to regulate its economic life in the public interest.”764 
  
Therefore, investment treaty tribunals could as a starting point in the 
ascertainment of reasonability of investor’s legitimate expectations begin with 
identifying an objective ‘expectations’ that triggers reliance on the part of the 
foreign investor. In other words, the journey of legitimate expectations should 
not start with the subjective belief of the claimant, rather with the recognition 
of an objective ‘expectations’ or assurance forming the basis of claimant’s 
reliance. It is the state that induces reliance pursuant to an objective 
assurance/conduct or regulatory and administrative framework.765 In this 
regard, the factual determination of an assurance/conduct or regulatory and 
administrative framework must have been ascertained. Where a claimant 
failed to show an objective basis for reliance such as ‘assurance’ ‘promise’ 
‘conduct’ or ‘legal and administrative framework’ worthy of reasonable reliance, 
the tribunal can easily decide against such plea due to the absence of a 
fundamental element in establishing violation of legitimate expectations. 
Although, the analysis is cyclical, but the main task of the tribunal in 
ascertaining reasonability of an expectation is testing the reasonability of the 
                                                 
764 EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania Case No. ARB/05/13 (n 306) [66]. 
765 According to Thunderbird, “…legitimate expectations relates, within the context of the 
NAFTA framework, to a situation where a Contracting Party‘s conduct creates reasonable 
and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said 
conduct, such that a failure by the NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could cause the 
investor (or investment) to suffer damages.’ International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. 
United Mexican States Mexico (n 28) [147]; See; Mobil Investments Canada Inc. & Murphy Oil Corp 
v. Canada (n 726) [152]; In Glamis Gold, the tribunal held that; ‘...a State may be tied to the 
objective expectations that it creates in order to induce investment.’ Glamis Gold v USA (n 22) 
[621]. 
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Claimant’s reliance with a view to ascertain how reasonable is the reliance. 
Indeed, flowing from the totality of arbitral awards considered in this thesis, 
reasonableness of legitimate expectations can be understood as a combination 
of subjective knowledge of the Claimant in the light of factual surrounding 
circumstance and taking into account regulatory/administrative framework, 
and ‘political, socioeconomic, cultural, and historical conditions’ of the host state at 
the time of making an investment. Investment treaty tribunals can therefore 
ascertain reasonableness of investor’s legitimate expectations by applying 
prudent economic operator test which is basically in tandem with Duke v Peru 
test regarding the experience of the foreign investor, the circumstance at the 
host state as defined in Duke v Ecuador and in the light of subsequent 
developments alluded to in Waste Management. Therefore, while ‘prudent 
economic operator test’ or ‘diligent and prudent investor test’ and ‘surrounding 
circumstance’ are mere evaluative tests and filters, the totality of the elements 
of legitimate expectations discussed in chapter III, ie 
(Assurance/conduct/framework, reliance, revocation resulting in damage) 
are the required elements needed to establish reasonable expectations. 
 
b. Determination of Legitimacy of investor’s expectations 
Having provided a framework for ascertaining the reasonableness of 
investor’s legitimate expectations, the next tier is the determination of  
legitimacy of the reasonable expectations. Indeed, both reasonableness and 
legitimacy elements of expectations are neither completely detached nor 
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operate in clinical isolation. The concern in the determination of the 
legitimacy of a reasonable expectations is the justified reasons for departing 
from protecting such expectations. As part of the lessons learnt from the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, two essential factors affecting legitimacy of an 
expectation are, legal constraints and public interests concerns. In the 
determination of legal constraints likely to affect the protection of legitimate 
expectations, the practice of courts reveals that courts do take into account 
range of factors sanctioned by a given legal order with a view  to determine 
whether such factors could militate against protection of a reasonable 
expectations. For instance, in the case of EU legal order, factors such as 
warning/transitional measures,766 bargain of obligation with public 
authorities,767 adverse effect of revocation,768 Foreseeability of revocation,769 
Applicant’s wrong doing/bad conduct,770 lack of conformity with the general 
framework of EU rules771 have all been regarded as legitimate factors 
depriving reasonable expectations any form of legitimacy. Indeed, while some 
of the factors are statute based others are products of judicial interpretation. 
 
Reflecting on the above mentioned lessons from the ECJ, investment treaty 
tribunals can determine the legitimacy of a reasonable expectation by taking 
                                                 
766 Case 90/77 Hellmut Stimming KG v Commission of the European Communities (1978) ECR  0995 
[6]. 
767 Case 84/78 Ditta Angelo Tomadini Snc v Ammministrazione delle finanze dello stalo (supra) [21]. 
768 Case 100/74 Societe CAM SA v Commission (1975) ECR 1393. 
769 T- 264/07 CSL Behring GmbH v European Commission and European Medicines Agency (2010) 
ECR 00000. 
770 Case C-179/00 Weidacher v Bundesminister fur Land- und Forstwirtschaft (2002) ECR 1-00501. 
771 Case 278/00 Hellenic Republic v Commission (2000) ECR 1-03997. 
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into account the above mentioned factors. Traces of most of the factors above 
are currently reflected in the jurisprudence of investment treaty arbitration. In 
Metalpar v Argentina the tribunal in rejecting legitimate expectations claims 
compared the fact of the case with classical legitimate expectations cases and 
concluded thus; 
“In this specific case, there was no bid, license, permit or contract of any kind between 
Argentina and Claimants, and the Tribunal considers that there were no legitimate 
expectations entertained by Claimants that were breached by Argentina.” 
 
The reasoning of the tribunal clearly shows an analytical semblance with 
ECJ’s “Clear bargain with public authorities’ factor as decided in Tomadini772 
supra. Other tribunals that begin to include some of the afore mentioned 
legitimacy factors includes Parkerings,773 Continental Casualty,774 etc. 
With regard to the second factor, namely public interest concerns, the juridical 
practice discussed in chapters II, IV, and V, shows that such determination 
involves weighing between protection of legitimate expectations on one hand, 
and assessment of the public interest on the other hand. Such exercise, 
invariably unties the third tier for applying investor’s legitimate expectations. 
Ie balancing. 
 
                                                 
772 Case 84/78 Ditta Angelo Tomadini Snc v Ammministrazione delle finanze dello stalo (supra) (n 
750). 
773 Parkerings-Companiet AS v Republic of Lithuania ICSID Case No.ARB/05/8 (n 23) [323 & 332]. 
774 Continental Casualty v Argentina Case No.ARB/03/9 (n 26) [259]. 
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c. Balancing investor’s expectations with the state’s regulatory and 
administrative functions. 
Having determined the existence of a reasonable/legitimate expectations, in 
the absence of any genuine public interest concern, the tribunals may likely 
have no other duty but to protect the proven investor’s legitimate 
expectations. The issue of balancing arises where the host state presents a 
justification for revocation of investor’s legitimate expectations pursuant to a 
purported public interest concern or the case as presented by the Claimant 
sought to challenge a state regulatory or administrative measure. This is the 
scenario that presents the third-tier to the analysis of investor’s legitimate 
expectations. 
 
As discussed earlier,775 the crux of the public law approach to investment 
treaty arbitration lies partly in the judicial  review function of investment 
treaty tribunals. For the purposes of this thesis, such function arises when the 
tribunals are called upon to balance investor’s legitimate expectations with 
host state’s legitimate regulatory and administrative functions. In this regard, 
the doctrine of margin of appreciation fits well with both public law and 
public international law nature of investment treaty arbitration in general and 
the application of investor’s legitimate expectations in particular. Matters 
relating to public or safeguarding public interest, such as human rights 
protection, environmental protections, public health, rising taxes,  etc which 
                                                 
775 See Chapter II 
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all fall within the public image of states are the thorny triggers to the genuine 
quest for balancing between investor’s legitimate expectations and state 
regulatory and administrative functions. As set out in Chapter II, the doctrine 
of margin of appreciation is undoubtedly one of the sophisticated applicable 
standards of review engaged by many international adjudicative bodies. It is 
a suitable balancing tool for adjudication and arbitration. Traces of the 
doctrine as unveiled, has been found in the jurisprudence of PCIJ/ICJ, WTO, 
ECJ, and Regional Human Rights adjudicative bodies.776 It has been used as a 
criterion for determining the extent to which states particularly within human 
rights regime may derogate from protected human rights to meet the 
overridden public interest. As a balancing mechanism, it recognises 
protection of private right while justifying the host state’s right to regulate ‘in 
good faith’. It recognises the autonomy of the state and accorded some 
flexibility under which state can act for public interest without incurring 
responsibility. It is applied in such a way that where state crosses a certain 
threshold or acted in a disproportionate manner, then the holder of a private 
right can seek legal redress and possibly get compensated.  
 
                                                 
776 For an analysis of factors relevant to the use of margin of appreciation by the ECtHR see; 
Yourow (n 65); R. St. J. Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’, The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Kluwer 1993); For criticisms surrounding the margin of 
appreciation, see; Jeffrey A Brauch, ‘Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004) 11 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 113, 113; According to Benvenisti the doctrine of margin of appreciation is 
undermining the universality of human rights, see; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, 
Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1998) 31 New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 843, 843. 
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In engaging with the doctrine of margin of appreciation, investment treaty 
tribunals could pursuant to Article 31 (3) (c) ‘systemic integration’ and their 
inherent adjudicative powers transpose and apply the doctrine in balancing 
between  of investor’s legitimate expectations and state’s administrative 
functions. Indeed, the tribunals, in Methanex,777 Saluka,778 and Tecmed779 
have all stirred the quest for balancing as opposed to vertical application of 
investment protections including legitimate expectations. In all the three 
awards, the tribunals deployed terms such as deference, proportionality and 
even margin of appreciation without however elaborating on how they 
should be applied. In Toto, the tribunal has this to say regarding the 
relevance of balancing in the context of investor’s legitimate expectations; 
“…legimate expectations are more than the investor’subjective expectations. Their 
recognition is the result of a balancing operation of the different interests at stake, 
taking into account all circumstances, including the political and socioeconomic 
conditions prevailing in the host state.”780  
  
 
a. Deference Balancing in the determination of legitimate expectations: 
As discussed in chapter II, deference connotes a balancing between the 
intrusive powers of investment treaty tribunals and sovereign powers of 
states. The essence of deference is to delineate the zone of legality where 
public bodies can function without undue interference by supervisory 
                                                 
777 Methanex Corporation v USA (n 25) [265]. 
778 where the tribunal concluded that ‘in determining whether to impose forced 
administration, the regulator enjoyed a margin of appreciation’ see; Saluka Investments BV 
(The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic   Partial Award (Watts, Fortier, Behrens) (n 15) [272]. 
779 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2 (n 24) [122]. 
780 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A v Republic of Lebanon (n 354) [165]. 
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adjudicative bodies.  Contextualizing deference to legitimate expectations 
scenario entails that where a foreign investor alleges violation of legitimate 
expectations, and the host state presents a public interest justification for the 
revocation or frustration of investor’s expectations, the tribunals should start 
first by defining the breadth of deference the host state should enjoy with a 
view to function as a sovereign state without  incurring responsibility. Indeed, 
unless manifest unreasonableness can be shown, states usually enjoy wide 
margin in regulating or carrying out administrative functions  regarding 
economic related matters. In this regard, investment treaty tribunals can 
simply analyse superficially whether a given measure, action or conduct is 
backed by law. If the answer is in the affirmative, the tribunal may simply 
proceed to examine other elements relating to proportionality. To reiterate, 
the balancing aspect in this regard, is between the intrusive powers of 
investment treaty tribunals as supervisory bodies on one hand, and the 
legitimate regulatory and administrative powers of states on the other hand. 
As  SD Myers tribunal held in reference to deference to the host state; 
“determination [that Article 1105 has been breached] must be made in light of the 
high measure of deference that international law generally extends to the right of 
domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders.”781 
 
 
b. Proportionality Balancing in the determination of legitimate 
expectations: 
                                                 
781 SD Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada (n 268) [263]. 
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Although proportionality is a judicial review tool of its own, in the context  of 
margin of appreciation, it is resorted to as one of the dual elements of  margin 
of appreciation. Proportionlity connotes balancing between competing 
interests. As discussed in Chapter II the balancing function of proportionality 
is to pair between private interest on one hand and overall public interest on 
the other hand.  In applying proportionality to the analysis of investor’s 
legitimate expectations, the tribunals need to apply suitability, necessity and 
proportionality tests to a given state measure or conduct and further 
determine whether the measure shall override investor’s legitimate 
expectations or not. In applying suitability test, the analysis requires that the 
state measure must suit the purpose sought to be achieved by the measure. In 
applying necessity test, the  focus is to ensure that the measure is justified 
only in the absence of less restrictive measure to achieve the sought objective.  
Lastly, proportionality entails the actual balancing, taking into account the 
deference given to the state pursuant to legitimacy test. In Tecmed, the 
tribunal applied both proportionality and deference balancing tests as 
follows: 
 
“Although the analysis starts at the due deference owing to the State when 
defining the issues that affect its public policy or the interests of society as a 
whole, as well as the actions that will be implemented to protect such values, 
such situation does not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal, without thereby 
questioning such due deference, from examining the actions of the State in 
light of Article 5 (1) of the Agreement to determine whether such measures are 
reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation of economic rights and 
the legitimate expectations of who suffered such deprivation. There must be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight 
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imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any 
expropriatory measure…”782  
 
 
6.4 Justification for balancing Investor’s Legitimate Expectations with 
State’s Regulatory and Administrative functions 
In justifying balancing investor’s legitimate expectations with state’s 
regulatory and administrative functions from the prism of margin of 
appreciation, the thesis argues that applying margin of appreciation to 
investor’s legitimate expectations analysis should not be seen as an additive 
to the elements of ‘reasonability’ and ‘legitimacy’ of investor’s expectations.783 
Rather, while ‘reasonability’ and ‘legitimacy’ tests are taking place within the 
domain of establishing legally protected expectations the Margin of 
Appreciation balancing should be understood to be  taking place at the level 
of reconciling public interest with a legitimate right. The reason being, the 
idea of public interest in itself has the potential of becoming ‘overriding’ in 
the same manner investor’s reasonable and legitimate expectations could 
either ‘trump’ or be treated as analogous to absolute right, if not tamed.  the 
following graph illustrates the justification for striking a balance between 
investor’s legitimate expectations and state’s legitimate regulatory and 
                                                 
782
 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v The United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB 
(AF)/00/2 (ICSID) [para 122]. 
783 For a reflective argument, see Glamis Gold where the tribunal held as follows; ‘…the 
Tribunal finds the standard of deference to already be present in the standard as stated, 
rather than being additive to that standard. The idea of deference is found in the modifiers 
“manifest” and “gross” that make this standard a stringent one; it is found in the idea that a 
breach requires something greater than  mere arbitrariness, something that is surprising, 
shocking, or exhibits a manifest lack of reasoning.’ Glamis Gold v USA (n 66) [617]. 
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administrative functions and highlighting further the insufficiency of 
legitimate expectations to balance itself alone without the aid of a balancing 
tool such as margin of appreciation. In providing the justification, the thesis 
relies on koskenniemian illustrations of Objectivity vs Subjectivity, Justice vs 
Consensus and Descention vs Ascention784 to aid in conveying the 
justification findings. 785 
                                                 
784 According to Koskenniemi, an obligation in international affairs can be argued in two 
ways. “One argument traces them down to justice, common interests, progress, nature of the 
world community or other similar ideas to which it is common that they are anterior, or 
superior, to State behaviour, will or interest. They are given normative code which precedes 
the State and effectively dictates how a state is allowed to behave, what it may will and what 
its legitimate interests can be. Another argument bases order and obligation on State 
behaviour, will or interest. It takes as given the existence of States and attempts to construct a 
normative order on the basis of the ‘factual’ State behaviour, will and interest. Following 
Walter Ullmann, I shall call these the ‘descending' and “ascending” patterns of justification.’ 
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) 59. 
785 The graph illustrates the outcome of reading margin of appreciation into investor’s 
legitimate expectations. It also explains the interaction of investor’s legitimate expectations 
with margin of appreciation from Koskenniemian terminologies of justice/descention vs 
consensus/ascention on one hand, and subjectivity vs Objectivity on the other hand. In 
Koskenniemian terminology some principles are products and appeal to justice and therefore 
descends as a matter of quality. Others are products of and appeal to consensus and therefore 
ascend in their quality. Here goes the explanation. Legitimate expectations as legal principle 
belongs  to justice domain as opposed  to consensus. Its appelations to property right, in 
terms of claim, possession, and entitlement renders its plea as  plea for justice. The creation of 
Legitimate expectations has two cardinal elements, namely assurance and reliance. The 
determination of existence of an assurance or conduct is objective, as rationality test is 
engaged in the determination. Acting upon an  assurance or conduct is however a product of 
subjective understanding of the party relying on the assurance. Indeed, the determination of 
legitimacy of a given expectation  would entail objectivisation of the subjective reliance to the 
level of legitimacy, at which level, objectivity reigns. Margin of Appreciation on the other 
hand as a legal doctrine belongs to the consensus domain as opposed to justice. Its 
distributive element and appellations of respect, and sub-sumption, renders its operation  a 
product of consensus. It belongs to the domain of understanding, respect, appreciation  as 
opposed to claim of right, possession or entitlement. Operationalising Margin of Appreciation 
entails engaging its two cardinal functions and elements, namely deference and 
proportionality. While deference element is subjective (belief), the proportionality element is 
objective (rationality). Unlike legitimate expectations where legitimacy test is run, there is no 
step further for margin of appreciation, except balancing which entails both margin of 
appreciation and legitimate expectations. Therefore, analyzing an objective legitimate 
expectations from  the prism of  margin of appreciation with dual objective and subjective 
tools would result in the reduction or elimination of arbitrariness. The explanation  is aimed 
to show the insufficiency of legitimate expectations alone to balance itself without the aid of 
legal doctrine such as margin of appreciation. If legitimate expectations were to operate alone 
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In addition to the above, and having outlined the framework of reasonability, 
legitimacy and balancing of investor’s legitimate expectations, and drawing 
on the lessons learnt from general international law, WTO, EU law and 
European Human rights law, the next  section advances the justification for 
balancing investor’s legitimate expectations with state’s legitimate regulatory 
and administrative functions from the prism of margin of appreciation.  
 
First, Justice/fairness, could offer a transcendental explanation of balancing 
between investor’s legitimate expectations and state’s legitimate regulatory 
and administrative functions.  The appeal to balance competing rights or 
                                                                                                                                            
relying on its internal checks, the end result would lead to either ‘absoluteness of right’ or 
something similar to ‘right trumps’. 
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obligations by an adjudicative body is an appeal to be fair and just in the 
determination of a given dispute.786 In Vivendi v Argentina the tribunal 
captures the appeal of balancing to just and fairness.787 According to the 
tribunal; 
“…in interpreting the meaning of fair and equitable treatment to be accorded to 
investors, the Tribunal must balance the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the 
Claimants with Argentina’s right to regulate the provision of a vital public 
service.”788 
 
Secondly, practical reasons could as well offer justification why tribunals 
should engage in balancing competing interests or values between foreign 
investors and host states. Investment treaty tribunals like other international 
courts or tribunals are required to provide reasons for their findings. As 
public international law tribunals, they are bound to state at least immediate 
reasons behind their findings.789 For instance, Article 48 (3) ICSID provides 
that “…award shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal, and shall 
state the reasons upon which it is based.” Some of the reasons offered by 
international courts generally and investment treaty tribunals include 
Institutional competence, Democratic legitimacy and Diversity. 
                                                 
786 In Belgian Linguistics Case, the court caught the glimpse of the transcendental theory as 
follows: ‘…The Convention therefore implies a just balance between the protection of the 
general interest of the Community and the respect due to fundamental human rights while 
attaching particular importance to the latter.’ Belgium v Belgium A 6 (1968); EHRR 252, (n 95); 
Similarly, in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden, the court further refers to the transcendental 
just/fairness as follows: ‘…the court must determine whether a fair balance was struck 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights…’Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (n 121). 
787 See; Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic   Partial Award (Watts, 
Fortier, Behrens) (n 15) [306]. 
788 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, v The Argentine Republic [2010] [236]. 
789 William Michael Reisman, The Reasons Requirement in International Investment Arbitration: 
Critical Case Studies (BRILL 2008). 
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a. Institutional competence 
Institutional competence as a practical justification to the balancing of 
investor’s legitimate expectations with state’s legitimate regulatory and 
administrative functions from the prism of margin of appreciation recognises 
that courts and tribunals generally are institutionally incapacitated to engage 
in scrutinizing complex public interest dimensions of many regulatory and 
administrative functions of states. In Glamis Gold, the Respondent argued 
that its not the task of the tribunal to become archaeologists or ethnographers 
with a view to draw a definitive conclusion. The Tribunal agreeing with this 
submission held; 
“It is not the role of this Tribunal, or any international tribunal, to supplant its own 
judgement of underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified domestic 
agency. Indeed, our only task is to decide whether Claimant has adequately proven 
that the agency’s review and conclusions exhibit a gross denial of justice, manifest 
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a ,complete lack of due process, evident 
discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons so as to rise to the level of a breach of the 
customary international law standard embedded in Article 1105.”790 
 
The above reasoning is a reflection of part of the lessons learnt from the 
jurisprudence of ECJ in its application of Margin of Appreciation. In United 
Kingdom v Council (Working time Directive) The ECJ while applying the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation held: 
“The Council must be allowed a wide discretion in an area which, as here, involves 
the legislature in making social policy choices and requires it to carry out complex 
assessments.’791 
                                                 
790 Glamis Gold v USA (n 22) [779]. 
791 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council (Working time Directive) (n 101). 
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b. Democratic Legitimacy 
Democratic legitimacy entails that public institutions have a legitimate 
mandate to engage in carrying out certain tasks mandated by law. The source 
of legitimacy in discharging such publc functions is the democratic choices 
made by people in either electing, appointing, or mandating the public 
personnel and the institutions to carryout such public tasks. An investment 
treaty tribunal or any other international tribunal is lacking such mandate. 
When called upon to adjudicate over a dispute involving legislative or 
executive measure of a state, a caution or deference is needed to avoid 
substituting the political choices made of society or their legitimate 
representatives. One of the reasons alluded to in chapter II in this regard, is 
while individual members of society reserve their right to express their 
discontent on political choices made on their behalf against their 
representatives in democratic polls, they do not possess any retaliatory tool 
against judicial bodies, particularly, international arbitrators and adjudicators, 
when the later meddled into such domestic policies.  
Therefore, investment treaty tribunals can justify recourse to the doctrine of 
margin of appreciation in balancing investor’s legitimate expectations on the 
ground of democratic legitimacy. In SD Myers, the tribunal alluded to this 
justification in the following terms; 
“Governments have to make many potentially controversial choices. In doing so, they 
may appear to have made mistakes, to have misjudged the facts, proceeded on the basis 
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of a misguided economic or sociological theory, placed too much emphasis on some 
social values over others and adopted solutions that are ultimately ineffective or 
counterproductive. The ordinary remedy, if there were one, for errors in modern 
governments in through internal political and legal processes, including elections.”792 
 
c. Diversity 
Diversity, pluralism and heterogenous nature of global communities is one of 
the fundamental justifications why margin of appreciation should be resorted 
to whenever sovereign functions are to be evaluated by international 
tribunals. From the framework set out in this research, investor’s legitimate 
expectations is conceived from human rights prism and as principle not 
rule.793 Therefore, diversity in this context breeds flexibility in terms of 
attaining a commitment including fulfilment of investor’s legitimate 
expectations.  While some of the regimes analysed in this thesis such as WTO, 
regional human rights law, and EU law have diversity appellations 
entrenched in their system, investment treaty tribunals (for now) would have 
to rely on judicial activism to transpose and recognise elements of diversity in 
the context of balancing between investor’s expectations and state 
administrative functions. At the heart of diversity justification is the variation 
in terms of level of development among the comity of nations. The diversity 
factor can be starkly felt in the context of international investment where a 
foreign investor, mostly from developed countries enters developing country 
or economy in transition. The level of regulatory and administrative maturity 
                                                 
792 SD Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada (n 268) [261]. 
793 On the discussion on principles and rules, see Chapter II 
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in the host state can hardly be compared with that of the home state of the 
foreign investor.  In Generation Ukraine the tribunal factored diversity 
justification and held as follows: 
“…it is relevant to consider the vicissitudes of the economy of the state that is host 
state to the investment in determining the investor’s legitimate expectations,…The 
Claimant was attracted to the Ukraine because of the possibility of earning a rate of 
return on its capital in significant excess to the other investment opportunities in 
more developed economies. The Claimant thus invested in the Ukraine on notice of 
both the prospects and the potential pitfalls.”794 
 
The above mentioned practical justifications are not exhaustive.  They 
however provide a moderate premise upon which investment treaty tribunals 
could adduce reasons in justifying why the tribunals should apply margin of 
appreciation with a view to balance investor’s legitimate expectations and 
state’s legitimate regulatory and administrative functions. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the answer to the research question raised by this thesis. 
It may be recalled, that in chapter I, the thesis asked the question of ‘How can 
investment treaty tribunals formulate and apply investor’s legitimate 
expectations taking into account state’s legitimate regulatory and 
administrative functions?’ In answering the research question, the chapter 
touches on the associated sub questions though most of which had been 
answered in the previous chapters. Accordingly, in the light of the lessons 
learnt from PCIJ/ICJ, WTO, ECJ, and ECtHR, taking into account the Saluka 
                                                 
794 Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine [2003] [20.37]. 
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benchmark, the chapter answers the research question as follows: Investment 
treaty tribunals can formulate and apply investor’s legitimate expectations 
whilst taking into account state’s legitimate regulatory and administrative 
functions by: 
a. Ascertaining the reasonableness of investor’s legitimate expectations 
b. Determining the legitimacy of investor’s legitimate expectations 
c. Balancing between legitimate and reasonable expectations on one hand 
and legitimate regulatory and administrative functions of states on the 
other hand by applying the doctrine of margin of appreciation.  
 
In ascertaining the reasonableness of investor’s legitimate expectations, the 
tribunals shall be guided by ‘diligent and prudent investor’ test. In 
determining the legitimacy of investor’s expectations, the tribunals shall be 
guided by identification of legal constraints and public interest concerns that 
could militate against the fulfillment of investor’s legitimate expectations. 
Lastly, in balancing between investor’s expectations and state’s legitimate 
regulatory and administrative functions, the tribunals should apply the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation as a balancing tool taking into account the 
doctrine’s dual functions of deference and proportionality. 
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Chapter VII: Summary of Findings, Contribution & Conclusion 
 
Summary of Findings: 
Against the background of inconsistent and incoherent formulation and 
application of investor’s legitimate expectations, the thesis formulated the 
research question of how can investment treaty tribunals formulate and apply 
investor’s legitimate expectations, taking into account host states’ regulatory 
and administrative functions. At the heart of the research question is the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation considered in this thesis as a balancing 
tool. The doctrine, as argued in the thesis, can through its dual balancing 
functions of deference and proportionality enable investment treaty tribunals 
to first, vertically balance between sovereign powers of states on one hand, 
and judicial powers of investment treaty tribunals on the other hand. 
Secondly, the doctrine can horizontally balance between investor’s legitimate 
expectations on one hand, and competing public interests on the other hand. 
A combination of doctrinal and comparative legal analysis led to analysing 
the jurisprudence of PCIJ/ICJ, WTO, ECJ, ECtHR, regarding both the doctrine 
of margin of appreciation and the principle of legitimate expectations. In 
identifying the key elements of investor’s legitimate expectations, the thesis 
found that investor’s legitimate expectations as understood by investment 
treaty tribunals connotes a situation ‘where a state through an assurance or 
conduct can create a reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an 
investor to act in reliance on the said assurance or conduct; failure by the state 
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to honour those expectations could cause the investor to suffer damages.’ In 
distilling the requisite elements needed to establish investor’s legitimate 
expectations, four essential elements have been established from the arbitral 
awards analysed in chapter III. These elements are; a. 
Representation/conduct/legal framework b. Reliance, c. Frustration, d. 
Damages. The research however, found that there are sub-elements/factors 
needed to either establish the aforementioned elements or refine their 
application. Given the developmental stage of investment treaty arbitration as 
a whole, the thesis deem it fit to search outward the investment treaty regime 
to transpose the needed element towards refining the principle on one hand, 
and to identifying a key analytical framework that would enable both the 
research and investment treaty tribunals to engage in balancing between 
investor’s legitimate expectations and state’s legitimate regulatory and 
administrative functions. 
  
From the general international law jurisprudence, the thesis found that the 
jurisprudence of ICJ regarding legitimate expectations is embedded in various 
associated principles such as abuse of right, estoppel, acquiescence and 
unilateral actions and conducts.795 The totality of the principles has a shared 
function of protecting legitimate expectations. In formulating the principles, 
the ICJ relied on the concept of good faith in articulating its jurisprudence 
regarding the ‘expectation protective’ principles. In applying the ‘expectation-
protective’ principles the thesis found that the four identified elements of 
                                                 
795
 See Chapter IV at 4.1 
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investor’s legitimate expectations are reflected in different forms among the 
principles. The thesis found that analogy has played a significant role in the 
jurisprudence of ICJ regarding cementing the minor differences among the 
totality of the expectations-protective principles. With regard to the 
application of margin of appreciation, the thesis found that the jurisprudence 
of both PCIJ and ICJ provides for the principle of margin of appreciation. In 
the plethora of cases discussed, both courts have alluded to the horizontal and 
vertical balancing functions of margin of appreciation.796 
 
Regarding the WTO jurisprudence, The thesis found that legitimate 
expectations are well-embedded in the jurisprudence. The formulation of the 
principle is pursuant to the concept of good faith and Pacta Sunt Servanda 
provided for under Article 26 VCLT. In addition, the thesis found that the 
principle of legitimate expectations is conceptually ingrained in the 
Constitutional/collectivism approach. As discussed,797 the approach views 
expectations of trade-related behaviour as the core in the WTO jurisprudence. 
With regard to the application of legitimate expectations, the research found 
that the application of legitimate expectations, though featured in three 
scenarios of violation complaints, non-violation complaints, and adopted 
panel and appellate body reports, but is mainly invoked in the first two 
scenarios, namely Violation complaints and non-violation complaints. In 
addition, the thesis found that the essential elements of legitimate 
                                                 
796
 See Chapter II at 2.4 (a)  
797
 See Chapter IV at 4.2.2 
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expectations are; assurance/conduct, reliance, and revocation resulting in 
damages. As argued in chapter IV, assurance/conduct in the context of WTO 
may take the form of benefit accruing to WTO member states, while 
revocation may be in form of Nullification and Impairment. Moreover, with 
regard to the doctrine of margin of appreciation, the thesis found that the 
WTO standards of review functions in a manner analogous with the doctrine 
of margin of appreciation. The WTO standard of review provides for both 
deferential and proportionality balancing.798 
 
While analysing the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the thesis found that the court 
formulates and applies the principle of legitimate expectations pursuant to 
the general principles of European Union Law, and the doctrine of legal 
certainty. Conceptually, the formulation is justified pursuant to the concept of 
rule of law. The thesis further finds that in the course of its application of the 
principle, the ECJ has devised a methodology of ascertaining most of the 
elements of legitimate expectations with relevant tests to guide the court. For 
instance, the court evaluates applicant’s ‘reliance’ in the light of “prudent 
economic operator test”. The court also evaluates an 
assurance/representation or conduct in the light of ‘pardonable confusion’ 
test.799 In addition, the thesis found that there are other factors affecting the 
legitimacy of expectations which the court usually consider before deciding 
whether a legitimate expectation must be protected by the court. These factors 
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have been dealt with in details in chapter V. Indeed, where issues of public 
interest are raised, the court embarks on balancing exercise. In carrying such 
exercise, the court deploys proportionality with wide margin of appreciation 
to public bodies and EU institutions in economic related matters.  
 
The application of margin of appreciation by the court as indicated above 
concerns when the court engages in balancing. The thesis found that the court 
applies the dual functional elements of margin of appreciation, namely, 
deference and proportionality. In its application of proportionality, the court 
is concerned with whether a revocation a measure is manifestly 
inappropriate, and if the measure is in respect of social or economic policies of 
the EU, the court usually accords wide margin of discretion to public bodies 
and institutions.800  
 
In the context of human rights jurisprudence, the research found that the 
principle of legitimate expectations is formulated pursuant to the concept of 
possession under right to property. The jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights in this regard helps in recognizing the types of expectations 
that tribunals should accept and recognize as worthy of claiming legally.801 
More importantly, the thesis found that the legitimate expectations pursuant 
to right to property are not absolute, rather subject to justified exceptions. In 
addition, the thesis found that the doctrine of margin of appreciation is 
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largely developed by human rights jurisprudence. In this regard, the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights formed part of the 
analytical framework of the whole research given its extensive grounding of 
the doctrine of margin of appreciation.802   
 
Contribution to Knowledge: 
The main task of this thesis has been to make a contribution to the body of 
knowledge in the formulation and application of investor’s legitimate 
expectations in investment treaty arbitration. The thesis begins by asking the 
research question of How could investment treaty tribunals formulate and 
apply investor’s legitimate expectations taking into account states’ legitimate 
regulatory and administrative functions.  In answering the research question, 
the thesis deploys the doctrine of margin of appreciation as an intellectual 
lens to provide a prism through which the principle of investor’s legitimate 
expectations can be analysed. In addition, the thesis made a case for looking 
at the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the World Trade 
Organization, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of 
Human Rights with a view to transpose lessons learnt from those regimes. 
 
Having reviewed the jurisprudence of the ICJ, WTO, ECJ and ECtHR 
regarding legitimate expectations and margin of appreciation, the thesis 
assembled the entire findings regarding the doctrine in Chapter VI. The 
findings include that the formulation and application of legitimate 
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expectations by the ICJ are rooted in the principle of Good Faith. In that 
regard, all good faith related principles share a common function of the 
fulfillment of expectations reasonably relied upon in good faith. The thesis 
also found that the jurisprudence of the WTO also applies the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations. Both Appellate body and Panel have formulated the 
principle pursuant to good faith and applied the principle accordingly. The 
jurisprudence of both ECJ and ECtHR also proves that the principle has been 
extensively applied by the two European Courts. The formulation of the 
principle by the ECJ was pursuant to rule of law and general principles of EU, 
while the ECtHR was pursuant to right to property.  
 
The first contribution of this research to the existing knowledge of investor’s 
legitimate expectations is in the formulation of the principle. Little attention is 
being paid to the process of formulation of legal principle. As the thesis 
proves, the principle of legitimate expectations can be formulated as right-
based principle. Two right-based approaches have been discussed in chapter 
VI. These approaches are human rights analogy and third party beneficiary 
analogy. Both approaches as argued in the thesis, harmonizes with public law 
approach and public international law identity of investment treaty 
arbitration regime. Therefore, investment treaty tribunals could pursuant to 
the two analogies of human right and third party beneficiary analogy 
formulate the principle of investor’s legitimate expectations. 
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The second contribution to the existing body of knowledge is on the 
application of the principle of legitimate expectations. The thesis contributes 
three-tier approaches or steps in the application of investor’s legitimate 
expectations. The first tier requires investment treaty tribunals to ascertain the 
reasonability of investor’s legitimate expectations. The second tier requires 
the tribunals to determine the legitimacy of the expectations. While the third 
tier requires the tribunal to balance the competing interests brought before the 
tribunal. Thus, the three tiered approach resides in the acronym of “ADB”. 
Meaning, Ascertain, determine, and balance between the protection of 
investor’s legitimate expectations on one hand, and allowing public interest 
policy dimension to override the legitimate expectations on the other hand.  
 
The third contribution to the existing body of knowledge is the three-tier 
approach, and justification/theoretical justification provided by this research.  
In chapter VI, two sets of justifications were provided for balancing between 
investor’s legitimate expectations and State’s legitimate regulatory and 
administrative functions. 
 
Lastly, though discovered in Chapter II, the thesis provided two sets of 
contributions in the refinement of the doctrine of margin of appreciation. The 
first contribution is the identification of the dual functional elements of the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation namely, deference and proportionality.803 
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The second contribution is on the theoretical basis of the doctrine.804 In 
chapter II, the analytical framework has been theorised into three levels of 
theory consisting of practical theory, pure theory, and transcendental theory. 
 
Conclusion and Further Research: 
The ubiquitous reference to investor’s legitimate expectations in investment 
treaty arbitration is one of the fundamental reasons why an exclusive study 
and research of the principle is regarded as paramount. The research reveals 
that the application of the principle of legitimate expectations is not limited to 
investment treaty arbitration. Other international courts and tribunals have all 
either directly or indirectly applied the principle accordingly. Indeed, the 
omnipresence of the principle in the generality of international law corpus 
leaves little doubt that such pervasive principle must have either been 
recognised as a general principle of law or is near recognition given its 
significance role in the supranational adjudication and arbitration . 
 
However, there are areas identified for further research. One of such lurking 
areas worth exploring is how the conception of legitimate expectations 
pursuant to right to property could illuminate the notion of investment under 
ICSID in particular, and general international investment law. This aspect 
have not been explored in this thesis due to the absence of direct relationship 
between the standards of treatment under investment treaties and notion of 
investment which appear to simply define what investment is and what its 
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not. Therefore, this aspect is left for another research (possibly at a post-
doctorate level). The second area for further research is regarding the cost 
allocation of justified violations of investor’s legitimate expectations. In other 
words, the thesis does not attempt to provide an answer as to who should 
bear the cost of change of laws or policies. Thirdly, discussion regarding the 
appropriate compensation in the event of violation of investor’s legitimate 
expectations is also outside the purview of this research. Thus, such analysis 
is left for further research. Lastly, another area not covered by this thesis and 
clearly left for further research is the determination of legitimate expectations 
and balancing that exist in other areas of International law not covered by this 
thesis. Such areas include the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Both 
the ITLOS and ICC jurisprudence have not been analysed due to the word 
limitation of the thesis  and also time and space constraints. Indeed, their 
existence is acknowledged and can be examined at a further level of research 
or by future researchers in the area. 
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